

F B I

Date: 12/19/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS - C

On 12/12/63 CG 5824-S* advised he was in receipt of a pamphlet entitled, "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism, Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," issued by the Foreign Language Press, Peking. He noted that for a number of years he had been receiving from the CP of China mailings of a similar nature and that the CP of China had always mailed such material to him at the following drop address:

JOHN SCHOLDERS
c/o Modern Book Store
56 East Chicago Avenue
Chicago 11, Illinois
USA

The source noted that this was the address he had furnished to representatives of the International Department, CP of China, a number of years ago during the course of a visit to the Peoples Republic of China.

In regard to the above, CG 5824-S* stated that what he desired to point out here to the Bureau was that the latest item he received, while mailed to the SCHOLDERS' address, had not been like the others which had previously been mailed from Peking, Peoples Republic of China. This particular item had

③-Bureau (RM) ENCLOSURE
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago
RWH:MDW

REC 33

100-428091-3511

(5)

Approved: *m9/ky*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

35 JAN 7 1964

12-24-63-105100

CG 134-46 Sub B

been mailed from Great Britain and bore a London, England address. From this he felt it must be concluded that the CP of China apparently had set up new mailing facilities in Great Britain or perhaps had hired some individual or organization to mail such material for them. Since this material originated in Great Britain instead of the Peoples Republic of China, such material naturally would not come under the inspection or reception by either U.S. Customs or postal officials as would be the case with printed matter originating in socialist countries. Thus, there would be apparently in the view of the CP of China a better chance of such material getting to its recipient. It was further noted that if this was the situation existing with him, the CP of China is undoubtedly now mailing to other individuals in the U.S. CP of China material via the same channel. He felt it was desirable to call this information to the Bureau's attention to show the extent to which the CP of China will go in order to disseminate its material.

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TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS - C

In accordance with Bureau instructions set forth in Bureau airtel dated 5/14/63 captioned as above, there are enclosed herewith for the Bureau the original and three copies of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Communist Party of Chile." One copy of the above is also enclosed for New York.

The information appearing in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/10/63 to SAS WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN.

Information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was developed through conversation with ZENICK WAGNER held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, 11/28/63.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" since it sets forth information furnished by CG 5824-S*, a most highly placed sensitive source who is furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement, the disclosure of which would tend to identify this source and thus adversely affect the national defense interest.

- ③-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

RWH:MDW
(5)

REC 33

DEC 26 1963

Approved: *[Signature]*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

INT. SEC.

CG 134-46 Sub B

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as having been made at Washington, D.C., in order to further protect this source.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C.
December 19, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE

In mid-December, 1963, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During conversation with Zenick ^{Wagner}, International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CP of CZ) representative in charge of relations with Latin American Communist Parties, held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in late November, 1963, this individual noted that he had recently traveled to Chile and in connection with this visit had the following observations:

In Chile there is an intensive election campaign presently going on and the Communist Party of Chile is having a tough time. While the Communist Party plays an important role in the coalition party, the Popular Action Front (FRAP), and although the FRAP may win the election, the Christian Democratic Party is making gains. He then noted that the big problem in Chile in regard to the Christian Democratic Party is that it has been using tactics and demands similar to those being projected by the Communist Party and the FRAP. This bourgeois party in Chile is even documenting their demands in order to show that they can do a better job than either the Communist Party or FRAP. They have also come out for peace but refuse to attack the United States; however, they say openly they will fight the United States if the United States begins to act like an imperialist power.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Group 1
excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Christian Democratic Party has even gone so far as to quote the Communist Party of China in order to show that the Communist Party of Chile is opportunistic.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

December 18, 1963

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

ALEKSEY M. KOLOBASHKIN
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - SMUN

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Ryan

SYNOPSIS:

Kolobashkin, an identified KGB (Committee of State Security) employee, has requested NY 694-S* to furnish him the names of 3 individuals to work with the Soviets. We propose NY 694-S* furnish Kolobashkin the identity of an individual within our control but to protect the security of NY 694-S* from any eventuality, a "cut out" will be used. New York will brief [redacted] regarding the background of [redacted] in the event of an inquiry by a Communist Party (CP) representative. Thereafter, NY 694-S* at our instructions, will obtain the identity of [redacted] from [redacted] and will refer the name to Kolobashkin as an individual who had been recommended by "a reliable source." NY 694-S*, to further protect and enlarge the operation, will also furnish Kolobashkin the name of a "legitimate" recruit, which name informant will request from Lem Harris or some other CP member within the informant's apparatus. Thus, we will have complete control of one likely Soviet recruit and knowledge of the identity of a second possible recruit.

DETAILS:

Recently Aleksey M. Kolobashkin, 3rd Secretary, Soviet Mission to the United Nations, an identified KGB employee who is the Soviet contact of NY 694-S*, requested the latter to furnish him the identities of 3 progressive Americans not associated with the CP to "work with us (Soviets)." This request presents a unique opportunity for us to refer individuals within our control to the Soviets for espionage assignments but such an operation must be most circumspect to avoid any possibility of compromise of NY 694-S*, an informant of exceptional value who operates as a CP apparatus man in a liaison capacity between the Communist Party, USA, leadership and the Soviets.

105-73927

100-428091

Enc.

DR:bge (8)

64 DEC 30 1963

DUPLICATE YELLOW

100-428091-
NOT RECORDED
98 DEC 20 1963

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: ALEXSEY H. KOLOBASHKIN

SOLO
105-76027
100-428601

New York has recommended [redacted] as a "recruit" to be referred to the Soviets. [redacted] is exceptionally intelligent and stable and has cooperated with the New York Office since [redacted]. His background is such as to make him attractive to the Soviets as a recruit for espionage assignments. New York proposes to brief and to make known to [redacted] that the CP is seeking an individual with his qualifications. At the same time, [redacted] (an informant of lesser value to the New York Office who has been periodically contacted by NY 694-S*) will be furnished background on [redacted] to enable him to intelligently recommend the latter when he is subsequently contacted by NY 694-S*. [redacted] will advise NY 694-S* he is not personally acquainted with [redacted] but knew of him through "reliable sources." NY 694-S* will not press [redacted] regarding the "reliable sources" and he, in turn, will advise Kolobashkin of the identity of [redacted] determined by him through "a reliable source." Kolobashkin has never questioned NY 694-S* regarding the informant's "apparatus" and it is not likely he would question NY 694-S* regarding informant's sources. In this manner, [redacted] will have no occasion to know either NY 694-S* or [redacted] nor will [redacted] have knowledge of the Bureau's relationship with NY 694-S* or [redacted]. If [redacted] were subsequently suspected by the Soviets, [redacted] as the "cut out" would be the logical scapegoat, thereby protecting the security and future effectiveness of NY 694-S*.

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To further protect and enlarge this plan, it is proposed NY 694-S* request Len Harris (trusted CP member and associate of NY 694-S* in Party financial matters) to furnish him the identity of a "legitimate" individual to be referred to the Soviets. Although such an individual would not be as valuable as a Bureau-controlled recruit of the Soviets, we would have the advantage of knowledge of a likely Soviet agent whom we could cover through established sources and special investigation where warranted.

Kolobashkin has requested 3 names from NY 694-S*. At this time, we believe he should only be furnished the names of a Bureau-controlled "recruit" and of a "legitimate"

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: ALEKSEY N. HOLOBASHKIN

SOLO
105-73927
100-428601

recruit. We will instruct New York to be alert for another individual who may be referred to the Soviets but before instituting a third referral, we will carefully analyze the preliminary effectiveness of the operation.

It is anticipated the referral of our source and the "legitimate" recruit to the Soviets will be effected early in January, 1964, when NY 694-S* is next scheduled to meet with Holobashkin. This operation will be carefully followed and analyzed to insure maximum results consistent with the basic consideration, which is the protection of NY 694-S*.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached airtel be forwarded authorizing New York to initiate the operation outlined above by having NY 694-S* refer to the Soviets a Bureau-controlled individual and a "legitimate" recruit for possible espionage assignment. New York will be cautioned to insure the security of NY 694-S* is protected and will be instructed to submit their recommendations as to a third Bureau-controlled individual who may be considered for future referral to the Soviets.

December 18, 1963

Airtel

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Ryan

To: SAC, New York (105-36402) (100-184637)

From: Director, FBI (105-70227) (100-428091)

ALEXSEY M. KOLOBASHIKIN
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - SMON

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ReNYlet 12/12/63 outlining a plan to have NY 694-S* comply with the request of his Soviet contact by referring to the Soviets names of individuals to work with the Russians.

You are authorized to immediately initiate the referral of [redacted] to the Soviets utilizing [redacted] as a cut out in the manner outlined in relet. Bear in mind that the prime consideration in this operation is the security of NY 694-S* and insure each phase of your plan is coordinated and executed to preclude the possibility of compromise of this most valuable informant.

Also, NY 694-S* should promptly request Lem Harris to recommend one or several "legitimate" recruits for use in this operation. In the event Harris is unavailable or refuses to make such a recommendation, informant should seek the identity of such an individual from another of his close contacts.

This operation must be carefully followed and analyzed and the Bureau advised of all pertinent developments by the most expeditious means warranted. At the earliest possible date you should submit to the Bureau the identity of a third possible Bureau-controlled candidate for referral to the Soviets.

NOTE: See memo Baumgardner to Sullivan, 12/18/63, same caption, DR:bgc.

DR:bgc (11)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

64 DEC 30 1963

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-70227-64

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-78927)
(100-428091)

12/12/63

SAC, NEW YORK (105-36402)
(100-134637)

ALEKSEY M. KOLOBASHKIN
IS-R - SMUN

SOLO
IS-C

ReBulet, dated 11/29/63, suggesting methods whereby NY 694-S* could furnish to the Soviets, without jeopardizing his own security, the names of individuals to be employed in the Soviet apparatus.

Re also NY airtel, dated 12/7/63, captioned, "SOLO; IS-C", reflecting on page 3, that ALEKSEY KOLOBASHKIN, on 12/6/63, inquired whether NY 694-S* could furnish him yet with the names of the "three young people" to work with the Soviets, and he expressed the desire that NY 694-S* "handle this soon."

The NYO agrees with the Bureau that, to insure the security of the informant, "cut-outs" should be used to recruit individuals for referral to the Soviets. In this regard, following the telephone conference on 11/19/63, between Mr. FRED BAUMGARDNER of the Bureau and Assistant Special Agent in Charge DONALD E. RONEY of the NYO, mentioned in reBulet, the NYO, pursuant to Mr. BAUMGARDNER's suggestion, questioned NY 694-S* concerning whom among his CP contacts he would consider approaching as "cut-outs" in this operation. The informant advised that he would prefer to contact LEM HARRIS, the latter being the most reliable for this kind of assignment.

3 - Bureau (105-78927) (RM)

(1 - 100-428091)

1 - NY 134-91 (ADM) (41)

1 - [redacted] (ADM) [redacted] (41)

1 - NY 100-134637

1 - NY 105-36402

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ALB:mm1
(7)

100-428091-
NOT RECORDED
98 DEC 16 1963

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-428091-64

NY 100-134637
105-36402

The NYO considers excellent the Bureau suggestions with respect to placing in contact with the "cut-out" the recommended recruit [redacted]. Since, however, KOLOBASHKIN on 12/6/63, stated that he wanted the informant to "handle this soon," and since the informant's failure to do so could result very likely in the Soviets' taking the matter out of the informant's hands, it seems that the Bureau cannot afford to engage in a time-consuming operation to effect contact between the recruit and a "cut-out".

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In view of the emergency nature of the situation, the NYO suggests the following with respect to [redacted]

That, as the Bureau suggested, [redacted] be used as a "cut-out" in this operation; that, without furnishing [redacted] with details of the nature of the operation, the latter be informed that it is known that the CP is looking for an individual with certain qualifications, including non-membership in the Communist Party; that the Party has noted that [redacted] contacts are outside the Party and that he very possibly could be of assistance in suggesting a desirable individual; that very likely either NY 694-S* or LEM HARRIS or some other CP functionary known to [redacted] may contact him in this regard in the immediate future; that if such person do [redacted] after considerable deliberation, suggest [redacted]

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In accordance with this plan, NY 694-S* could contact [redacted] who would be furnished previously with a documentation of [redacted] sufficient for [redacted] to intelligently discuss [redacted] with NY 694-S*. NY 694-S*, of course, would not ask any questions of [redacted] except those that [redacted] would be prepared to answer. Lest [redacted] be concerned about NY 694-S*' subsequently questioning [redacted] about the latter's acquaintance with [redacted] [redacted] could tell NY 694-S* that he and [redacted] were not personally acquainted, but that [redacted] knew of [redacted] through "reliable sources." NY 694-S* would not press [redacted] regarding these "reliable sources." and could indicate that it was understandable that [redacted] for his own security, would not wish to involve his contacts in this matter.

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NY 100-134637
105-36402

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[redacted] in accordance with this plan.
would have no occasion to know either [redacted] or
NY 694-S*.

When submitting [redacted] name to KOLOBASHKIN
NY 694-S* could inform KOLOBASHKIN that he did not know
[redacted] but that the latter had been recommended by a
"reliable source." Since the Soviets respect the need for
secrecy in such operations and since in the past they have
never asked specific questions regarding the informant's
"apparatus," it is not likely that KOLOBASHKIN would question
NY 694-S* about the source of the latter's information
regarding [redacted]

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The NYO also is in accord with the Bureau's
suggestion that the name of one "legitimate" recruit be
submitted to the Soviets. In this regard, it is suggested
that NY 694-S* request LEM HARRIS to furnish him the name
of a potential recruit for the Soviets.

For the information of the Bureau, NY 694-S*, on
12/12/63, advised, that in his opinion, KOLOBASHKIN would
expect him to furnish the names of potential recruits at
the next meeting of KOLOBASHKIN and the informant, which is
scheduled for 1/6/64.

The NYO is of the opinion that initially only
two names should be submitted by NY 694-S* to KOLOBASHKIN,
one of a "legitimate" recruit, and the other of a Bureau-
controlled recruit. In the event that, as a result of
Soviet investigation, the Bureau-controlled recruit should
become suspect, NY 694-S* position would not be jeopardized
to the extent that it would be if two out of three recruits
should become suspect.

The NYO believes that, should the Bureau approve
the plan suggested above, subsequent discussion with
NY 694-S* would result in specific refinements with respect
to execution of said plan.

F B I

Date: 12/19/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS - C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are three copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement captioned, "Meeting with Representative of Security Department, Intelligence Division, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, November, 1963."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/3, 9-11/63 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN.

100-428091-3513
 ③-Bureau (Enc. 3) (RM)
 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
 1-Chicago

RWH:MDW
 (5)

REC 33

100-428091-3513

22 DEC 26 1963

Approved: *[Signature]*

Sent _____

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Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

65 JAN 7 1964 1-7-64-408

**MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVE OF SECURITY DEPARTMENT,
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, NOVEMBER,
1963**

X LUKIANOV

During the week of November 18, 1963, an individual identified only as "Paul," who is, in fact, actually Pavel Lukianov of the Security Department, Intelligence Division, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), contacted Morris Childs, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), representative who was then in Moscow, USSR. This meeting took place in Childs' suite in the Central Committee, CPSU apartment building in Moscow. Arrangements for the meeting had been set up by the North and South American Section of the International Department, Central Committee, CPSU, in order that Childs and a representative of the Security Department would have an opportunity to raise any existing problem or offer suggestions regarding the apparatus which has been set up to serve the CPSU and the CP, USA in the United States.

The meeting which took place was cordial but quite brief. Lukianov opened by noting that they were very happy with the work being performed by Jack Childs in New York City and he stated that they "had nothing but praise for his work." Morris Childs then noted that Jack Childs had asked that he advise the Russians that if the quality of his work in connection with certain matters was on occasions bad, this must be entirely attributed to the technical equipment which had been made available to him. Therefore, if there was any desire on the part of the Russians to improve the technical quality of such work, the Russians should consider sending Jack Childs any new equipment available which they might now possess or any information as to how he could secure such equipment in the United States. In this connection, Lukianov noted that apparently Jack Childs had the latest technical equipment available and they had nothing new to supply or recommend to him.

Morris Childs then raised with Lukianov a complaint regarding the method which had been used to transmit to the CP, USA last September the contents of a confidential letter from the CPSU. Childs noted that in this particular case the contents of the letter had been placed on tape and from this tape Jack Childs was expected, on one hearing, to make sufficient

100-428091-
ENCLOSURE

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notes from which he could convey the full text to the American Party. To complicate matters, the meeting at which they arranged for Jack Childs to hear this tape was set up in a public place which made the entire situation much more difficult and almost impossible. Morris Childs remarked that it was only because he had actually seen this confidential letter and made some notes from it personally while previously in Moscow that it was possible for the Party to have the benefit of the full text of this letter. Childs stated it was ridiculous to have expected Jack Childs under the conditions he encountered at the time to have gotten the complete text.

In view of the foregoing, Childs suggested that some new different methods of meetings between Jack Childs and his Russian contact be set up in New York. He inquired as to why it could not be arranged to have such meetings set up in a motel or hotel room rather than in parks, subways, etc. If motels or hotels were used, it would be possible at certain times to sit down and talk matters over which cannot be done under the present setup. Lukianov agreed to raise this matter with his superiors and was also in agreement that some new arrangements had to be made concerning meetings in New York. Lukianov also agreed that in the future they would not attempt to put the content of such things as the confidential letter on tape but would instead consider the preparation of a document containing the summary or essence of such material which could be transmitted during personal contacts by microfilm or otherwise.

^{USA}
Childs then brought up for discussion a request of Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CP, USA, as to the possibility of the CPSU supplying the CP, USA with information concerning recently developed methods for detection of listening devices and other types of electronic devices and similar equipment which are utilized in connection with surveillances. Lukianov noted that they had nothing that could be sent to the CP, USA but that it might be advantageous for Childs to be briefed by an expert on the matter of electronic devices and their detection. He then suggested that on the following Monday or Tuesday, November 25 or 26, 1963, they could set up a couple of briefing sessions for him with an expert from this field who would demonstrate what was new and discuss with him the means for detection of electronic devices.

Childs also brought up the fact that Gus Hall had informed that he had recently discussed electronic listening devices with [redacted] from Chicago, an electronics expert,

and that Gus is now convinced that it is impossible to pick up sound waves through glass by electronic devices. Childs noted that he had told Hall that the Russians had demonstrated the feasibility of such a technique when he was in the Soviet Union a year ago but Hall was not convinced and wanted it verified again. Lukianov in response noted that this could be done and that when the expert he previously mentioned came in, a demonstration in this connection could be arranged.

Lukianov next noted that in regard to the alternate channel of communication, that is the communication route through Mexico, it was still operative and the addresses remained valid.

In regard to Vladimir ^{Russia} Barkovsky, Lukianov noted that on this individual's return to the Soviet Union he had become ill and indicated that he may be sick once again. He remarked that he had been having a hard time since his return and by implication gave the impression that they might be holding him partially responsible for some of the arrests in the New York area.

Upon terminating this brief meeting, Lukianov indicated he would see Childs again when they would meet for the discussion on electronic devices. At this point, Childs, since Lukianov had always expressed an interest in new gadgets or gimmicks, gave that individual a pack of stainless steel razor blades which are now in common use in the United States.

Although Lukianov had suggested at the above meeting that there would be some follow-up briefing sessions on the following Monday or Tuesday dealing with the topic of electronic devices and also indicated he would see Childs again at that time, such meetings never did occur. According to a representative of the International Department, Central Committee, CPSU, these meetings had been canceled because of the turmoil resulting from the intervening assassination of President John F. Kennedy in the United States and a need to reassess the direction of the Party's activity. The representative of the International Department stated that for the time being they must be most cautious and discreet in any matters involving the CP, USA.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2011

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Baumgardner
1 - R. W. Smith
1 - Liaison
1 - Shaw

December 24, 1963

BY LIAISON

51
(Solo)

Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rusk:

The following information was supplied in December, 1963, by sources which have furnished reliable information in the past.

According to an official of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the domestic situation in Czechoslovakia is greatly improved. Millions of dollars' worth of consumer goods have been purchased and stores are now completely stocked with these goods. As a result, there are no longer "lines or queues" outside stores as has been the case in the past.

The above official stated, however, that the political situation is a "mess." He described the bureaucracy in the Government as "gigantic," but indicated that steps were being taken to improve this situation. He stated that the Party leadership is "cleaning house" and bringing new people into the leadership.

In regard to Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia, the above mentioned Czech official stated that Novotny's position is not too secure and he is, in effect, on probation.

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Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

100-428091

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGS:kmj

(8)

51
65 JAN 21 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~EX-100~~
~~TOP SECRET~~
Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

REC 33

22 DEC 26 1963

DEC 31 3 54 PM '63

REC'D-READING ROOM

Dec 24 11 09 AM '63

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Dean Rusk

In regard to the United States, the Czech official stated that efforts are being made to establish better relations with that country.

Because of the sensitive nature of our sources, we have classified this communication "~~Top Secret~~." This information is being furnished to other interested officials of the Government.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is CG 5824-S*, who is referred to in letter as "sources" in order to further protect his identity. See Chicago airtel 12/17/63 captioned "Solo, IS-C" with enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled "Comments of Representatives of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, on Domestic Situation in Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia." CG 5824-S* obtained this information while on Solo Mission 14 from (First name unknown) Chernik, Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2011

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Shaw

(IS) 100-428091

encl 5
Date: December 27, 1963
To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CHILE
0-160

The following information was supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the past.

100-428091-3515
According to an official of the Central Committee, Communist Party (CP) of Czechoslovakia, who recently visited Chile, the CP of Chile is having a difficult time in the election campaign presently taking place in Chile. The CP of Chile plays an important role in the coalition party, the Popular Action Front (FRAP), and although the FRAP may win the election, the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) is making gains. The Czech official noted that the big problem in Chile in regard to the CDP is that it has been using tactics and demands similar to those being projected by the CP and FRAP. The CDP is even documenting its demands in order to show that it can do a better job than either the CP or FRAP. Although the CDP is campaigning for peace, it has stated openly it will fight the United States if the United States begins to act like an imperialist power. The CDP has even gone so far as to quote the CP of China in order to show that the CP of Chile is opportunistic.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication "~~Top Secret~~."

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGS:kmj

(7)

1964

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

BY COURIER S/C
30 DEC 27
COMM-FBI

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REC-1

22 DEC 27 1963

WGS
100-428091-3515

~~TOP SECRET~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is CG 5824-S*, who obtained this data from Zenick Wagner during a confidential discussion held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on 11/28/63. See Chicago airtel 12/19/63, "Solo, IS-C," enclosing letterhead memorandum captioned "Communist Party of Chile." The Popular Action Front is a coalition party consisting mainly of elements of the Communist and Socialist Parties. It is commonly known as FRAP.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - DeLoach
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Baumgardner
- 1 - R. W. Smith
- 1 - Shaw

December 24, 1963

BY LIAISON

Honorable Walter W. Jenkins
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Jenkins:

The following information was supplied in
December, 1963, by sources which have furnished reliable
information in the past.

According to an official of the Central Committee,
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the domestic situation
in Czechoslovakia is greatly improved. Millions of dollars'
worth of consumer goods have been purchased and stores are
now completely stocked with these goods. As a result,
there are no longer "lines or queues" outside stores as
has been the case in the past.

The above official stated, however, that the
political situation is a "mess." He described the bureauc-
racy in the Government as "gigantic," but indicated that
steps were being taken to improve this situation. He stated
that the Party leadership is "cleaning house" and bringing
new people into the leadership.

In regard to Antonia Novotny, First Secretary of
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the
Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia, the above-mentioned
Czech official stated that Novotny's position is not too
secure and he is, in effect, on probation.

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100-428091

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGS:kmj
(8)

65 JAN 7 1964

TOP SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

22 DEC 27 1963

DEC 24 11 10 AM '63
REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Walter W. Jenkins

In regard to the United States, the Czech official stated that efforts are being made to establish better relations with that country.

Because of the sensitive nature of our sources, we have classified this communication "~~Top Secret~~."

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is CG 5824-S*, who is referred to in letter as "sources" in order to further protect his identity. See Chicago airtel 12/17/63 captioned "Solo, IS-C" with enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled "Comments of Representatives of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, on Domestic Situation in Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia." CG 5824-S* obtained this information while on Solo Mission 14 from (First name unknown) Chernik, Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

12/23/63

1 - Mr. Shaw

AIRTEL

To: SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091)


SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurairtel 12/16/63.

Referenced airtel discloses that CG 5824-S* has a copy of the book "Das Programm der KPd SU und der Westen" ("The Program of the CPSU and the West") which he will retain for a short period prior to presenting it to Peggy Dennis. Referenced airtel further discloses that in the event the Bureau desires the temporary use of this book, Chicago will forward it to the Bureau upon request.

The Bureau would like to review this book. It is requested that you forward same to the Bureau. You should indicate how long a period the Bureau will be able to retain this book before it is to be returned to CG 5824-S*.



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WGS:fjh

(4)

DEC 30 1963

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

REC-108

DEC 24 1963

100-428091-3517

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: December 10, 1963

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: **SOLO**
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Shaw

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This memorandum recommends forwarding attached letter to the Honorable Walter W. Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, setting forth an evaluation of President Johnson for the Soviets by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA).

It is recalled that by letter 11/29/63 to Jenkins we supplied information received by NY 694-S* 11/25/63 that Hall had taken steps to have Calvin Benham (Beanie) Baldwin contacted for the purpose of having Baldwin provide a personal and political evaluation of the President.

On 12/6/63 NY 694-S* furnished our New York Office a document dated 12/5/63 which he had received from Hall for transmittal 12/6/63 to the Soviets. Among other things, this document set forth Hall's evaluation of President Johnson as follows. The CPUSA does have some basis of judging the possible course of this Administration although much about United States politics is unpredictable. It is "our" view that Johnson has been in that section of "our" political spectrum that takes a more sane view of the relationship of world forces and will reflect this in his policies and attitudes. It is also "our" feeling that he may be even more responsive to the movements, pressures and moods of the masses than was Kennedy. Johnson is a man more moved towards the solution of the immediate problems and has less of an eye for history and long-range viewpoints. He has a much broader viewpoint of political struggles than Truman because Truman had the mentality and outlook of a village political hack. Johnson has throughout the years retained a close personal friendship with many of the old New Deal core like Beanie Baldwin and Aubrey Williams and this may have some significance in the coming period of the Administration.

Johnson will continue in the direction of the policies of the Kennedy administration. Johnson may try to utilize the newness of his Administration to get around some difficulties and binds into which the Kennedy administration had worked itself.

"We" are proceeding on the premise that this Administration, while representing American capitalism and imperialist interests, can be influenced by mass struggles and mass movements.

Enc. sent 12-10-63
100-428091
LTG:kmj

REC-52 100-428091-3518

22 DEC 27 1963

65 JAN 10 1964

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

On 12/4/63 Hall advised NY 694-S* that in connection with "a broad electoral effort for 1964," Hall intends to give an individual in the Democratic Party the sum of \$3,000 as a down payment for this person's working full time in the Democratic Party in 1964. Hall made no mention of this individual by name. It is possible that Baldwin could be the individual to whom Hall has reference as regards working within the Democratic Party and New Haven has been instructed to advise whether any information is available indicating that Baldwin might be said individual. This matter will be followed closely.

BEARIE BALDWIN
ALVIN BALDWIN Baldwin was employed by the Department of Agriculture and Foreign Economic Administration from 5/23/33 to 4/11/44, at which time he resigned to enter private business. He was formerly Executive Secretary of the Progressive Party and campaign manager for Henry Wallace in the 1948 presidential campaign. He is reported as having been a member of the CPUSA in the 1940's, as well as having been a member of or associated with communist front organizations in the 1940's and 1950's. In late 1962* he was placed on the pay roll of the Party in view of his important contacts with "liberal and progressive people." His job was to mold various "political alliances" designed to influence the direction of foreign policy in the United States and the Party considered that to be the most important activity it had undertaken in some time. *according to Gus Hall

Calvin B. Baldwin, Jr., is an Executive Officer, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health, Education and Welfare. A full-field Security of Government Employees (SGE) investigation was conducted on him in 1951 based on his father's connection with numerous Communist Party front organizations. Civil Service Commission advised in 1952 that he was "eligible on loyalty" and "retained." A supplemental SGE investigation on Baldwin, Jr., is currently being conducted.

Between 1933 and 1943 Aubrey Willis Williams was employed by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Works Progress Administration and the National Youth Administration. Williams is President Emeritus of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Incorporated (SCEF), the successor organization of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare which was cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activities as a communist front. SCEF is an interracial group in the South composed of communists and noncommunists. It is currently under investigation as a suspected communist front. Williams has been associated with a number of communist fronts in the past.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be forwarded to the Honorable Walter W. Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President.

J. W. Jenkins
W. W. Jenkins

J. W. Jenkins

J. W. Jenkins

J. W. Jenkins

J. W. Jenkins

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2011

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Kleinkauf
1 - Mr. Shaw

(IS) 100-423091

Date: December 18, 1963

To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: ~~INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE~~
VIENNA, AUSTRIA
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

0
Solo

The following information was supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the past.

Nisha Altman, a former member of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), from Hollywood, California, who is currently associated with the International Institute for Peace (IIP) in Vienna, Austria, recently forwarded to the CPUSA for review a document he had prepared entitled "Memorandum on Some Problems of Work at the International Institute for Peace." There is set forth below a summary of Altman's memorandum.

It is unfortunate that the enthusiasm generated at the Moscow Peace Congress held in July, 1963, was not used to the fullest possible extent to stimulate further activities in the post-Congress period. Since the July Congress, the IIP has not projected activities that correspond to the scope of the growing sentiment for peace. This is mainly due to the absence of real democracy within the IIP and of any objective evaluation of divergent opinions. Political collaborators are presented with ready-made solutions of problems connected with their specific region before they are examined collectively. The absence of democratic procedure is a demoralizing factor in the work of the IIP. A thorough change in the atmosphere of the IIP is needed to bring it up to its full ability of discharging its responsibilities and of taking advantage of existing potentialities.

OK

Q

BY COURIER SVC.

21 DEC 20

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WGS:erc
(8)

~~TOP SECRET~~

(SEE NOTE PAGE FOUR)

100-423091-3519

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

22 DEC 27 1963

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

Altman indicated that the following suggestions, if acted upon, would serve to stimulate the IIP's activities.

Peace Organizations

In every country outside the "socialist camp" there is a great mushrooming of a variety of peace organizations. By exploring the possibilities of some joint or parallel activities the IIP could broaden its direct contacts in many countries, especially the United States. An exchange of ideas with these organizations would influence their pattern of thinking and at the same time establish the IIP as an organization actively interested in each and every problem related to peace. The reservations existing in the minds of many sincere peace-concerned people regarding the IIP make it imperative that the IIP demonstrate in practice its willingness to participate in every valid sphere of peace activity.

Negro Movement in the United States

The American Negro movement has accepted the principle that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. The growing consciousness of his African heritage makes the American Negro a natural ally of the African liberation movement. In order to take advantage of this situation, the IIP should publish a series of reports on Africa bringing into focus the interdependence of their welfare and progress with disarmament and peace. Thereafter, the IIP should get these reports into the hands of organizations in the United States where they can do the most good.

Labor

Organized labor's involvement in the peace movement in the United States would be decisive in influencing United States foreign policy. The IIP must endeavor to involve American workers and their unions in a free exchange of opinions and ideas. The reduction of international tension produced by the test-ban agreement gives the IIP an opportunity to undertake bold steps in this direction. Small meetings of

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~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

second echelon union officials organized by the IIP would demonstrate that it is sincerely occupied with the problems of labor and is not using these problems as a camouflage for some ulterior motive.

Latin America and the United States

More and more Americans are becoming aware of the dreadful conditions existing in all of Latin America. The IIP must seek the cooperation of peoples of North and South America who can make a valuable contribution to the success of Latin America's struggle against American imperialism. The most valuable argument in favor of such cooperation should be sent to peace committees in Latin America. Material from the IIP should also be sent to peace groups in the United States which are most likely to be interested in the problems of Latin America. It should show the existing conditions in Latin America and point out how these conditions endanger peace, using Cuba as a clear example.

Culture and Peace

The invaluable role of culture is well recorded by past history as a powerful medium for evoking in man an abhorrence of destruction. Several cultural programs for peace were submitted to the IIP over the past two years but were not adopted mainly by reason of the lack of finances. Three of the many projects submitted included "Music for Peace," designed to bring a message of friendship into American homes without uttering a word that could be construed as propaganda for any particular government; "Berlin Now," a film providing a dramatic presentation of the dangers inherent in the Berlin problem; and "World with War Maps," designed to give peace workers a potent argument for disarmament and peace.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication "~~Top Secret~~."

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is CG 5324-S* who obtained this material in early December, 1963, while on Solo Mission 14. See Chicago airtel 12/9/63 captioned "Solo, IS - C," which enclosed a 39-page copy of Altman's memorandum.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOV.

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: December 20, 1963

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Mr. Shaw

SUBJECT: SOLO
 INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

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 Rosen _____
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I thought you would be interested in learning that the Soviets "ran for cover" when CG 5824-S* endeavored to obtain information concerning former Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who was executed by the Soviets in April, 1963, for his alleged spying activities.

You will recall that CG 5824-S* was in the Soviet Union while on Solo Mission 14, 11/1/63 to 12/2/63. Prior to informant's departure on this mission he was given a target of attempting to determine whether Colonel Penkovsky in fact was tried; whether the trial was a hoax, and whether or not he may still be alive. Informant advised that during his confidential discussion with Soviet officials he had raised the matter of Colonel Penkovsky, but at the mere mention of his name, "they all ran for cover." Informant noted that Soviet officials and citizens alike denounce Penkovsky and have stated that they cannot understand such an action in view of the fact that he was a native-born Russian. Among the officials, this is a subject which they do not wish to discuss in view of the fact there is a certain amount of fear involved in this matter. The Penkovsky case resulted in the removal of some persons in high places, mainly in the military and security forces, who had vouched for him.

ACTION:

For Information. Since informant was not successful in obtaining any pertinent information concerning Penkovsky no dissemination is being made.

100-428091
 WGS:icb
 (6)

REG-52

DEC 27 1963

65 JAN 7 1964

F44

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: December 23, 1963

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: **SOLO**
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

WOS

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Babington
Subject

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 12/23/63, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland on scheduled times and frequencies at which time a message was sent.

The plain text of the message is set forth below. The cipher text is attached.

NR 759 GR 28

IN ACCORDANCE WITH BIRCH'S (Gus Hall) REQUEST YOU WILL BE GIVEN THIRTY COLOUR PRINTS (\$30, 000) IN THE FIRST HALF OF JANUARY.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)

PWP
PWP:drv
(10)

REC-15

100-428091-352

DEC 27 1963

ENCLOSURE

74 JAN 2 - 1964

82782	64570	59191	93676	79327	47833	08413	17502	24339	68879
59110	83271	08301	56295	71477	51848	11424	54430	76736	05584
57136	29030	57174	98962	96818	47911	12464	64550		

100-428091-3521

ENCLOSURE

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2011

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - R. W. Smith
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Shaw

December 24, 1963

BY LIAISON

Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

The following information was supplied in December, 1963, by sources which have furnished reliable information in the past.

According to an official of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the domestic situation in Czechoslovakia is greatly improved. Millions of dollars' worth of consumer goods have been purchased and stores are now completely stocked with these goods. As a result, there are no longer "lines or queues" outside stores as has been the case in the past.

The above official stated, however, that the political situation is a "mess." He described the bureaucracy in the Government as "gigantic," but indicated that steps were being taken to improve this situation. He stated that the Party leadership is "cleaning house" and bringing new people into the leadership.

In regard to Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia, the above-mentioned Czech official stated that Novotny's position is not too secure and he is, in effect, on probation.

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100-428091

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGS:kml

(8)

65 JAN 7 1964

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

TOP SECRET
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

22 DEC 22 1963

Date 12-23-63

To

☒ Director

BU FILE # 100-428091

Att.

☐ SAC

Title CP, USA

☐ ASAC

INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

☐ Supv.

☐ Agent ReBulet to Legat, Paris, 12-11-59, re
Dissemination of Security-Type Information
SE to Foreign Agencies.

☐ CC

☐ Steno

☐ Clerk

ACTION DESIRED

☐ Acknowledge

☐ Assign.....Reassign.....

☐ Bring file

☐ Call me

☐ Correct

☐ Deadline.....

☐ Deadline passed

☐ Delinquent

☐ Discontinue

☐ Expedite

☐ File

☐ For information

☐ Initial & return

☐ Leads need attention

☐ Return with explanation or notation as to action taken.

☐ Open Case

☐ Prepare lead cards

☐ Prepare tickler

☐ Recharge serials

☐ Return assignment card

☐ Return file

☐ Return serials

☐ Search and return

☐ See me

☐ Send Serials.....

to

☐ Submit new charge-out

☐ Submit report by

☐ Type

On 12-23-63, the original and one copy of
LHM dated 12-19-63, at WDC, captioned "Norman Freed
forwarded with Bulet 12-19-63 in the captioned
matter, were furnished to [redacted]

XXX Legat, Ottawa

See reverse side

Office

b7D

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable John A. McCone

In regard to the United States, the Czech official stated that efforts are being made to establish better relations with that country.

Because of the sensitive nature of our sources, we have classified this communication "~~Top Secret~~." This information is being furnished to other interested officials of the Government.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is CG 5824-S*, who is referred to in letter as "sources" in order to further protect his identity. See Chicago airtel 12/17/63 captioned "Solo, IS-C" with enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled "Comments of Representatives of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, on Domestic Situation in Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia." CG 5824-S* obtained this information while on Solo Mission 14 from (First name unknown) Chernik, Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 12/16/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReNYairtel, 12/6/63, captioned, "SOLO; IS-C; ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY", which enclosed a letter of GUS HALL, CPUSA, General Secretary, dated 12/5/63, and NY airtel, 12/9/63, page 5 of which sets forth a message sent by GUS HALL regarding a suggested procedure for the organization of a delegation of Negro leaders to visit the Soviet Union.

On 12/16/63, NY 694-S* received from the Soviets two ciphered-coded radio messages. The first message advises NY 694-S* that his Soviet contact desired to meet him at the "Armstrong" rendezvous on 12/17/63, at the usual time (6:00 p.m.). The message noted that the Soviets would then advise the informant of the opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding GUS HALL's letter of 12/5/63.

- 3 - BUREAU (100-428091) (RM)
- 1 - CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) (AM RM) REG 35
- 1 - NY 134-91 (Inv) (41)
- 1 - NY 100-84994 (GUS HALL) (414)
- 1 - NY 105-36402 (ALEKSEI KOLOBASHKIN) (341)
- 1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

WGC:mfd (#41)
(9)

Approved: *[Signature]*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

ROUTED IN ENVELOPE

[Handwritten notes and stamps]
100-428091-3523
30
6

[Vertical handwritten notes]
100-428091-3523
30
6

NY 100-134637

The second message, which was addressed to GUS HALL, is set forth in plain text form as follows:

"Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations is sending to Rev. Galamison an invitation for seven persons. It is pointed in the invitation that the delegation will have a possibility to visit different places in the U.S.S.R. (not only in Uzbekistan) and to acquaint itself in detail with the life of the Soviet people. Please take into account that Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations which is instructed to receive the delegation may accept only seven persons as you were informed by us earlier. Our Washington Embassy have all instructions. In order to avoid any misunderstanding or complications with the meeting of the group, please inform us in advance of the date of its departure and its itinerary."

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPETO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WC*

DATE: 12/19/63

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Mr. Shaw

SUBJECT: SOLO
 INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Tolson _____
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I thought you would be interested in learning that Soviet officials have refused to acknowledge the presence in Moscow, Russia, of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster.

You will recall that the late Elizabeth Terrill Bentley, former Soviet espionage courier, identified Silvermaster as a Soviet agent who headed an underground espionage group of Government employees in the Washington, D. C. - New York City area in the late 1930's and early 1940's.

CG-5824-S*, while on Solo Mission 14 in the Soviet Union during November, 1963, learned that Silvermaster was visiting Moscow on a tourist visa. While in Moscow, Silvermaster attempted to arrange an appointment and hold some discussions with responsible officials in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). However, CPSU officials would not meet with him or even acknowledge his presence in Moscow. Silvermaster contacted Henry Winston, Vice-Chairman, Communist Party, USA, who is temporarily residing in Moscow, for the purpose of having Winston utilize his influence in arranging a meeting for him with CPSU officials. Winston attempted to arrange such a meeting but met with no success. Winston was unable to understand how a man like Silvermaster who had devoted much of his life to the Communist Party could not even see a CPSU official when visiting Moscow.

CG 5824-S* was of the opinion that the action of CPSU officials in refusing to meet with Silvermaster was part of the Soviets' total effort not to take any action which might jeopardize the continuing development of better relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

OBSERVATION:

REC 33

100-428091-3524

We have previously advised the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency of the fact that Silvermaster was scheduled to visit the Soviet Union.

Enc. *per 12-21-63*

100-428091

WGS:erc

65 JAN 7 1964

DEC 30 1963

Handwritten signatures and initials
 5-*Handwritten*

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter containing information concerning the refusal of Soviet officials to meet with Silvermaster be sent to Newark, which is office of origin in the Silvermaster case, for its information looking toward a possible interview of Silvermaster when he returns to the United States. *NEWARK IS TO SUBMIT ITS RECOMMENDATIONS.*

That the attached letter to Department of State with copy to the Central Intelligence Agency go forward to advise those agencies of the fact that Silvermaster was known to have been in Moscow during November, 1963. We are not disseminating information re Silvermaster's activities in Moscow as to do so would jeopardize security of our informant.

F B I

Date: 12/23/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReNY airtel to Bureau, captioned as above, dated 12/9/63, reflecting on page four thereof that GUS HALL had sent a message to Moscow advising that circumstances compelled him to request that an emergency amount of \$50,000 be sent to the CPUSA before the first of the year.

On 12/23/63, NY 694-S* received, via radio from Moscow, a ciphered coded message, the plain text of which is as follows:

"In accordance with Gus Hall's request you will be given \$30,000 in the first half of January."

1-80866
3-Bureau (100-428091) (RM)
1 - Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (RM)
1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
1 - NY 100-134637

ACB:mm1
(7)

REC 33

100-428091-3525

30
1 DEC 24 1963

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

65 JAN 7 1964

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPETO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: December 24, 1963

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*SUBJECT: **SOLO**
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Tolson	✓
Belmont	✓
Mohr	
Casper	
Callahan	
Conrad	
Loach	✓
Evans	
Gale	
Rosen	
Sullivan	<i>WCS</i>
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Holmes	
Gandy	

This is to advise of contact made by CG 5824-S* with the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, Russia, during Solo Mission 14. This contact resulted in the setting up of liaison between the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP)* through the Polish Consulate in Chicago, Illinois.

** a COMMUNIST-DOMINATED GROUP IN POLAND*

CG 5824-S*, in November, 1963, while in Moscow, had occasion to make contact with the Polish Embassy. He spoke with the First Secretary of the Embassy concerning liaison activities between the CPUSA and the PUWP. Informant pointed out that the PUWP representative who had been carrying on liaison activities with the CPUSA through the Polish Consulate in Chicago had recently been called back to Poland for reassignment. The First Secretary stated that this was correct and that this individual was presently assigned to the Foreign Ministry Office in Warsaw, Poland. Informant pointed out that the CPUSA was hesitant concerning who at the Consulate should now be contacted on Party matters. The First Secretary indicated that the new replacement in Chicago would be the proper person, and further agreed that Jack Kling, a functionary of the CPUSA Illinois District, would be a satisfactory person to carry on liaison activities at the Consulate.

ACTION:

For information. No dissemination is being made of this information since it pertains to the administration of the highly clandestine Solo apparatus controlled by our informant.

100-428091

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. R. W. Smith
- 1 - Mr. Shaw

WGS:kmj
(6)

65 JAN 7 1964

REC 33

100-428091-3526
22 DEC 30 1963

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 12/16/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS - C

In accordance with Bureau instructions set forth in Buairtel dated 5/14/63 captioned as above, there are enclosed herewith for the Bureau the original and three copies of a letterhead memorandum entitled "MISCHA ALTMAN." One copy of above is also enclosed for New York.

The information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/10/63 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN.

The information in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was obtained by the source during the period 11/20-22/63 in conversation with HENRY WINSTON, a Vice Chairman of the Communist Party, USA temporarily residing in Moscow, USSR.

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been classified "~~TOP SECRET~~" since it sets forth information furnished by CG 5824-S*, a most highly placed sensitive source who is furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement, the disclosure of which would tend to identify this source and thus adversely affect the national defense interest.

- ENCLOSURE
- 3 - Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1 - New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Chicago

WAB:b11
(5)

REC 33

100-428091-3527

22 DEC 30 1963

5/1068

Approved: _____

Sent _____

M

Per _____

65 JAN 7 1964

Special Agent in Charge

1/3/64-015

CG 134-46 Sub B

The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as having been made at Washington, D.C., in order to further protect this source.



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C.
December 16, 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

MISCHA ALTMAN

During December, 1963, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:

During November, 1963, Henry Winston, a Vice Chairman of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) temporarily residing in Moscow, USSR, furnished the following information:

Mischa Altman, a former member of the CPUSA, Hollywood, California, currently associated with the World Institute for Peace in Vienna, Austria, has been in correspondence with Henry Winston. According to Winston, Altman is doing good work in the peace movement, but no one in the United States is keeping him informed on developments in the peace movement in the United States. CZ 2244
PAGE 11
CPUSA

According to Winston, Altman had a heart attack, is now recovering, and at present he is unemployed. He has indicated to Winston that he wants some recognition for the work that he has done. Winston noted that Altman will be going home soon (presumably to the United States) and will meet Winston in Prague, Czechoslovakia, during December, 1963.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Group 1~~

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2011

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Shaw

OK (IS) 100-423001

Date: December 27, 1963
To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: CHINESE COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA MAILED
TO THE UNITED STATES

5040

The following information was supplied by a source who has furnished reliable information in the past.

Chinese Communist propaganda issued by the Foreign Language Press, Peking, China, which was formerly mailed to the United States directly from Peking, is currently being received in the United States bearing the postmark of London, England. The Chinese Communists have apparently set up mailing facilities in Great Britain in order that they can have a better chance of getting their propaganda to recipients in the United States.

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency

REC-50

100-427011-3528

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

19 DEC 27 1963

NOTE:

Classified "~~Confidential~~" because disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons would jeopardize the source, who is furnishing information on a top-level basis concerning the international communist movement. Source is CG 5824-S*. See Chicago airtel 12/19/63 "Solo,

NOTE CONTINUED
PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WGS:kmj
(7)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

BY COURIER SVC.
30 DEC 27
COMM-FBI

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

NOTE (Continued):

IS-C" which discloses that Chinese Communist propaganda being received from a drop operated by CG 5824-S* is now postmarked London, England, whereas this propaganda had formerly been mailed directly from Peking, China.

- 2 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
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Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
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Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: December 20, 1963

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT:

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

The attached memorandum, F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan dated 12-18-63, sets forth information concerning some of the administrative activities of CG 5824-S* while abroad on Solo Mission 14, 11-1-63 to 12-2-63, including informant's request of the Soviets that the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), be given the sum of \$1,295,000 to cover an expected deficit of that amount in its 1964 budget. The Director noted, "Have we sent Jenkins a memo on above?"

We have disseminated select items of an intelligence nature from Solo Mission 14 to the Honorable Walter W. Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President. Further, we included the information to which the Director referred in the brief which he used recently to talk to President Johnson. Normally, we do not disseminate details pertaining to the administration of this extremely clandestine Solo apparatus as it would jeopardize the security of this valuable operation. If the Director believes that we should go beyond what he said in his conversation with President Johnson to disseminate the referred to financial transaction to Mr. Jenkins, it is suggested that it may be well to have it done orally through Assistant Director DeLoach. However, if the present dissemination of the material is sufficient, no further action need be taken.

ACTION:

For the information of the Director.

Enc.

100-428091

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Shaw

REC-13

WGS:kmj:pwd
(5)

65 JAN 7 1964

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-3529
22 DEC 31 1963

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: December 18, 1963

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

 1-Mr. Belmont
 1-Mr. Sullivan
 1-Mr. Baumgardner
 1-Mr. Shaw

 SUBJECT: SOLO
 INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

 Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

This is to advise of some of the activities of CG 5824-S* while abroad on Solo Mission 14, 11-1-63 to 12-2-63, and in particular informant's request of the Soviets that the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), be given the sum of \$1,295,000 to cover an expected deficit of that amount in its 1964 budget.

London, England

Informant arrived in London on 11-2-63 and proceeded directly to the Czech Embassy to obtain his visa. The Embassy was closed, and it took considerable time before informant was able to attract the attention of some clerks inside the Embassy. However, Czech officials quickly came to the Embassy and issued a visa to informant. On departure from London on 11-4-63, informant noted that British Customs now on a regular basis checks departures from Great Britain in compliance with a new regulation which forbids the taking from the country an excess of 50 English pounds. This checking procedure caused informant some concern because it represented a dual checking by British authorities both on arrival and departure from the country.

Prague, Czechoslovakia

Informant arrived in Prague on 11-4-63 and was greeted by Czech officials, who discussed political matters in Czechoslovakia. Informant also had an occasion to contact Norman Freed, Canadian CP representative to the "World Marxist Review," theoretical organ of the international communist movement, who furnished details relating to difficulties existing on the staff of the "World Marxist Review."

Moscow, Russia

REC-13

ENCLOSURE

100-428091-3529

Informant was warmly greeted by Soviet officials upon his arrival in Moscow on 11-6-63. He was given lodging in a new apartment building erected by the Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), for the housing of special guests. At this location he was provided with an apartment containing a short-wave radio, a safe, library, television as well as full-time attendants.

 100-428091
 WGS:skw (5)

22 DEC 31 1963

5-12-64

Memorandum to W.C.Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

Shortly after his arrival, informant was told that he was to be a special guest at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU scheduled for that evening. However, due to his late arrival this would not be possible. (This meeting is one held annually on the eve of the November 7 celebration at which a main CPSU policy address is given.)

On the following day, informant was taken to Red Square to review a parade in celebration of the Russian revolution. It was arranged for the protection of informant that he be assigned to view the parade with a group of Soviet nationals a short distance from the reviewing stand occupied by Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Informant advised that the military portion of this parade was extremely brief, possibly not in excess of ten minutes. According to the Soviet official who accompanied informant, the only new military item displayed in the parade was an antimissile missile recently reported as having been developed by the Soviet military forces.

Request of Soviets Regarding Financial Assistance for the CPUSA

Informant prepared and presented to Soviet officials an 8-page document dealing with the request for financial assistance to the CPUSA. This document was addressed to Premier Khrushchev and the CPSU. It pointed out that the CPUSA was not squandering money and the amount being requested was carefully considered. It noted that the legal defense of the CPUSA; the planned establishment of a dailypaper; plans related to the forthcoming 1964 election; expanded work in the South; assistance to the CP of Puerto Rico; and other matters would require financial assistance to the CPUSA in the amount of \$1,295,000. It was noted that this sum represented only the deficit in the contemplated 1964 CPUSA budget. The document concluded with the comment "We, in the CPUSA, did not want to ask you for this but we have had to do it."

Soviet officials assured informant that this request would be given serious consideration, but no decision as to how much the CPSU would give the CPUSA could be made until after 12-15-63, which was the deadline by which all fraternal Parties were to submit financial requests. Informant was advised that the CPUSA would be advised through channels as soon as a decision was made on its request for financial aid.

Memorandum to W.C. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

Comment: The CPUSA requested \$1,000,000 from the Soviets for 1963, and to date has received \$577,600, which is the largest amount the CPUSA has received in any one year.

Informant then brought up the urgent need for the CPUSA to be given emergency funds of \$25,000 before the end of the year to cover defense expenditures. Informant was advised that this request would be approved and the \$25,000 sent to the CPUSA through channels within a very short time.

ACTION:

For information. Appropriate dissemination has been made of pertinent items relating to informant's mission.

USA
JWS
WCS
✓ Keyne
Have we sent
Gentkins a memo
on above?
4

December 26, 1963

1 - Mr. Shaw

Airtel

To: SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

From: Director, FBI (100-428091) 3530

SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Re New York airtel 12/23/63 (copy to Chicago)
which pertains to a documentary film made in the Soviet
Union on the life and death of William Z. Foster.

Reairtel discloses that CG 5824-S* viewed the
film on Foster while in the Soviet Union. On the occasion
of your next regular contact with CG 5824-S*, it is requested
that you obtain from informant all pertinent information per-
taining to the film. You should cover such items as length
of film; whether black and white or color; and whether the
Soviets are identified as the producers of the film. You
should also obtain informant's assessment of the film.

Reairtel also disclosed that Gus Hall had men-
tioned that he had seen this film and considered it "terrible."
You should also endeavor to ascertain from informant the
reason why Hall did not approve of it.

1 - New York (100-134637)

NOTE:

CG 5824-S* during his recent Solo Mission learned that
two copies of a documentary film prepared in 1961 by the Soviets
on the life and death of William Z. Foster, former CPUSA Chairman,
had been transmitted to the CPUSA. New York was instructed on
12/20/63 to determine from CG 5824-S* if informant could obtain
a copy of the film for perusal by the Bureau. Informant contacted

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

Tolson _____
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Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____


WGS:kmy

(5)

1964

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐



ALL INFORMATION ON THIS
PAGE IS CLASSIFIED
UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE

Airtel to Chicago
RE: SOLO
100-428091

NOTE (Continued):

Gus Hall, CPUSA General Secretary, in this regard but could obtain no information except that Hall mentioned he had seen the film and considered it "terrible." Informant mentioned since he had seen this film while in the Soviet Union he would have no reason now to request that the film be made available to him. Chicago is being instructed to ascertain from CG 5824-S* pertinent details relative to the film.

F B I

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-04-2012

Date: 12/23/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

Re telephone call on 12/20/63, from Mr. FRED BAUMGARDNER of the Bureau to ASAC DONALD E. RONEY of the NYO concerning the Bureau's interest in a documentary film made in the Soviet Union on the life and death of WILLIAM Z. FOSTER.

Re also Chicago airtel to Bureau, dated 12/17/63, captioned as above, advising that, according to CG 5824-S*, a copy of said film had been transmitted to the CPUSA from the Soviet Union in the late summer or early fall of 1963, by ROSE WEINSTOCK, and that a second copy also had been transmitted to the CPUSA, the time and circumstances of said transmittal being unknown to CG 5824-S*.

On 12/21/63, CG 5824-S*, who was in NYC on that date, advised SA ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON that he could furnish no further information regarding the aforesaid film except that GUS HALL had mentioned that he had seen this film and considered it "terrible."

- 3 - Bureau (100-428091) (RM) **REC-13**
1 - Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (RM)
1 - NY 66-6989
1 - NY 100-134637

ACB:mm1
(7)

Classified by _____
Declassify on: OADR

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

100-428091-1367-100

NY 100-134637

CG 5824-S* stated that he has no idea in whose possession the film now is. He said that, having viewed this film while in the Soviet Union, he would have no reason now to request that the film be made available to him, especially since it is known in the CPUSA that CG 5824-S* had viewed the film in the past.

At this time, CG 5824-S* stated, he can offer no constructive suggestion regarding how the film might be made available to the Bureau. He said he would be alert, however, to take advantage of any situation that may arise, as a result of which he may be able to make the film available to the Bureau.

NYO will also be alert to ascertain how the above-mentioned film may be made available to the Bureau.

ROUTE ENVELOPE

~~SECRET~~

1 -
1 - Mr. Shaw

b6
b7c

SAC, Los Angeles (100-21193)

December 30, 1963

Director, FBI (100-370750)

copy 51
JOHN HOWARD LAWSON
SECURITY MATTER - C

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE~~

Information has been recently received from CG 5824-S* indicating that the Soviets plan to publish a book of Clifford Odets, a United States author and playwright. Since Odets has severed his connections with the Communist Party (CP) and has been attacked as a "stool pigeon," the Soviets do not want to take any action without first receiving the approval of the CP, USA. Therefore, it was requested that this matter be taken up with John Howard Lawson. (S)

In view of the above, you should remain alert for any additional information indicating that Lawson has been contacted relative to this matter.

The above data received from CG 5824-S* is being furnished for your information and you are cautioned that extreme care must be exercised with respect to any dissemination of this data as the information, by its nature, tends to identify the informant. Unless this information is obtained from a source other than CG 5824-S*, it should not be included, even in paraphrased form, in the investigative section of a report. (S)

NOTE:

Classified by 9145UC2/actup
Declassify on: OADR 4-30-86
254,446

Subject on Security Index. He has been a leading CP member in the Cultural Section of the Party in Los Angeles for more than 20 years. He returned to this country in May, 1963, after a stay of approximately two years in the Soviet Union, where he reportedly wrote a book on the film industry for publication in the Soviet Union. [Shortly after his return to the United States, subject met with Gus Hall, CPUSA General Secretary, and gave Hall a complete report on his activities while in the Soviet Union. CG 5824-S* obtained information set forth in letter in mid-November, 1963, from Aleksei Grechukhin, an official of the CP of the Soviet Union. See Chicago airtel 12/12/63 captioned "Solo, IS-C."] (S)

60 JAN 2 1964
100-428091 (Solo)
WGS:kmj
(6)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

DUPLICATE YELLOW

[100-428091-] (S)
NOT RECORDED
126 DEC 31 1963
~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-370750-319

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

W. C. Sullivan

12/24/63

W. R. Wannall

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Sullivan
- 1 - Baumgardner
- 1 - Shaw
- 1 - Wannall
- 1 - Buehl

ANNA LOUISE STRONG
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA

CG 5824-S*, Bureau's highly placed informant, was advised by Boris N. Ponomarev, head of International Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Soviet Union, that subject who presently resides in Communist China may have been working on behalf of Chinese Communists against Soviets as early as 1940's.

Ponomarev prefaced following remarks to informant with "You'll never believe it!" Subject was formerly married to Soviet General Michael Borodin who in 1923 was sent by Lenin to help SUN Yat-sen organize a Chinese government. Borodin and Strong had a son who resided in Moscow under name Borodin. Soviets were unaware of identity of young Borodin's mother. He subsequently became a colonel in Soviet Secret Police. Upon orders of Stalin, subject was deported from USSR in 1940's and thereafter, Soviets discovered she maintained secret apartment in Moscow which she shared with her son. A number of diaries were discovered which disclosed subject's son was responsible for subject obtaining numerous visas enabling her to travel in and out of USSR. Stalin ordered subject's son, Colonel Borodin, executed.

Ponomarev was intrigued by subject's diary which in the 1940's predicted as inevitable the current Sino-Soviet split. Ponomarev speculated possibly subject was involved in Chinese espionage for more than twenty years.

- 1 - Shaw
- 1 - Wannall

Anna Louise Strong, a Security Index subject is presently 78 years of age. She resides in Communist China and is a prolific writer of pro-Chinese Communist propaganda. She has stated her intention is to spend last ten years of her life in China. Her procommunist activities date back to 1918. In 1932 by her own admission she entered into a common-law marriage with Joel Shubin, a Soviet official now deceased. Data furnished by Ponomarev is first indication of Strong's

100-7888

100-428091 (Solo)

60 JAN 2 1964
(8)

100-428091-
NOT RECORDED
126 DEC 27 1963

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-7888-926

Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan
Re: ANNA LOUISE STRONG
100-7888

there
romantic liaison with Borodin ~~BUE~~ is ample evidence subject
and Borodin were closely associated in Soviet Union during
1920's publishing 'Moscow Daily News.'

Borodin was a Russian revolutionary at an early age. Prior to 1917 he was in U. S. where he married a Russian University student. When the Russian czar was overthrown, Borodin and his family returned to Russia. In 1923 he was sent to China to assist Chinese Nationalists in organizing a political party patterned on Soviet Communist Party. Borodin incurred Stalin's displeasure and was recalled to USSR in 1927. According to Moscow news service, Borodin died in 1952.

While Panomarev's revelations are startling, they could possibly be accurate. Nevertheless, data should not be disseminated outside Bureau as unauthorized disclosure would point inevitably to CG 5824-S* and his life could be forfeited. While it is true, calculated risks must be taken by disseminating information of vital interest to other agencies obtained from CG 5824-S*, when information is of no practical value to anyone else, it should not be disseminated. Subject is in Communist China and not accessible to either the State Department or Central Intelligence Agency. If she ever returns to U. S., which now seems doubtful, Bureau would handle investigation.

RECOMMENDATION:

Information furnished by Panomarev regarding Strong and Borodin not be disseminated. We will maintain the information in file for possible use when and if subject returns to U. S.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

December 18, 1963

BY LIAISON

Handwritten: 3.
Handwritten: SOLO
Honorable Walter W. Jenkins
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. R. W. Smith
1 - Mr. Shaw

Dear Mr. Jenkins:

Handwritten: Classified by 1565 SNO/ [unclear] 1/17/82
Handwritten: Declassify on: 1565 SNO/ [unclear] 1/17/82
Handwritten: 394-227 5090 [unclear] 12/1/94
Zenik Wagner, an official of the International
Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia, who specializes in Latin-American affairs,
furnished the following comments to most sensitive sources
of this Bureau concerning the caches of arms recently
discovered on the beaches of Venezuela.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has
verified that the arms shipments discovered on the
beaches in Venezuela were, in fact, shipped from Cuba.
This matter was handled in a clumsy, uncoordinated way
and, as a result, millions of dollars worth of arms were
lost. The Cubans did not consult with the Czechs or the
Russians on these shipments and, as a matter of fact,
the Czechs and Russians do not know whom the Cubans
were negotiating with among the Venezuelans. The Czechs
and the Russians are very disturbed concerning the
handling of these shipments of arms by the Cubans to
the communist terrorists in Venezuela.

Because of the sensitive nature of our sources,
which have furnished reliable information in the past, we
have classified this communication "~~Top Secret.~~"

Sincerely yours,

Handwritten: 100-428091

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGS:erc
(10)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Handwritten: (R)
Handwritten: [Signature]
Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

DEC 26 1963

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

DEC 18 10 32 AM '63
FBI
READING ROOM

100-428091-3538

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Walter W. Jenkins

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. See memo Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan 12/17/63 captioned "Solo, Internal Security - C," WGS:lmj, and Chicago airtel 12/11/63, also bearing the Solo caption.

(~~S~~)

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1-Mr. Shaw

Legat, Ottawa

12-19-63

Director, FBI (100-428091)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Solo

There are enclosed three copies of a letterhead memorandum classified "~~Top Secret~~" and captioned "Norman Freed" which relates to Freed's current activities.

You may furnish a copy of the memorandum to your source in the prandum

b7D

Enc. (3)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route through for review) (Enc.)

WGS:skw
(5)

MAILED 8

DEC 19 1963

COMM-FBI

100-428091-3532
X973/11

FBI - 702 LICE
REC'D - 2071A VV

DEC 18 2 03 PM '63

22 DEC 19 1963

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

ch
ENCLOSURE

65 DEC 26 1963

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1-Mr. Shaw

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2011

December 19, 1963

NORMAN FREED

The following information, supplied by sources which have furnished reliable information in the past, is being brought to your attention as a matter of possible interest.

Norman Freed continues to serve in Prague, Czechoslovakia, as the Canadian Communist Party representative to the "World Marxist Review," theoretical organ of the international communist movement. Freed was scheduled to visit Indonesia during December, 1964, for the purpose of giving a lecture on the Canadian Communist Party. Although Freed had planned to return to Canada during October, 1963, it is not anticipated that he will return to Canada until the early part of 1964.

Because of the sensitive nature of our sources, it is requested that the contents of this memorandum be afforded careful security and its use restricted to a need-to-know basis.

Orig. and 2 to Legat, Ottawa, by letter 12-19-63

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is CG 5824-S*. See Chicago airtel 12-7-63 entitled "Solo, IS-C," enclosing letterhead memorandum captioned "Norman Freed, Communist Party of Canada Representative to 'World Marxist Review,' Prague, Czechoslovakia."

Tolson _____
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Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

WGS:sky

(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

100-428091-35-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2011

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Rushing
1 - Mr. Shaw

(IS) 100-428091

Date: December 30, 1963
To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subject: [REDACTED]
SECURITY MATTER - C
[REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this matter concerning the intentions of captioned individual to travel to the Soviet Union in the Fall of 1963.

A confidential source which has furnished reliable information in the past advised during December, 1963, that [REDACTED] was admitted to the Soviet Union in September, 1963. She is currently studying Russian in a school in the Soviet Union preparing herself for the study of dramatics.

b6
b7C

You will be advised of any additional information received relating to this matter.

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

DEC 30 1963

NOTE:

Subject is the [REDACTED] prominent CPUSA member. the Russians to attend school in the Soviet Union. Pittsburgh Office has been instructed by prior communication to submit FD-122 placing subject's name on the

b6
b7C

NOTE CONTINUED
PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WGS:kmj

PLK(7)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

BY COUNIER SVC.
3 DEC 30
COMM-FBI

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Holmes _____
Gandy _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

NOTE (Continued):

Security Index. Information in letter obtained by CG 5824-S* during Solo Mission 14 from Aleksei Grechukhin, an official of the CP of the Soviet Union. See Chicago airtel 12/16/63 captioned "Solo. IS-C" enclosing letter-head memorandum entitled

b6
b7c

Classified "~~Confidential~~" because disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons would jeopardize the source (CG 5824-S*), who is furnishing information on a top-level basis concerning the international communist movement.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F B I

Date: 12/18/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReNYairtel captioned "SOLO, IS-C," which states that NY 694-S* had received from the Soviets a coded-ciphered radio message instructing him to meet with his Soviet contact at the "Armstrong" rendezvous on 12/17/63 at the usual time.

NY 604-S* advised SAS ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON and [redacted] on 12/18/63 that pursuant to these instructions, he met and conferred with ALEKSEI M. KOLOBASHKIN at approximately 6:00 p.m. on the evening of 12/17/63 in the vicinity of the "Armstrong" rendezvous. NY 694-S* gave KOLOBASHKIN a roll of microfilm containing the following messages:

3 - BUREAU
1 - CHICAGO
1 - NY 134-91
~~1 - NY 100-84994~~
1 - NY 105-36402
1 - NY 100-134637

(100-428091) (RM)
(134-46-Sub-B) (RM-AM)
(INV) (41)
(~~GUS-MALE~~) (~~414~~)
(ALEKSEI KOLOBASHKIN) (341)
(41)

WGC:msb
(10)

Zero copy retained
G. L. L. 12-24-63

REC 55

100-42809

~~DEC 10 1958~~

1-2-00

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

65 JAN 10 1964

NY 100-134637

- (1) A coded-ciphered message, the plain text of which reads as follows:

"To Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"Have confirmed that JESSICA of American-Soviet ^{Council} ~~Council~~ received \$15,000.00 on November 1st.

"MORRIS CHILDS."

(Re NYO airtel captioned "SOLO, IS-C," dated 9/6/63, advising that on 9/5/63 KOLOBASHKIN gave NY 694-S* \$15,000 for JESSICA SMITH's magazine, "New World Review.")

- (2) A coded message, the plain text of which reads as follows:

"Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

"It would be well if some country other than a socialist country would sponsor a proposal for Puerto Rican independence in the United Nations Assembly. The Mali representative was to have made that proposal but he is no longer in the UN, and we do not know the new representative. Therefore we request the above.

"GUS HALL
National Executive Committee
CPUSA"

- (3) A coded message, the plain text of which reads as follows:

"Please convey for me to HENRY WINSTON that I have received all of his letters and regards.

"GUS HALL"

NY 100-134637

(4) A coded message which reads:

"Sister HELEN next. BERKMAN next."

(This refers to the next drop and the next meeting place through which NY 694-S* may make contact with KOLOBASHKIN.)

ReNYairtel 12/3/63, captioned "SOLO, IS-C; ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY," which enclosed a document dated 12/5/63 which NY 694-S* had received from GUS HALL for transmittal to the Soviets on 12/6/63. This document concerned an evaluation of President LYNDON B. JOHNSON and expressed the intention of GUS HALL with respect to his taking issue with what he considers wrong and harmful tactics by some forces in Venezuela. HALL had requested by 12/16/63 a reply setting forth the observations of the Soviets before he made a statement criticizing these tactics.

NY 694-S* advised on 12/18/63 that in the course of his meeting with KOLOBASHKIN on 12/17/63, KOLOBASHKIN read to him a message which KOLOBASHKIN was simultaneously translating from a Russian text. The message was addressed to GUS HALL, National Committee, CPUSA, and was signed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The message, as read by KOLOBASHKIN, included the following:

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union heartily thanks you for the analysis of President JOHNSON and for your observation concerning President JOHNSON's continuation of the policies of the JOHN F. KENNEDY administration. Undoubtedly this analysis will be received with great interest by the world public.

Regarding the Venezuelan question, and your announced public statement of criticism, we doubt that this would be expedient at this time. It could easily be misinterpreted by the world reactionaries and those who threaten the peace of the world. It is also possible

NY 100-134637

that such criticism could be misunderstood by the Venezuelan comrades. It could provide the Communist Party of China with an occasion for further accusations and attacks upon the CPUSA, and furnish support for further pro-Chinese activists in the USA. Such criticism can be attacked by the Venezuelan and Cuban Parties as interference in their internal party affairs. Such criticism would also lead to the deterioration of relations between the CPUSA and the Venezuelan Communist Party, as well as between the CPUSA and other fraternal parties in Latin America.

It is necessary for the Venezuelan comrades to undertake a discussion of their tactics during their last election.

We wish to you and to the leadership of the CPUSA our fraternal and communist greetings in this noble and manful struggle.

ReNYairtel, 12/9/63, setting forth details of a conference between KOLOBASHKIN and NY 694-S* on 12/6/63, at which time they discussed the difficulty being encountered in the use of the walkie-talkie equipment. As set forth on page 2 of referenced airtel, it was agreed that the walkie-talkie operation be tested on Wednesday evening, 12/11/63, at 10:00 p.m. and again on Thursday morning, 12/12/63, at 10:00 a.m., when the Soviets would go to the informant's home neighborhood and attempt to send him a message by walkie-talkie. It was agreed that whether or not the informant received said signals, he would go to the area of the headquarters of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations at 7:00 p.m. on Thursday night, 12/12/63, and send a message indicating whether or not he had received the aforementioned signals from the Soviets.

NY 694-S* advised on 12/18/63 that on 12/17/63, KOLOBASHKIN and he again discussed the difficulty being experienced in the operation of the walkie-talkie equipment. NY 694-S* informed KOLOBASHKIN that he had not received the signals either on 12/11/63 or 12/12/63 at the specified times. KOLOBASHKIN informed NY 694-S* that the Soviets had not received any signal from NY 694-S* on 12/12/63.

It was agreed that on the occasion of their next meet,

NY 100-134637

KOLOBASHKIN would furnish NY 694-S* with a tuner such as was previously furnished NY 694-S* on 9/5/63. (See NY airtel, 9/6/63, page 10). Using the tuner, NY 694-S* would then be able to recheck his walkie-talkie receiver.

It was further agreed that in the event KOLOBASHKIN wishes to contact NY 694-S*, he will notify NY 694-S* by CW radio transmission. In the event NY 694-S* wishes to contact the Soviet, he will transmit the usual signals in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations on Tuesday or Thursday nights between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m. as before. (See SOLO airtel, 10/4/63) On a Tuesday or a Thursday when NY 694-S* sends such a signal between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m., he is to be in the public telephone booth at the Parsons Boulevard Independent Subway Station, Jamaica, New York at 9:00 p.m. (JA 6-9427). The Soviet will call this number at 9:00 p.m. and allow the phone to ring twice. This will acknowledge receipt of NY 694-S*'s earlier transmissions between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m. on the same date.

It was agreed that NY 694-S* and KOLOBASHKIN will meet on either January 14, 1964, or January 21, 1964, at the "Berkman" rendezvous at 6:00 p.m. If they fail to make personal contact on January 14, 1964, NY 694-S* and KOLOBASHKIN will again attempt to make personal contact on January 21, 1964.

Before parting, KOLOBASHKIN advised NY 694-S* that the people at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations were favorably impressed by President LYNDON B. JOHNSON's 12/17/63 address to the United Nations.

IN VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE POSITION OF [REDACTED] b7D
EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING THE INFORMATION SET OUT BELOW. NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD POSSIBLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.

At 1:55 p.m. on 12/17/63, [REDACTED] b7D
contacted the NYO by telephone and spoke to SA VINCENT J. CAHILL over the private line.

NY 100-134637

Informant said that he had learned on this date in KGB quarters at the Soviet Mission that ALEKSEI KOLOBASHKIN was to have a meeting with an agent at 6:00 p.m. this date, at a place unknown to the informant. Informant said he did not know the identity of the agent with whom KOLOBASHKIN would meet.

Informant stated that as part of the arrangement for this meeting, VLADIMIR CHUCHUKIN was to be in the KGB quarters in late afternoon of 12/17/63, monitoring FBI radio transmissions. Informant said that in the event CHUCHUKIN heard any transmissions over the FBI radio which appeared to indicate an interest in KOLOBASHKIN, CHUCHUKIN at 5:45 p.m. would go to a public telephone and would call KOLOBASHKIN at telephone number RE 9-9713, to warn him that he was possibly under surveillance by the FBI. Informant said that in the event CHUCHUKIN detected no FBI radio transmissions relating to KOLOBASHKIN, then, of course, it would not be necessary for him to contact KOLOBASHKIN by telephone.

Informant said he had no other information to offer at this time, but said that he was anxious to pass this information along to the interviewing agents since it appeared to be an excellent opportunity to determine the identity of the agent with whom KOLOBASHKIN would meet.

As set forth above, NY 694-S* met KOLOBASHKIN at 6:00 p.m. on 12/17/63, in the vicinity of the Townhouse Restaurant, located at 138-39 Queens Blvd., Jamaica, New York. It is noted that the telephone number RE 9-9713 to which reference was made by [redacted] is located in a public telephone booth at the Rose Hill Bar and Grill, 138-19 Jamaica Ave., Jamaica, New York. b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPETO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: December 27, 1963

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *FJB*

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Shaw

SUBJECT: *SOLO*

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

This is to advise that CG 5824-S*, while on his recent Solo Mission in the Soviet Union, was unsuccessful in his efforts to discuss with Soviet officials problems relating to the Jewish question in the Soviet Union.

It will be recalled that in October, 1963, Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), disturbed about reports of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, directed a communication to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) concerning the possibility of sending a CPUSA representative to the Soviet Union to discuss matters relating to the Jewish question in the Soviet Union. Prior to the departure of CG 5824-S* on his Solo Mission in November, 1963, Gus Hall instructed informant to discuss with responsible CPSU officials the Jewish question in the Soviet Union. Hall indicated that it should be pointed out to the CPSU that the CPUSA was not looking for a fight on this matter but was raising it only from a tactical point of view.

In mid-November, 1963, CG 5824-S*, while in the Soviet Union, presented to the CPSU both written and oral requests that a meeting be arranged to discuss the Jewish question with responsible CPSU officials. However, in neither case was there any official response from the CPSU. At every occasion where this matter was raised by informant, CPSU officials sought to avoid discussion of it. In view of the reaction of the CPSU, informant did not push this matter beyond initial stages of inquiry. As a result, there was no formal, direct response, negative or positive, to his request to discuss with responsible CPSU officials the Jewish question in the Soviet Union.

ACTION:

For information. In view of the failure of the Soviets to state their position in regard to the Jewish question, no dissemination is being made of this information.

100-428091

WGS:kmj
(5)

65 JAN 10 1964

22 JAN 20 1964

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. Conrad *JWC*

DATE: December 16, 1963

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson ☒
Belmont ☒
Mohr ☐
Casper ☐
Callahan ☐
Conrad ☐
DeLoach ☐
Evans ☐
Gale ☐
Rosen ☒
Sullivan ☒
Tavel ☐
Trotter ☐
Tele. Room ☐
Holmes ☐
Gandy ☐

si
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 12/16/63, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland on scheduled times and frequencies at which time two messages were sent.

The plain text of the messages is set forth below. The cipher text is attached.

NR 214 GR 180

TO BIRCH (Gus Hall). UZBEK SOCIETY FOR FRIENDSHIP AND CULTURAL RELATIONS IS SENDING TO REV. GALAMISON AN INVITATION FOR SEVEN PERSONS. IT IS POINTED (out?) IN THE INVITATION THAT THE DELEGATION WILL HAVE A POSSIBILITY TO VISIT DIFFERENT PLACES IN THE USSR (NOT ONLY IN UZBEKISTAN) AND TO ACQUAINT ITSELF IN DETAIL WITH THE LIFE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE. PLEASE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT UZBEK SOCIETY FOR FRIENDSHIP AND CULTURAL RELATIONS, WHICH IS INSTRUCTED TO RECEIVE THE DELEGATION, MAY ACCEPT ONLY SEVEN PERSONS, AS YOU WERE INFORMED BY US EARLIER. FAIR (Washington) CASHIER (Embassy) HAS ALL INSTRUCTIONS. IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OR COMPLICATIONS WITH THE MEETING OF THE GROUP, PLEASE INFORM US IN ADVANCE OF THE DATE OF ITS DEPARTURE AND ITS ITINERARY.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

REC-21

100-428091-3536

1 - Mr. Belmont

2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)

PWP:drv

(10)

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

65 JAN 9 1964

SEVEN

Memorandum to Mr. Conrad
Re: SOLO
Internal Security - C

NR 126 GR 38

FOR REFEREE'S (Central Committee) OPINION IN RESPECT OF BIRCH'S (Gus Hall) LETTER FROM DECEMBER (number) FIVE PLEASE MEET US AT ARMSTRONG ON TUESDAY DECEMBER (number) SEVENTEEN AT THE USUAL TIME.

The UZBEK SOCIETY FOR FRIENDSHIP AND CULTURAL RELATIONS is an organization in the Soviet Union. REV. GALAMISON is probably identical with a clergyman from the Bronx, New York, who is thought of very highly by the Communist Party. ARMSTRONG is a meeting location at the Town House Restaurant in Queens, New York.

ACTION:

For information.

A handwritten signature, possibly "JWC", written in dark ink.A handwritten signature, possibly "BJW", written in dark ink.

NR 126 GR 38

75059 62294 33729 56210 28413 61495 04090 64796 66316 59664
78494 08459 17273 72560 06834 31443 20165 17396 64740 24518
14215 48605 22197 19350 67497 43348 56055 52086 73087 27258
90830 95214 85073 41189 72779 05391 94343 28602

NR 214 GR 180

05141 74605 43097 83374 81904 61292 21853 22686 69679 57147
77771 92172 56118 88443 19812 35053 71180 99936 76051 65129
47345 18245 55699 12352 27467 24717 91506 44645 45409 76718
44158 84200 08492 01197 93000 47659 35981 25419 35541 61636
36501 64612 26290 37279 30735 57060 90126 07820 07268 89531
97935 41431 34772 22698 78153 72337 57206 74901 06158 45217
38927 80538 09841 71964 94404 92372 40335 62203 29449 60318
52010 40736 16145 02632 70531 41846 75888 55635 67440 46637
16793 31888 10753 41480 56682 06007 05421 61134 67650 20478
15393 79535 88803 36861 00342 17617 76048 17459 18550 90072
42882 79710 91675 67627 36693 22005 64372 84912 32366 17138
11438 10368 20513 42773 21857 76114 64897 08602 31489 04620
44300 18326 33012 39906 09368 06389 89243 71496 33188 76855
57845 37227 77072 76377 18163 47593 56673 44153 85376 07386
27125 22350 27451 40694 97520 14573 86638 70148 57370 67645
72052 86732 84293 27058 76590 51149 18460 69284 84885 75702
48868 37164 74196 27380 48725 35075 39613 88318 53951 69326
95859 90460 29999 59739 33385 10663 54835 42721 52855 70956

100-428091-3531
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: December 26, 1963

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Conrad
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Mr. Shaw

SUBJECT: **SOLO**
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Tolson ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Casper ☒
 Callahan ☒
 Conrad ☒
 DeLoach ☒
 Evans ☒
 Gale ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Sullivan ☒
 Tavel ☒
 Trotter ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Holmes ☒
 Gandy ☒

This is to advise of the results of a discussion which took place in Moscow, Russia, between CG 5824-S* and a Soviet official relative to the Solo communication apparatus and electronic devices designed to counteract listening devices.

You will recall that CG 5824-S* was abroad on a Solo Mission from 11/1/63 to 12/2/63. Prior to informant's departure, he was briefed by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). Hall instructed informant to ask the Soviets if they have anything which the CPUSA could use to counteract electronic listening devices.

During the week of 11/18/63, CG 5824-S* had the occasion to meet with Pavel Lukianov of the Security Department, Intelligence Division, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union. CG 5824-S* brought up for discussion Hall's request that the CPUSA be supplied with information concerning recently developed electronic equipment designed to counteract listening devices. Lukianov noted that the Soviets had nothing that could be sent to the CPUSA, but stated he would arrange for CG 5824-S* to be briefed by an expert, who would demonstrate what was new and would also discuss the means for detection of electronic devices. Informant mentioned that Gus Hall is not convinced that it is possible to pick up sound waves through glass by electronic devices, in spite of the fact that the Soviets had previously demonstrated to CG 5824-S* that this could be done. Informant stated that Hall wanted the Soviets to demonstrate this technique again to informant. Lukianov noted that such a demonstration would be given informant in connection with the briefing informant would be given by an expert.

(Although arrangements were made to have CG 5824-S* briefed on electronic devices, no such briefing took place. CG 5824-S* was informed by a Soviet official that the briefing had been canceled because of the turmoil resulting from the intervening assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It was explained to CG 5824-S* that for the time being the Soviets must be most cautious and discreet in any matters involving the CPUSA.)

100-428091

REC-21

WGS:kmj
(7)

EX-115

100-428091-3537
22 JAN 2 1964

65 JAN 1964

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: SOLO
100-428091

Lukianov stated that the Soviet security officials had nothing but praise for the work being performed by NY 694-S*. (NY 694-S* handles the Solo communication apparatus between the CPUSA and the Soviets.) CG 5824-S* pointed out that if the quality of work performed by NY 694-S* on occasions was poor, it must be attributed to the technical equipment which has been made available to him. CG 5824-S* suggested that the Soviets consider providing NY 694-S* with any available new technical equipment or provide NY 694-S* with information as to how he could secure such equipment in the United States. In this regard, Lukianov stated that apparently NY 694-S* had the latest technical equipment available and they had nothing new to supply or recommend to him.

CG 5824-S* raised with Lukianov a complaint regarding the method used to transmit to the CPUSA in September, 1963, the contents of a confidential letter from the Soviets. CG 5824-S* noted that in this particular case the contents of the letter had been placed on tape and from one hearing of the tape at a meet set up in a public place, NY 694-S* was expected to make sufficient notes from which he could convey the full text to the CPUSA. CG 5824-S* suggested that in the future meetings between NY 694-S* and his Soviet contact in New York City be held in a motel or hotel room rather than in parks, subways and the like. This would provide an opportunity to talk matters over which cannot be done under the present setup. Lukianov agreed to raise this matter with his superiors to see if some new arrangements could be made. He also agreed that in the future messages would not be put on tape and consideration would be given to transmitting such messages during personal contacts by microfilm or otherwise.

ACTION:

For information. No dissemination of this data which pertains to the extremely clandestine Solo apparatus is being made as it would jeopardize the security of this valuable operation.

WCS
J.P. [unclear]
J.P.
Q
WCS
[unclear]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : *mgl/ey* DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SUBJECT: *(C)* SOLO
IS - C

DATE: 12/27/63

ReBulet dated December 23, 1963, inquiring whether Chicago had inadvertently neglected to include in the monthly Solo Funds accounting letter for the month of November, 1963, the amount of \$6,006.00 which amount was obtained by CG 5824-S* during November, 1963.

For the information of the Bureau, although this amount of \$6,006.00 was obtained by CG 5824-S* during November, 1963, this information was not available to the Chicago Office until December, 1963, since the source had not returned to the United States until December 2, 1963 and not until December 6, 1963, did he return to Chicago where the Solo Funds are maintained. Therefore, the \$6,006.00 was not actually added to the Solo Funds until December, 1963, and will be so recorded in the December, 1963, Solo Funds accounting letter.

184918
②-Bureau (RM)
1-Chicago

WAB:MDW

(3)

REC-21

100 - 428091 - 3538

22 JAN 6 1964

EX-11

5/1/68

1146
65 JAN 7 1964

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
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Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan WJG
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad WJG

DATE: December 30, 1963

FROM : C. F. Downing CFD

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 12/30/63 transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland on scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were sent.

ACTION:

For information.

2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)

WJP
PWP:drv
(9) WJP

EX-115

REC-21

100 - 428091 - 3539

22 JAN 6 1964

5/11/68

SEVEN

65 JAN 9 1964

Legat, Bonn (100-631)

January 2, 1964

Director, FBI (100-76388)

1 - Mr. Schwartz

1 - Mr. Shaw

gm
GEORGE OHLWERTHER
SECURITY MATTER - C

Information has been received from a delicate and reliable source that captioned individual has an illness for which he needs to live in a warmer climate. As a result, Ohlwerther and his wife, Helga Weigert Ohlwerther, plan to move to Africa.

It is desired that you remain alert for any additional information pertaining to subject's plan to move to Africa. Because of the extreme sensitiveness of the source, you should not advise your sources that you are in receipt of the above information.

1 - San Francisco (100-26672)

1 - 100-428091 (Solo)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for review)

NOTE:

Source is CG 5824-S* who received information concerning Ohlwerther's plans to travel to Africa. See airtel from Chicago 12/16/63 captioned "Solo, IS-C" enclosing letterhead memorandum entitled "George Lohr." Ohlwerther is not on SI. He has been out of the country since 1951. He has a long history of activities in the CPUSA and was formerly Chairman of the San Diego County CP.

WGS:fjh
(8)

100-76388-11
REFUGATE YELLOW

66 JAN 6 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

The Attorney General

January 7, 1964

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Shaw

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Solo

We have learned from a most sensitive source which has furnished reliable information in the past that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev recently prepared a "massive document" addressed to "All Heads of Government" throughout the world asking for a termination of the cold war. The heavy concentration of Chinese troops on the Sino-Soviet border is responsible for Khrushchev's proposals to capitalist countries with respect to ending the cold war. Khrushchev believes that by easing tensions with the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able to move troops from the West to the East and concentrate on the Chinese.

REC'D-READING ROOM

JAN 7 11 50 AM '64

According to information received by our source, Communist China is currently basing its foreign policy with respect to its borders on its desire to re-establish its borders as they were a hundred years ago. At that time the Chinese territory was a great deal more extensive and included areas now held by the Soviet Union.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication "~~Top Secret~~." This information has been furnished to the Honorable Walter W. Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, and other interested officials of the Government.

100-429091

REC-47

100-428091-3540

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

22 JAN 7 1964

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

WGS:kmj
(10)

~~TOP SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

65 JAN 9 1964

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Communist Party. See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS-C."

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 12-31-63

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Baumgardner
1-Mr. Row
1-Mr. Shaw

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
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Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

This is a memorandum setting forth information concerning a trip to Canada by NY 694-S* as instructed by the Soviets in connection with the SOLO apparatus.

~~CONF. INFO.~~
On 12-30-63 ASAC Roney of the New York Office telephoned to state that NY 694-S* had asked permission to go to Canada for a trip in connection with the SOLO apparatus. NY 694-S* pointed out that when CG 5824-S* was in Russia during the recent SOLO Mission 14, certain problems regarding Cuba were discussed and it was decided that certain arrangements should be made with the Canadians. The purposes of the trip were to be as follows:

(1) Arrange a system of communications between the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and the CP of Cuba via Canada.

(2) Arrange to send funds through Canada to Beatrice S. Johnson, correspondent for "The Worker" in Cuba.

(3) Discuss with the Canadians the "World Marxist Review," a magazine published in Prague, Czechoslovakia, which sets forth the international communist line. The Soviets pointed out that some CPs are not patronizing the "World Marxist Review" and the Russians desire that the CPUSA and the CP of Canada discuss the matter in an effort to gain support among other CPs of the world, particularly France, for the "World Marxist Review."

(4) NY 694-S* is to get for us all the information he can concerning activities in Cuba.

NY 694-S* pointed out that he would confer with top Party leaders in Canada and would stay at the Royal York Hotel in Toronto. NY 694-S* said he planned to leave New York City at about 6 p.m., 12-30-63, via Trans Canadian Airlines and fly to Toronto. He said it would be necessary for him to take his wife along in view of the fact that she is suffering from cancer and he cannot leave her alone.

LTG:jdd
(6)

EX-108

REC-34

100-428091-3541

22 JAN 7 1964

65 JAN 9 1964

5-W68

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: SOLO

Roney desired authorization for an advance of \$300 to NY 694-S* for this trip.

In view of the urgent nature of the trip to Canada by NY 694-S* and the great potential of information he will obtain, the funds were authorized by telephone.

ACTION:

Immediately upon the return of NY 694-S* to the U. S. he will be debriefed and you will be apprised of the arrangements made. Any information which can be disseminated as a result of this trip will be appropriately handled.

WES. ✓
J. Br ✓
GK.
H

SAC
S-2

0-1 (Rev. 1-2-63)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Return to Bureau

file

TO : SAC, Chicago (Your file 134-46 Sub F) DATE: 12/30/63

FROM : Director, FBI (Bufile and Serial 100-428091)

Room No. 808 RB

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
ReBulet 11/18/63

☐ Post in file and
destroy 0-1
(For SOG use
only)

mj

1. Bufiles indicate this case is delinquent. Give specific reason for delinquency.
*No explanation to Bureau due to 18th Solo mission
of duplications, 19 day trip to NYC & recent illness.
However, efforts to act as personal interest/Source during week
11/6/63 in Boston will be submitted as soon as possible*

2. Date ☐ airtel ☐ letter ☐ submitted
☐ report ☐ letterhead memo ☐ will be submitted

3. If valid reason exists for not submitting report at this time, state reason specifically and when report
will be submitted

4. Status of ☒ Appeal ☐ Inquiry ☐ Investigation ☐ Prosecution

5. Submit ☐ airtel ☐ letter
☐ report ☐ letterhead memo By _____

(Place reply hereon and return to Bureau. Note receipt and acknowledgment on top)

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 31 1963	
FBI - CHICAGO	
67-9420-19	

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

F B I

Date: 12/31/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS - C

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are three copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement captioned, "Document Concerning Doctor Wellington Chung, Former American in Czechoslovakia."

The information appearing in the enclosed informant's statement was furnished on 12/27/63 by CG 5824-S* to SA RICHARD W. HANSEN.

100 - 348169

80-108

REC-1

100 428091/3542

22 JAN 8 1964

ENCLOSURE
3-Bureau (Enc. 3) (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

RWH:MDW
(5)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

61 JAN 1 1964

DOCUMENT CONCERNING DOCTOR WELLINGTON CHUNG,
FORMER AMERICAN IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

During the latter part of the week of December 15, 1963, Dorothy Healey, a Communist Party, USA (CP, USA) representative from the Southern California District, had in her possession a document concerning Dr. Wellington Chung setting forth certain facts and details concerning that individual. In connection with this information, Healey requested that the CP, USA arrange, if possible, to make inquiries concerning the matter set forth in the document with the CP of Czechoslovakia in order that the true facts might be known. The document which Dorothy Healey had in her possession at this time was as follows:

"Dr. Wellington Chung died on Oct 28, 1963 a suicide. His last residence was Ernsta Thalmanaf Cheb Czechoslovakia

no lead
[redacted] is hospitalized with a nervous breakdown.

"Dr. Chung was the son of Alice Hyun, and [redacted] to [redacted] and [redacted] and was born an American citizen.

"Dr. Chung emigrated to Czechoslovakia in 1948 as a young student to study medicine and with the dedicated fervor of a young militant progressive.

"His mother, Alice Hyun followed him to Czechoslovakia hoping to enter North Korea from that country. She was permitted to go to North Korea in approx. 6 months or so. Later, unconfirmed reports were received in this country that she was arrested and executed by the North Korean government for traitorous activity.

"Correspondence with Dr. Chung was kept to a minimum by his family before, during and after the Korean War on account of FBI harassment of the family at home and then later for fear of international complications etc.

"In approx. 1960 correspondence was received and the following conditions seemed to appear in his letters.

- "(1) He was extremely unhappy in Czechoslovakia and wished to return to this country.
- "(2) He was considered a suspicious person and ostracized by the North Korean students. Suspicion was such that he could not hope for a good medical appointment and anyone who so recommended him was sticking out his neck.
- "(3) He attempted scientific medical studies and research with little encouragement and help from his profession. What little he accomplished was apparently in spite of conditions.
- "(4) He was bitter at the racial prejudice he encountered.
- "(5) It appears all the youthful enthusiasm and dedication became so frustrated that he said in his letter to his uncle in his last message--the world is confusing, the family is confusing--then something__ him to snap.

"Most of the information above is not bared clear conclusive or confirmation or outspoken grievance."

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-29-2011

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Shaw

January 7, 1964

BY LIAISON

Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rusk:

We have learned from a most sensitive source which has furnished reliable information in the past that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev recently prepared a "massive document" addressed to "All Heads of Government" throughout the world asking for a termination of the cold war. The heavy concentration of Chinese troops on the Sino-Soviet border is responsible for Khrushchev's proposals to capitalist countries with respect to ending the cold war. Khrushchev believes that by easing tensions with the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able to move troops from the West to the East and concentrate on the Chinese.

According to information received by our source, Communist China is currently basing its foreign policy with respect to its borders on its desire to re-establish its borders as they were a hundred years ago. At that time the Chinese territory was a great deal more extensive and included areas now held by the Soviet Union.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication "~~Top Secret~~." This information is being furnished to other interested officials of the Government.

Sincerely yours,

100-428091

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGS:kmj
(8)

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Callahan _____
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Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

11 JAN 8 1964

65 JAN 13 1964 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Dean Rusk

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Communist Party. See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS-C."

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

1-8-64

Airtel


1 - Mr. Shaw

To: SAC, Chicago (134-46-Sub B)
From: Director, FBI (100-428091)
Subject: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Advise by return airtel if your office has
any additional information to submit relative to Solo
Mission 14.

REG-21

100-428091-3544



19 JAN 8 1964

EX-103

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Gandy _____

WGS:njh
(4)

50 JAN 10 1964
FBI

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Lex

~~SECRET~~

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. R.W. Smith
1 - Mr. Shaw

(IS) 100-423091

Date: January 7, 1964

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: ~~WELLINGTON CHUNG~~
SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference is made to previous correspondence in this matter which disclosed that captioned individual departed the United States for Czechoslovakia in 1948 for the purpose of attending the University of Prague, Prague, Czechoslovakia.

The following information was supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the past.

Wellington Chung committed suicide on October 28, 1963, in Czechoslovakia. Following the suicide, Chung's [redacted] suffered a nervous breakdown. Chung, prior to committing suicide, was known to be extremely unhappy in Czechoslovakia and wished to return to the United States. His mother, Alice Hyun, who was a former resident of Los Angeles, California, was reportedly executed by the North Korean Government for traitorous activity.

b6
b7C

REC-1 100-423091 3545

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" because disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons would jeopardize the source who is furnishing information on a top-level basis concerning the international communist movement. Source is 5824-S* who obtained the above information from Dorothy Healey, Chairman, Southern California District, Communist Party, USA. See CGairtel 12/31/63 captioned "Solo, IS-C." Wellington Chung and his mother, Alice Hyun, were known to be members of the Communist Party in Hawaii in 1946. Subject's father, Chun Chung, in 1948 was known to be residing in Korea.

WGS:eeb (7)

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Shaw

January 7, 1964

BY LIAISON

JAN 7 11 50 AM '64
REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

C
Honorable Walter W. Jenkins
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Jenkins:

Solo
We have learned from a most sensitive source which has furnished reliable information in the past that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev recently prepared a "massive document" addressed to "All Heads of Government" throughout the world asking for a termination of the cold war. The heavy concentration of Chinese troops on the Sino-Soviet border is responsible for Khrushchev's proposals to capitalist countries with respect to ending the cold war. Khrushchev believes that by easing tensions with the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able to move troops from the West to the East and concentrate on the Chinese.

According to information received by our source, Communist China is currently basing its foreign policy with respect to its borders on its desire to re-establish its borders as they were a hundred years ago. At that time the Chinese territory was a great deal more extensive and included areas now held by the Soviet Union.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication ~~"Top Secret."~~ This information is being furnished to other interested officials of the Government.

L.P.
100-428091

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGS:km
(8)

Tolson _____
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Casper _____
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DeLoach _____
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Gandy _____

~~TOP SECRET~~
Sincerely yours,

Wes
428091-3846
~~TOP SECRET~~
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

22 JAN 9 1964
REC'D DEPT. OF JUSTICE

JAN 14 1964

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable Walter W. Jenkins

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Communist Party. See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS - C."

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☒ TELETYPE

Conrad ☒
 DeLoach ☒
 Evans ☒
 Gale ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Sullivan ☒
 Tavel ☒
 Trotter ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Holmes ☒
 Gandy ☒

URGENT 1-3-64 1:40 AM DE/JAA
 TO DIRECTOR -2-
 FROM SAC NEW YORK 030400

SOLO, ~~IS - G~~ INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

ON JANUARY 2 INSTANT, NY 694-S* RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO TORONTO, CANADA, AND FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS OF INFORMATION OBTAINED THERE FROM THE CANADIAN CP: ~~Communist Party~~

LESLIE MORRIS, SECRETARY OF THE CANADIAN CP, ADVISED ON DECEMBER 30 LAST THAT THE CANADIAN CP RELATIONS WITH THE CASTRO REGIME IN HAVANA ARE AS BAD AS, IF NOT WORSE THAN, THOSE OF THE CPUSA WITH THE CASTRO REGIME. MORRIS ATTRIBUTED THIS SITUATION TO THE FACT THAT IN THE SPRING OF 1963, WHEN THE TERRORIST GROUP KNOWN AS "FLQ" WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOMBINGS AND DYNAMITING IN CANADA, THE CANADIAN CP ASCERTAINED THAT CASTRO WAS AIDING AND ABETTING THE TERRORISTS. AT THE TIME CASTRO WAS IN MOSCOW, AS ALSO WERE CANADIAN CP FUNCTIONARIES INCLUDING NELSON CLARKE. THE CANADIAN CP, THROUGH NELSON CLARKE, PROTESTED TO CASTRO IN MOSCOW, REQUESTING THAT HE CEASE AIDING AND ABETTING THE AFOREMENTIONED FLQ. CASTRO'S RESPONSE WAS "MIND YOUR OWN DAMN BUSINESS." AS A RESULT, THE CANADIAN CP DID NOT RECEIVE AN INVITATION TO THE CELEBRATION IN HAVANA OF THE 5TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION CURRENTLY BEING OBSERVED AND THE CANADIAN CP IS QUITE DISCONCERTED ABOUT THIS SITUATION. THE CANADIAN CP HAS SCHEDULED A MEETING WITH THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO CANADA ON JANUARY 10 IN THE HOPE OF AMELIORATING THE CURRENT BAD SITUATION EXISTING BETWEEN THE CASTRO REGIME AND THE CANADIAN CP.

NY 694-S* ADVISED FURTHER THAT ON JANUARY 2 INSTANT, SHORTLY

Let's hope to hear from 1/7/64 REC-15
 WGS: [unclear] 428070-3547
 [unclear] (OIA)
 AG - 1-DAG
 [unclear] Sullivan

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
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 Gandy _____

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☒ TELETYPE

PAGE TWO

FROM SAC NEW YORK

030400

BEFORE HE LEFT FOR NY, HE HAD ANOTHER MEETING WITH LESLIE MORRIS, WHO TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM OTTAWA WHERE HE HAD CONFERRED WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CANADA. MORRIS STATED THAT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS PAST HE HAS BEEN MEETING REGULARLY WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHO FURNISHES HIM AND THE CANADIAN CP WITH INFORMATION CONCERNING MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THE CANADIAN CP. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW A "MASSIVE DOCUMENT" WRITTEN BY KHRUSHCHEV, ADDRESSED TO "ALL HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS" THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ASKING FOR A TERMINATION OF THE COLD WAR. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO TRANSLATE THE DOCUMENT FROM THE ORIGINAL RUSSIAN IN WHICH IT IS WRITTEN AND THAT AS SOON AS SUCH TRANSLATION IS MADE, THE DOCUMENT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE RESPECTIVE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. HE STATED FURTHER THAT HE WOULD FURNISH TO LESLIE MORRIS EITHER A COPY OR A RESUME OF THE AFOREMENTIONED DOCUMENT AS SOON AS A TRANSLATION IS MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM. LESLIE MORRIS TOLD NY 694-S* THAT HE IN TURN WOULD MAKE WHATEVER MIGHT BE GIVEN TO MORRIS BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AVAILABLE TO THE CPUSA.

NY 694-S* STATED THAT HE WILL FURNISH FURTHER DETAILS REGARDING HIS TRIP TO TORONTO ON JANUARY 3 NEXT.

NY 694-S* FURTHER ADVISED THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FOR NY 694-S* AND HIS WIFE FROM JACK COWAN, CANADIAN CP MEMBER, WHO IS CLOSE TO THE CANADIAN CP SECRETARIAT, TO ACCOMPANY COWAN AND HIS WIFE TO NASSAU ON SUNDAY, JANUARY 5 NEXT. NY 694-S* STATED THAT HE WILL BE IN NASSAU BETWEEN JANUARY 5 AND RETURN TO NY ON JANUARY 12.

HE STATED HIS PRIMARY PURPOSE IN GOING TO NASSAU IS TO PROVIDE HIS WIFE WITH A NEEDED REST.

AIR MAIL COPY TO CHICAGO.

RECEIVED:

2:31 AM

ENT

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad *✓*

DATE: January 6, 1964

FROM : C. F. Downing

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen *✓*
Sullivan *✓*
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 1/6/64 transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland on scheduled times and frequencies at which time a message was sent.

The plain text of the message is set forth below. The cipher text is attached.

NR 627 GR 144

TO BIRCH (Gus Hall) FROM LAST (Henry Winston). BEST WISHES AND HAPPY NEW YEAR. (Number) 1. IN PRAGUE (repeat) PRAGUE I HAD A TALK WITH RODRIGUEZ. HE PROMISED TO RENDER ANY ASSISTANCE TO BEATRICE (repeat) BEATRICE JOHNSON (repeat) JOHNSON. IN REPLY TO MY PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUGGESTING NORMALIZATION RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA (repeat) CUBA AND USA (repeat) USA RODRIGUEZ PROMISED TO CONVEY IT TO FIDEL CASTRO AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CASTRO MAY INCLUDE THIS PROPOSAL IN HIS SPEECH ON JANUARY (number) 2. PLEASE PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THIS. (Number) 2. ROBSON WAS GOING TO MAKE A NEW YEAR STATEMENT DEVOTED TO THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE.

RODRIGUEZ is probably identical with Carlos Rodriguez, a functionary of the Cuban Government. BEATRICE JOHNSON is probably identical with the Havana correspondent of the communist east coast newspaper, "The Worker," of that name. ROBSON is probably identical with Paul Robeson, noted singer and Soviet apologist, who has spent considerable time in the USSR.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Belmont

2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)

65 JAN 14 1964
JAPWP:drw (10) *✓*

EX-114

22 JAN 10 1964

3548

15825	13584	11391	26619	03073	43231	84097	71185	83979	70770
08201	21601	27965	07620	36395	91792	55882	76143	90141	35905
18574	70710	57951	85664	65098	67412	11260	91340	16420	96626
18681	47450	20396	16345	63580	24900	31749	97315	87093	55598
58936	72031	78025	60687	10914	00697	79314	15870	43856	38951
93214	27308	67692	90959	08961	78479	18366	88903	96913	56711
70912	16946	55246	70728	63486	00996	98413	65846	26357	23062
99417	00518	18637	95129	68634	32134	19622	09565	36129	38285
91560	43557	31868	98362	45907	50586	38345	86099	76544	54381
32432	72375	46998	43820	18700	12266	13042	61481	11849	34887
27380	40947	65889	10335	72144	74255	30425	54836	66962	44724
21813	18410	50592	54636	38620	03689	52567	26440	93994	37650
91362	07536	65770	14823	58631	65681	46535	68976	43968	07564
55213	39853	16220	47113	66454	14552	61772	74492	56559	12068
13448	04989	28588	61437						

ENCLOSURE/00-428091-3548

Domestic Intelligence Division

INFORMATIVE NOTE

Date 1/3/64

Attached contains highlights of conference by NY 694-S* with Leslie Morris, Secretary of Canadian Communist Party.

Upon receipt of complete details from informant dissemination will be made to Department, State, CIA, and military agencies.

BCR



ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-30-2011

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Shaw

January 7, 1964

BY LIAISON

JAN 7 11 50 AM '64
REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

Honorable John A. McCone
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

We have learned from a most sensitive source which has furnished reliable information in the past that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev recently prepared a "massive document" addressed to "All Heads of Government" throughout the world asking for a termination of the cold war. The heavy concentration of Chinese troops on the Sino-Soviet border is responsible for Khrushchev's proposals to capitalist countries with respect to ending the cold war. Khrushchev believes that by easing tensions with the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able to move troops from the West to the East and concentrate on the Chinese.

According to information received by our source, Communist China is currently basing its foreign policy with respect to its borders on its desire to re-establish its borders as they were a hundred years ago. At that time the Chinese territory was a great deal more extensive and included areas now held by the Soviet Union.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication "TOP SECRET." This information is being furnished to other interested officials of the Government.

REC-41 100-428091-3549
Sincerely yours,

100-428091
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
WGS:kmj
(8)
JAN 14 1964
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

22 JAN 10 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

Honorable John A. McCone

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Communist Party. See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS-C."

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-30-2011

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Shaw

January 7, 1964

BY LIAISON

REC'D-READING ROOM

JAN 7 11 50 AM '64

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

We have learned from a most sensitive source which has furnished reliable information in the past that Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev recently prepared a "massive document" addressed to "All Heads of Government" throughout the world asking for a termination of the cold war. The heavy concentration of Chinese troops on the Sino-Soviet border is responsible for Khrushchev's proposals to capitalist countries with respect to ending the cold war. Khrushchev believes that by easing tensions with the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able to move troops from the West to the East and concentrate on the Chinese.

According to information received by our source, Communist China is currently basing its foreign policy with respect to its borders on its desire to re-establish its borders as they were a hundred years ago. At that time the Chinese territory was a great deal more extensive and included areas now held by the Soviet Union.

Because of the sensitive nature of our source, we have classified this communication "~~TOP SECRET~~." This information is being furnished to other interested officials of the Government.

100-428091

Sincerely yours,

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGS:kmj

(8)

65 JAN 14 1964

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~TOP SECRET~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

22 JAN 10 1964

~~TOP SECRET~~

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top Secret~~" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation. Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Communist Party. See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS-C."

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 1/3/64

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637A)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReNYlet 12/4/63.

The records of the NYO reflect the following transactions regarding SOLO funds, as reported by NY 694-S* during the month of December, 1963:

Credits

On hand 12/1/63 \$258,595.00

Debits

12/11/63 to GUS HALL for:		\$ 12,000.00
Democratic Party Work	\$3,000.00	
National Executive Committee Meeting expenses	\$4,500.00	
Peoples World	\$2,500.00	
BETTY GANNETT for "Political Affairs"	\$2,000.00	
	\$12,000.00	
12/17/63 to LENA DAVIS SCHERER FOR:		\$ 18,000.00
Prompt Press	\$4,000.00	
CP National Office expenses	\$14,000.00	
	\$18,000.00	

Total Debits: \$ 30,000.00

Balance: \$228,595.00

- ② - Bureau (RM)
- 1 - Chicago (134-46-F)(SOLO)(RM)
- 1 - New York (134-91 Inv)(#41)
- 1 - New York (100-128861)(CPUSA-FUNDS-RESERVE FUNDS)(#414)
- 1 - New York (#41)

WGC:mcn

68 JAN 14 1964

REC-52

100-428091-3551

10 JAN 6 1964

EX-114
INT. SEC.

32 JAN 6 1964

EXP. PROC.

SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B)

1-10-64

Director, FBI (100-428091)

1 - Mr. Shaw

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reurairtel 12-27-63 enclosing one copy of the book, "Das Programm der KPdSU und der Westen" (The Program of the CPSU and the West) written by Timur Timofeev.

Being returned herewith is the copy of the book furnished as an enclosure to reairtel. For your information, the Bureau has made photostats of this book.

Enclosure


ENCLOSURE

REC-16

100-428091-3552

JAN 10 1964

WGS:mjh
(4)



Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

TRANSLATION FROM GERMAN

The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
and the West

From the Soviet Viewpoint

(European Perspectives)

Europa Publishing House, Wien, Koeln, Stuttgart, Zuerich.

By Timur Timofejew (or Timofeev)

Printed in Austria by Gutenberg, Wiener Neustadt.

The book was written with the cooperation of Wladimir Turadshjew
(or Vladimir Turadshev).

Translated from the Russian by Lili Keith, Erich Einhorn, Heddy
Hofmaier and Spartak Borissow (or Borisov).

<u>Contents</u>	<u>Page</u>
Preface	7
<u>The Manifesto of the New World</u>	9
<u>The Higher Phase</u>	13
What Communism is	19
The Production Apparatus of Communism	21
Utopia or Realism ?	42
Competition of the Giants	45
Production and Man	52
To Each According to His Needs	62
Genuine and Seeming Surplus	70
Economy and Politics	73
A New Society - A New Race of Men	79
 <u>Communism Means Peace</u>	 93
Where the Danger of War Arises	94
The New Ratio of Power	96
 <u>Powerful Influence</u>	 107
The Strength of the Model	109
Guatemala Will Not Be Repeated	111

TRANSLATED BY:

January 2, 1964

blh

b6
b7C

100-438091-3006
ENCLOSURE

Necessary Concessions	114
The Collapse of Colonialism	118
The Class Struggle Under Peace Conditions	125
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<u>Capitalism in the Vise of the Contradictions</u>	137
The New Given Conditions and Marxism	138
The "Neocapitalistic" Front and the Reality	147
The Omnipotence of the Monopolies	155
The Capitalism "Without Crises"	161
The Exploitation Increases	170
"Integration" of Europe or Fight of the Trusts?	180
Not "Social Concord," but Fight Against the Monopolies	187
<u>Communism - the Future of mankind</u>	195

FBI

REC 55

Date: 1/6/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

A coded-ciphered radio message was sent to NY 694-S* on 1/6/64 by the Soviets, the plain text of which is as follows:

"To GUS HALL from HENRY WINSTON. Best wishes and Happy New Year.

"1. In Prague I had a talk with RODRIGUEZ. He promised to render any assistance to BEATRICE JOHNSON. In reply to my proposal to address the American People suggesting normalization relations between Cuba and USA RODRIGUEZ promised to convey it to Fidel Castro and it is possible that Castro may include this proposal in his speech on January 2. Please pay special attention to this.

"2. ROBESON was going to make a New Year statement devoted to the struggle for peace."

It would appear that RODRIGUEZ possibly refers to CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ, Director of "Hoy," the Cuban CP news paper, in that BEATRICE JOHNSON, to whom reference is made in the message, is "The Worker" correspondent in Havana, Cuba.

In the absence of NY 694-S*, who is currently in Nassau, Bahamas, and scheduled to return to New York on 1/12/64,

- 3 - BUREAU (100-428091) (RM)
1 - CHICAGO (134-46-Sub-B) (RM-AM)
1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

WGC:msb
(7)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

65 JAN 10 1964

G JAN 22 1964

NY 100-134637

the above message was telephonically furnished to the Chicago Office 1/6/64 for referral to CG 5824-S*, with understanding it will not be furnished to GUS HALL.

The message will be furnished to NY 694-S* upon his return to New York, who will furnish it to GUS HALL.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: January 6, 1964

FROM :

SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)

SUBJECT:

SOLO
IS - C

Re Bureau letter dated 5/4/60 and Chicago letter dated 12/17/63.

Referenced Bureau letter dated May 4, 1960, instructed Chicago to set forth details of receipts and disbursements of funds in possession of CG 5824-S* and report such information to the Bureau by the fifth of the month following the month being reported.

Balance of funds in possession of
CG 5824-S* as of November 30, 1963

Solo Funds

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois.....\$ 23,830.58

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Chicago Office, FBI, to be returned to CG 5824-S* for redeposit in safe deposit box, Mid America National Bank, Chicago, Illinois..... 62,000.00

CP, USA Reserve Funds

Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Michigan Avenue National Bank, Chicago, Illinois..... 22,853.22

Total \$108,683.90

- 1-100-428091
- 2 - Bureau (RM)
 - 2 - New York (RM)
 - (1 - 100-134637) (SOLO)
 - (1 - 100-128861) (CP, USA - Reserve Funds)
 - 1 - Chicago

RWH:b11
(5)

65 JAN 10 1964

REC 55

JAN 10 1964

5/1/64

CG 134-46 Sub F

Additions

Solo Funds

Received from representative of
the International Department,
Central Committee, CP, Soviet
Union, during course of 14th Solo
Mission, November, 1963, and added
to Solo funds December, 1963 (for
details see Chicago airtel captioned
"SOLO, IS - C," December 9, 1963).....\$ 6,003.00

CP, USA Reserve Funds

None.

Disbursements

Solo Funds

None.

CP, USA Reserve Funds

None.

Total funds in possession of CG 5324-S*
as of December 31, 1963

Solo Funds

Maintained in cash in safe deposit
box, Michigan Avenue National Bank,
Chicago, Illinois..... 23,830.58

Maintained in cash in safe deposit
box, Mid America National Bank,
Chicago, Illinois..... 6,003.00

Maintained in cash in safe deposit
box of Chicago Office, FBI, to be
returned to CG 5324-S* for redeposit
in safe deposit box, Mid America
National Bank, Chicago, Illinois,
during week of January 6, 1964..... 62,000.00

CG 134-46 Sub F

CP, USA Reserve Funds

Maintained in cash in safe deposit
box, Michigan Avenue National Bank,
Chicago, Illinois.....\$ 22,853.32

Total \$114,689.90

F B I

Date: 1/10/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

6
2
SOLO
IS - C

ReBuairtel dated 1/8/64.

For the Bureau's information, debriefing has been completed and all information received from CG 5824-S* relative to the 14th Solo Mission has been submitted to the Bureau by letterhead memoranda or informant statements.

Boyle
mm
Shelton

P

REC 55

100-428091-3555

JAN 15 1964

1/10/64 RB
③-Bureau (RM)
1-ChicagoRWH:MDW
(4)
1/10/64 RB
*mg**5/NGR*Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

65 JAN 1 1964
FH

F B I

Date: 1/10/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS - C

ReBuairtel dated 12/26/63.

The matter referred to in reairtel has not to date been handled by Chicago because of lack of opportunity for extended personal contact at which discussion on this matter could be held. Every effort, however, will be made by Chicago to handle this matter as expeditiously as possible.

REC 55

100-428091-3556

JAN 15 1964

- 7 100-428091-3556
- ③-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (100-134637) (Info) (RM)
1-Chicago

RWH:MDW
(5)

Approved: _____

Sent _____ M Per _____

65 JAN 10 1964
Special Agent in Charge
F-110

F B I

Date: 12/27/63

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B)

SOLO
IS - C

ReBuairtel dated 12/23/63.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau is one copy of the book "Das Programm der KPdSU und der Westen," ("The Program of the CPSU and the West"), written by TIMUR TIMOFEEV, which the Bureau expressed an interest in reviewing by reairtel.

CG 5824-S* has indicated that he intends to present this book to PEGGY DENNIS, mother of TIMUR TIMOFEEV, in approximately 45 to 60 days. Therefore, the Bureau may retain this book for that period at the end of which time Chicago will return the book to CG 5824-S*.

COPY AND SPECIMENS RETAINED IN LAB.
FOR LAB ACTION AND REPORT

Fin. doc
12-31-63

1-80886
③-Bureau (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-Chicago

~~COPY AND SPECIMENS RETAINED IN LAB.
FOR LAB ACTION AND REPORT~~

WAB:MDW

(4)

REC-11

NOT RECORDED

22 JAN 16 1964

(2) INT. SEC.

Approved: *[Signature]*

Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner *AB* DATE: 1-14-64FROM : Mr. W. G. Shaw *WEL* 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. ShawSUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

This memorandum outlines the material developed during Solo Mission 14, and will assist in locating pertinent data within the Solo file.

DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION:AIRTELSERIAL

ALGERIA (CP OF).....	12/7/63	3404
ALTMAN, MISCHA		
CPUSA member residing in Vienna, Austria.....	12/16/63	3527
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100-428091 JAN 17 1964 REG-40
 WGS:pwd (3)

22 JAN 16 1964

100 428091-3558
 5

Memorandum to Mr. F. J. Baumgardner
 RE: SOLO
 100-428091

	<u>AIRTEL</u>	<u>SERIAL</u>
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ESCALANTE, CESAR (Visits USSR).....	12/9/63	3412
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[REDACTED].....	12/16/63	3473
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Memorandum to Mr. F. J. Baumgardner
 RE: SOLO
 100-428091

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Memorandum to Mr. F. J. Baumgardner
 RE: SOLO
 100-428091

	<u>AIRTEL</u>	<u>SERIAL</u>
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	12/16/63	3476

ACTION:

None. File for record purposes.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *[Signature]*
FROM : C. F. Downing

DATE: January 14, 1964

SUBJECT: SOLO
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.

On 1/13/64, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies, but no messages were transmitted.

ACTION:

For information.

2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)

[Signature] PWP:drv
(9) *[Signature]*
[Signature]

RECEIVED

100-428071-3559

22 JAN 16 1964

FIN 6
57 JAN 20 1964

[Signature]
[Signature]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-30-2011

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 1/3/64

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL

REGISTERED MAIL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [100-428091] (X) (S)
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [100-134637] (X) (S)
SUBJECT: SOLO (X) (S)
IS-C (X) (S)

ReNYtel, 1/2/64, concerning NY 694-S*: trip to
Toronto, Canada, 12/30/63 to 1/2/64 (X) (S)

NY 604 S* advised SAS ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON and
[redacted] 1/3/64, as follows (X) (S)

According to LESLIE MORRIS, General Secretary, CP of
Canada, the Soviet Ambassador to Canada informed MORRIS that the
"massive document" asking for termination of the cold war, was
prepared by KHRUSHCHEV because of the following: (X) (S)

The concentration of Chinese troops on the Sino-Soviet
border is "overwhelming." The Soviets are making the proposals
to the capitalist countries with respect to ending the cold war
because of this concentration of Chinese troops. By easing
tensions with the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able
to concentrate on the Chinese. If necessary, the Soviets will
be able to move troops from the west to the east and the Chinese
will recognize that the Soviets will be able to do this by reason
of the fact that tensions have been eased with the capitalist
countries. (X) (S)

The Soviets do not openly admit that the Chinese
have so many troops, basing them on the Sino-Soviet border. (X) (S)

- 3 - Bureau [100-428091] (RM)
- 1 - Chicago [134-46 Sub B] (RM)
- 1 - NY [134-91] (41)
- 1 - NY [100-134637] (41)

WGC/ACB:ml
(7)

Approved: _____

Special Agent in Charge

M

Per _____

b6
b7Cb6
b7C

(5)

NY 100-134637

The Soviet Ambassador told LESLIE MORRIS that the Chinese are basing their foreign policy, with respect to their borders, on the borders which China had 100 years ago. At that time the Chinese territory was a great deal more extensive and included areas now held by the Soviet Union. The Chinese wish to re-establish their borders as they were 100 years ago. (S) (X)

NY 694-S* advised that he met with TIM BUCK, Chairman of the CP of Canada and the latter's wife at BUCK's residence on 1/1/64. On the authority of the Canadian CP, BUCK and NELSON CLARKE, a CP of Canada functionary, who were in Moscow in May, 1963, sent through the Central Committee of the CP of the Soviet Union to FIDEL CASTRO who was also then in Moscow, a letter protesting Cuban support of "FLC" terrorist activities in Canada. Subsequently both BUCK and CLARKE met FIDEL CASTRO at a reception in Moscow and conferred briefly with him. CLARKE and BUCK raised the question of support of "FLC" activities and CASTRO told them to "mind their own damn business." According to TIM BUCK, the CP of Cuba does not enjoy the complete confidence of FIDEL CASTRO in that CASTRO relies primarily upon young administrative people who were with him in the mountains prior to his successful overthrow of the Batista Regime. Although old time members of the CP of Cuba are respected by CASTRO, he leans in the direction of the young administrators who know nothing of the years of work of the Cuban CP. The Cuban CP would like to tell FIDEL CASTRO that the revolution in Cuba did not begin when CASTRO came out of the mountains, rather there had been a class struggle existing for years before CASTRO's appearance on the scene and that the Cuban CP was extremely helpful in bringing about the successful revolution. The Cuban CP considers it politic, however, not to do so. (S) (X)

TIM BUCK stated that CASTRO leans upon the Soviet Union in every respect but at the same time many of the people surrounding him lean toward the Chinese. (S) (X)

NY 100-134637

TIM BUCK informed NY 694-S* that he had received letters from "Comrade Jackson" of the New Zealand CP which reflected that JACKSON is now leaning toward the Soviets rather than the Chinese. According to JACKSON, others in the leadership of the New Zealand Party are beginning to lean towards the Soviets. However, the New Zealand Party in total consists of only 500 members.

In a subsequent meeting with NY 694-S*, LESLIE MORRIS informed NY 694-S* of the following:

The Soviet Ambassador to Canada is pleased by the fact that the Canadian Party will continue its polemics in support of the Soviets with respect to their dispute with the Chinese CP. The Soviet Ambassador further advised MORRIS that the 6 Canadian students, who had been sent to Moscow CP training school, have completed their course. The Soviet Ambassador requested that 6 more students from Canada be sent to Moscow in the near future to attend this particular CP training school. MORRIS expressed the opinion to NY 694-S* that it is not wise to send students from Canada to Moscow. He would prefer that the CP of Canada should provide a training school for its own students. MORRIS observed that 87 Canadian CP members traveled to the Soviet Union during 1963. MORRIS expressed the opinion that this distracts from the independent character of the Canadian CP, indicating the influence of the Soviets upon the Canadian CP.

With respect to an inquiry by NY 694-S* concerning printing equipment for the CPUSA to be obtained in East Germany, MORRIS informed NY 694-S* that he is aware that NORMAN FREED is looking into this matter for the CPUSA. He did not know of the results of FREED's efforts.

MORRIS further informed NY 694-S* that he has no information from NORMAN FREED concerning the seminar that was scheduled to take place in the German Democratic Republic for 12/8&9/63, concerning the conditions in the East German Party.

NY [100-134637] (S) (X)

(S) (X) MORRIS did note, however, that FREED, who is the Canadian CP representative of the World Marxist Review in Prague, Czechoslovakia, is scheduled to return to Canada in Feb., 1964. (S) (X) MORRIS is not certain FREED will return to Canada from his assignment on the World Marxist Review because of a discussion presently going on between the CP of Canada and the World Marxist Review. The Canadian CP contends that the World Marxist Review is "too Russian" and concerns itself to an excessive extent with issues concerning the Russian CP. The Canadian CP contends that the World Marxist Review should adopt a policy of becoming more international in character. (S) (X)

(S) (X) MORRIS expressed the opinion that the recent article by ELIZABETH GURLEY FLYNN appearing in the Nov., 1963 issue of "Political Affairs" was "indiscreet in that she displayed excessive partisanship for the Soviet position with respect to the China-Soviet dispute." MORRIS requested that his opinion be brought to the attention of GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP. (S) (X)

MORRIS advised that the Convention of the CP of Canada will be held on or about Easter, 1964, and that the CPUSA is invited to send 3 delegates. (S) (X)

REC-25
F B ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Date: 1/6/64

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

ReNYairtel 1/3/64, concerning NY 694-S*'s trip to Toronto, Canada, 12/30/63 to 1/2/64.

NY 694-S* advised SAS ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON and [redacted] on 1/3/64 that he conferred with GUS HALL, General Secretary, CPUSA, on that date, advising HALL of the results of his Canadian trip.

Page 4, par. 2 of referenced airtel notes that LESLIE MORRIS expressed the opinion that an article by ELIZABETH CURLEY FLYNN appearing in the November, 1963, issue of "Political Affairs" was "indiscreet," in that she displayed excessive partisanship for the Soviet position with respect to the China-Soviet dispute. MORRIS requested that his opinion be brought to the attention of HALL.

HALL advised NY 694-S* that he, himself, as well as others in the leadership of the CPUSA, agreed with MORRIS' opinion of the FLYNN article. HALL stated that the article reflected an undesirable intimacy between the CPUSA and the Soviets.

Referenced airtel on page 3, par. 3, also notes that Canadian students were attending a CP training school in Moscow. HALL advised NY 694-S* on 1/3/64 that he was opposed

- 3 - BUREAU (100-428091) (RM)
1 - CHICAGO (134-46-Sub-B) (AM-RM)
1 - NY 134-91 (INV) (41)
1 - NY 100-134637 (41)

WGC:msb

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

65 JAN 8 1964

REC-25 100 428091-3561
JAN 7 1964

NY 100-134637

to the procedure whereby students from this country go to Russia to study, in that it reflects Soviet influence on the CPUSA. HALL said that with respect to the Canadians, he would suggest that the Canadian CP organize a national training school in Canada which could be used for the training of both Canadian and American students for CP leadership. HALL also suggested that such a school could be staffed with instructors not only from Canada and the United States, but also from England and possibly even with one from the Soviet Union.

Bureau attention is invited to page 4, par. 1 of referenced NY airtel, lines 3 through 6, which state: "MORRIS is not certain FREED will return to Canada from his assignment on the World Marxist Review because of a discussion presently going on between the CP of Canada and the World Marxist Review." The Bureau and Chicago are requested to change this particular sentence to read as follows: "MORRIS is not certain FREED will return to Prague from Canada to his assignment on the World Marxist Review...."

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-63)

DATE: JAN 6 1964

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-74560)

SUBJECT: CPUSA FUNDS
IS-C

The following are the positive results in the tracing of SOLO money used by the CPUSA and related organizations.

Committee for a Free Press

The Committee for a Free Press is the name of the bank account at First National City Bank, 250 5th Ave., NYC, maintained for receipt and disbursements of monies used in the operation of Publishers New Press, Inc.

<u>Date of Deposit</u>	<u>Denomination</u>	<u>Amounts Identical with SOLO Funds</u>
6/17/63	7 \$10 bills & 105 \$20 bills	93 \$20 bills
6/25/63	103 \$20 bills 69 \$10 bills 1 \$50 bill	77 \$20 bills 2 \$10 bills
8/5/63	50 \$50 bills	47 \$50 bills
8/7/63	1 \$10 bill 253 \$20 bills 50 \$50 bills	228 \$20 bills 48 \$50 bills
9/17/63	220 \$20 bills 3 \$100 bills	206 \$20 bills

- 3 - Bureau
(1 - 100-428091) (SOLO-TRACING OF SOLO MONEY)
2 - Detroit (100-30975) (ASSOCIATION FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES)
(1 - 100-13460) (CP FUNDS)
6 - New York
(1 - 97-169) (PUBLISHERS NEW PRESS) (414)
(1 - 100-144189) (FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INC.)
(1 - 100-134637) (SOLO) (41)
(1 - 65-17696) (TRACING OF AMERICAN MONEY
USED IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS) (34)
(1 - 100-141893) (YOUTH PUBLICATIONS) (414)

RLP:jec
(11)

53 JAN 23 1964

CARBON COPY

NOT RECORDED
162 JAN 10 1964

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-129091-101

NY 100-74560

9/23/63	150 \$20 bills	145 \$20 bills
10/11/63	2 \$100 bills 62 \$20 bills	60 \$20 bills
10/23/63	140 \$20 bills	126 \$20 bills
10/28/63	298 \$20 bills	278 \$20 bills
11/6/63	150 \$20 bills	142 \$20 bills

Freedomways Associates, Inc.

The account for this organization is maintained at the Amalgamated Bank of New York, 11-15 Union Square, NYC.

7/19/63	200 \$20 bills 1 \$5 bill 5 \$1 bill	194 \$20 bills
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Association for Economic Studies

The account for this organization is maintained at the Bank of the Commonwealth, Wyoming-Grand River Branch, Detroit, Michigan.

7/11/63	50 \$20 bills	45 \$20 bills
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Youth Publications, Inc.

The account for this organization is maintained in the Amalgamated Bank of New York, mentioned above.

7/18/63	40 \$20 bills 2 \$10 bills	35 \$20 bills
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The identity of the foregoing money was established by checking serial numbers against the index maintained in connection with NY case 65-17696, "THE TRACING OF AMERICAN MONEY USED IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS."

THE FOREGOING INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE BUREAU.

1/3/64

[Handwritten signature]

SOLO

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

NY 694-S* has following itinerary for trip to Nassau, Bermuda, and return:

Leave J. F. Kennedy Airport, New York City, Sunday, 1-5-64, Pan American Airways Flight 205, 11:00 a.m., arriving Nassau, Bermuda, 1:30 p.m. same date.

When returning will leave Nassau 1-12-64, 3:00 p.m., via Pan American Flight 206, arriving J. F. Kennedy Airport 6:00 p.m. same date.

While in Nassau, informant will stay at Gleneagles House. He will travel and will be registered in this hotel under his true name and will be accompanied by his wife, Roslyn. Arrangements have been made, utilizing adequate security measures, to contact informant and for him to contact us in event of emergency.

File-5

WGS

100 - 428091 -

NOT RECORDED

22 JAN 21 1964

65 JAN 23 1964

~~SECRET~~

REC- 19

(IS) 100-428091 - 3562

BY LIAISON

Date: January 14, 1964

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Shaw

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: REPORTING ON THE IMPACT OF THE SINO-SOVIET
SPLIT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 30, 1963, captioned as above (your file CSCI-3/779,276), concerning the collection of data on the Sino-Soviet split and requesting that this Bureau make available any comprehensive study made on the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA).

Your study of the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on the international communist movement is of considerable interest to us. We are certainly desirous of cooperating to the fullest extent and will continue to disseminate to you all data received dealing with the various aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute and its repercussions.

We are forwarding to your agency under separate cover a copy of a 181-page study we have prepared entitled "History and Development of the Sino-Soviet Rift." Our study covers Sino-Soviet relations during the period 1958 to December, 1963, which is the period during which most of the major developments in this rift occurred. The study also contains a section pertaining to the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the CPUSA.

NOTE: Classified "~~Secret~~" because incoming is so classified and outgoing by necessity refers to incoming.

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Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

WGS:kmj:rbrn
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downgrading and
declassification

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1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Shaw

RA

(IS) 100-423091

Date: December 20, 1963

To: Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

SECURITY MATTER - C

U.S.S.R.

C N.Y.

SOLO

b6
b7C

A source which has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that subject is currently in the Soviet Union where [redacted] is taking the equivalent of a post-graduate course at a Soviet university. [redacted] apparently studied Russian previously in the United States and as a result is reportedly making excellent progress in [redacted] studies.

b6
b7C

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Assistant Attorney General

REC 7, dek

BY COURIER SVC
22 DEC 23
COMM-FBI

100-423091-21
100-428091-3562X

NOTE:

Classified "~~Secret~~" because disclosure of information to unauthorized persons would jeopardize the source, who is furnishing information on a top-level basis concerning the international communist movement. Source is CG 5824-S*. See Chicago airtel 12/16/63 captioned "Solo. IS-C" enclosing letter-head memorandum entitled [redacted] Subject is included in Section B of Reserve Index. [redacted] and [redacted] Communist Party, USA, members from New York City. State, CIA and Department of Justice have previously been furnished reports pertaining to subject.

b6
b7C

Tolson _____
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WGS:kmj

(8)

MAY 13 1964

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Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)

DATE: 12/31/63

FROM : SAC ~~CHICAGO~~ (134-46 Sub B)

ATTN: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN

SUBJECT: SOLO
IS-C

There are enclosed by separate package seven copies for the Bureau of a paper prepared by the Chicago Office of materials furnished by CG 5824-S* and to a lesser extent by NY 694-S* on the "History and Development of the Sino-Soviet Rift" and on Sino-Soviet relations generally during the period of 1958 to December, 1963. This paper is the joint effort of CG 5824-S* and Supervisor CARL N. FREYMAN. One copy is enclosed herein for New York.

In the interest of setting a background for these developments and since to a large degree they are the focal point and core of these disagreements, considerable attention was also given to the proceedings of the 20th Congress, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1956 and the Moscow Conference and Declaration of 1957.

To facilitate the reading of this voluminous document, a foreword, table of contents and an index of names were also prepared. The summary and conclusions beginning at page 171 are based on the information appearing in the document itself and the observations of CG 5824-S* who has read the entire document and approved of same for accuracy of content.

As will be noted, the document is detailed and pointed in content insofar as contacts with individuals, travel and attendance at conferences, congresses and celebrations are concerned. It was felt necessary to be specific in order to give the paper authenticity and value as well as to indicate the true reliability of this source. For this reason a classification of "~~Top Secret~~" must be recommended.

One copy of this paper is designated to New York in view of the participation of NY 694-S* in the Solo operation and the utilization of certain documents furnished by this source and received through the Solo apparatus.

- (2) - Bureau (RM) REC-38
1 - Package (RM)
1 - New York (100-134637)(Enc. 1)(RM)
1 - Chicago

MYJ:mec

(5)

ENCLOSURE

REC- 38

EX-114

22 JAN 20 1964

~~INT. SEC.~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 12-30-2011

~~TOP SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION



SUBJECT:

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT

DATE:

December 31, 1963

ENCLOSURE

100-428,91-3563

~~TOP SECRET~~

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I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CPC
HAS RELATION TO SINO-SOVIET
RIFT-RECTIFICATION PROGRAM

Communist Parties of the world at one time or another go through periods of preserving the "purity" of the Party. Stalin had his purges in the 30's and at other times. Khrushchev, after the Stalin exposures, cleansed the leadership of the remaining pro-Stalin elements by disposing of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and others from positions of leadership in the CPSU.

The CPC, on the other hand, has had a continuous program of cleansing its Party of unreliaables which is known in that Party as the "Rectification Program." Kang Sheng, alternate member of the Political Bureau and a member of the Secretariat, Central Committee CP of China (CCCCP), in charge of ideological work for the CPC, in 1958 described the rectification campaign within the CPC as a struggle between proletarian ideology and non-proletarian ideology. Outside the CPC, according to Kang, it is a struggle between revolution and counter-revolution. It is a nation-wide campaign of socialist education to raise the level of Marxism-Leninism. It is a campaign to use methods of criticism and self-criticism. It is a campaign against the

class enemy - it is a struggle of revolutionaries against counter-revolutionaries.

The Rectification Program began as an internal program in China in 1942, seven years before the taking of state power by the CPC. It was important, according to Kang, because it laid down the ideological basis for victory of the revolution in 1949 as it solved the problem of who conquers whom on the ideological front - capitalism or socialism.

While the Rectification Program carries on a struggle against counter-revolutionaries, it goes much further. Kang quoted Mao Tse-tung as stating that it is the socialist-revolution on the "political and ideological fronts."

Kang explained the Rectification Program historically, noting that the capture of power by the CPC was only the beginning of the revolution; that getting state power was only the beginning, and that thereafter the task of the working class was to continue socialist transformation by continuing the economic revolution to change the ownership of the means of production. If the CPC had not continued to carry out an ideological revolution on the political and ideological fronts, the socialist revolution, even though accomplished on the economic front, could not have been consolidated and enemies on the inside and outside would have attempted counter-revolution. A

prolonged period of struggle must follow the capture of power. Therefore, this formulation is included in the common laws governing transition, and the CPC views this universal truth as very important.

Kang, in summarizing, quoted Mao as stating that rectification has for its purpose the getting of a correct political orientation for everybody. Mao listed the aims to include, "A campaign to correct shortcomings and weaknesses of the Party work - to rid the Party of bureaucracism, sectarianism, and subjectivity and to raise the political and ideological levels of all the people!" Revisionism, according to Kang, has one characteristic the world over - revisionists never understand how to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism. The history of the CPC is that victories were inconceivable without unity obtained through the Rectification Program.

The remarks of Kang Sheng are not unrelated to and cannot be disregarded in any analysis of the present rift in the international communist movement. They represent the ideological basis of the CPC for the need of the preservation of Marxism-Leninism in the international communist movement at this time. The Chinese think dogmatically on Marxism-Leninism and have extended their thesis of the need to preserve the purity of Marxism-Leninism from the area of purity as an

internal matter into the arena of the international communist movement. The international communist movement under the leadership of the CPSU in the eyes of the Chinese is pursuing a revisionist line in the matter of foreign policy through its "peaceful coexistence" line, in its program relative to the underdeveloped countries, in its evaluation of the effect of nuclear weapons in the hands of imperialism, and in other similar areas. Consequently, in the view of the Chinese, a program among Communist Parties is necessary to correct deviations from Marxism-Leninism and to preserve the purity of the ideology on an international level.

II. CONFERENCES AND DOCUMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RIFT

A. 20th Congress, CPSU, February, 1956

Nikita Khrushchev, in his report on the international situation given at the 20th Congress, CPSU, in February, 1956, emphasized that the most important task confronting the world at the present time is the preventing of a new war. He called for cooperation within socialist circles, including cooperation with the Social Democrats, whose views on forms of transition may be different than that of the Communist Party, where they were willing to engage in an active struggle against war.

The CCCPSU endorsed working with "big popular forces" in the fight for the preservation of peace.

Khrushchev called for the winning of political freedom of former colonies and semi-colonies through the achievement of economic independence and proffered economic help from the socialist countries. He differentiated this type of "aid" from the imperialist countries from the so-called aid proffered by socialist countries by pointing out that when imperialism gives "aid" it is granted on definite political terms.

Khrushchev stated that the peace initiative of the Soviet Union has become one of the most important factors, exerting a tremendous influence on international events. He listed important steps in which the Soviet Union initiative for peace had developed. They included the following:

1. Improving relations with the great powers.
2. Elimination of the breeding grounds for war in West Europe and Asia.
3. Adjusting tensions with a number of countries in East Europe to ease tension in Europe, including the normalization of state relations with Yugoslavia.
4. Exploration of new ways to settle questions such as the establishment of a collective security program in Europe, disarmament, prohibition of atomic weapons, the German problem, etc.

5. Rapprochement with all countries desiring to serve peace.

6. Expanding international contacts through trade unions, social, cultural and economic means.

Khrushchev noted success in the Soviet program to ease tensions and pledged to strive to establish greater and closer cooperation with the great powers - France, the United States and Great Britain.

He listed three cardinal problems whose solutions can lay the foundations for lasting and durable peace; they were: collective security in Europe, assuring collective security in Asia and disarmament.

He enumerated the ending of the arms race as being one of mankind's vital tasks and pledged the CPSU to spare no effort to solve this problem. Khrushchev pledged the Soviet Union to do everything necessary to safeguard international peace and security.

He then proposed five principles of "peaceful coexistence" as a basis for peace if the United States would agree to them. These included mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference with others' domestic affairs, equality and mutual advantage, peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation.

He expressed a desire of the Soviet Union for friendship with the United States and cooperation with it for peace and international security. He also called for cooperation in the economic and cultural spheres and stated that the Soviet Union had proposed such a treaty with the United States.

On the question of the present day international development, Khrushchev listed peaceful coexistence of the two systems, and the "possibility" of preventing wars in the present era, and forms of transition to socialism as being the key questions of the day.

On the question of "peaceful coexistence" of the two systems, Khrushchev said that it rests on Leninist principles and remains the general line of Soviet policy. He denied that the peaceful coexistence policy has been reached out of considerations of expediency or as a tactical move. He stated the program was possible because the Soviet Union does not want war.

He denied that the Soviet Union was out to "export revolution" to overthrow capitalism. He said the Soviet Union has no plans to interfere with the internal affairs of countries of capitalism.

He said that communists say, "Socialism will win in competition between the two systems. This by no means signifies that its victory can be achieved through armed

interference by socialist countries in the internal affairs of capitalist countries. Our certainty of victory of communism is based upon the fact that the socialist mode of production possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of production."

He stated that the CPSU has always held and continues to hold that the establishment of a new social system in one or another country is an internal affair of the peoples of the countries concerned.

Continuing on the question of the "possibility" of preventing war in the present era, Khrushchev said that Marxists must answer this question by taking into consideration the epoch-making changes of the last decade. He recognized the Marxist principle that "wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists." He stated that this precept evolved at a time when imperialism embraced the entire world system and social and political forces which did not want war were weak and unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war.

He stated that in the early period of socialist state development this precept was absolutely correct, but at the present time this situation has changed radically. Now there is a world camp of socialism and the peace forces have support and material means to prevent aggression. The movement of

peace supporters has sprung up and developed into a powerful factor.

In these circumstances, according to Khrushchev, the Leninist precept that so long as imperialism exists the economic basis giving rise to war will also be preserved remains in force - that is why the Soviet Union must display the greatest vigilance. But he noted, war is not "fatally inevitable," - "The more actively the peoples defend peace, the greater the guarantees that there will be no new war."

Explaining the formulation of forms of transition to socialism in different countries, he noted that radical changes in the world have opened up new prospects in respect to the transitions of countries and nations to socialism. He recalled that as far back as the October revolution Lenin wrote, "All nations will arrive at socialism - this is inevitable, but not all will do so in exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own in one or another form of democracy, one or another variety of dictatorship of the proletariat, one or another rate of which socialist transformations will be effected in the various aspects of social life." "Works", Volume 23, Page 58.

Continuing, he reported that ^{STATE} it is probable that more forms of transition to socialism will appear. Moreover, the implementation of these forms need not be associated with civil

war, under all circumstances...True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a socialist society. It is this that distinguishes revolutionary Marxists from reformists and the opportunists. There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of the class struggle connected with this are inevitable. But the forms of social revolution vary. It is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society."

(Emphasis added.)

Khrushchev continued by stating that Lenin thought the ruling class will not surrender voluntarily and that the use or non-use of violence in transition depends on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiters will resort to violence rather than the proletariat.

The question arises whether it is possible to go over to socialism by parliamentary means since the historical situation has had radical changes which make possible a new approach to the question. Socialism today, according to Khrushchev, has the great power of attraction for workers and peasants and intellectuals of all countries.

Khrushchev noted that at the same time the present situation offers the working class in a number of capitalist countries a need and real opportunity to unite the overwhelming majority of the people under its leadership and to secure the

basic means of production in the hands of the people. The winning of a parliamentary majority backed by a revolutionary movement of the proletariat and all of the working class could create for the working class of a number of capitalist and former colonial countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes.

Continuing, he said, "In countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will inevitably offer strong resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class revolutionary struggle." (Emphasis added.)

Khrushchev, in his report, then listed the tasks confronting the Party in the sphere of foreign policy as follows:

1. To pursue the Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence between different states irrespective of social systems.

2. To strengthen in every way the fraternal relations of the Soviet Union with the other countries within the socialist camp. To strengthen friendship and cooperate with the fraternal peoples of Yugoslavia.

3. To consolidate the bond of friendship with India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan and other countries which stand for peace.

4. To pursue a vigorous policy of improving relations with the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan,

Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and other countries with a view to strengthening mutual confidence.

5. To follow vigilantly the intrigues of circles who do not want a relaxation of international tensions, to ensure the security of our socialist state.

Continuing, Khrushchev reported on the question of improving the state apparatus. He stated that whenever the Party made mistakes the CCCPSU took the necessary steps to correct them. The CCCPSU considered it of paramount importance to re-establish and strengthen in every way the Leninist principle of collective leadership. The CCCPSU was concerned with developing the creative activity of Party members and to this end it took steps to explain the Marxist conception of the role of the individual in history. "It vigorously condemned the cult of the individual as being alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, a cult which tends to make a particular leader a hero and miracle worker and at the same time belittles the role of the Party and the masses, and tends to reduce creative effort---." Continuing, he said, "at the same time we firmly stand for peaceful coexistence, for economic competition between socialism and capitalism; we follow a consistent policy of peace and friendship among nations."

1. Significance of the 20th Congress
in the Sino-Soviet Rift

At an important conference involving the CPSU and CPC leaders held from July 5 - 20, 1963, Teng Hsiao-ping, General

Secretary, CPC, delivered two significant speeches in which he outlined the history and development of the Sino-Soviet rift.

He stated that many of the differences between the Parties stem from the 20th Congress, CPSU, in 1956, which presented propositions which ran counter to Marxism-Leninism on the question of war and peace and peaceful transition to socialism. Also, the 20th Congress was the scene of an indiscriminate attack on Stalin on the "pretext of the personality cult." This paved the way for a revision of Marxism-Leninism.

After the 20th Congress, according to Teng, with the mistakes laid as a basis, revisionism as an ideological trend became widespread.

Revisionist and anti-Party factional groups became widespread. They began operating in Canada, the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, France and in other Parties. The Soviet Union began to take an opportunistic and revisionist path. Teng reminded the CPSU that as early as 1956 the CPSU was told that the CPC disagreed with the peaceful transition to socialism and on the question of Stalin. Teng said that Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the CPC, himself, said that it was better to view Stalin as 70 percent good and 30 percent bad as against Khrushchev's statements that Stalin was 50 percent good and 50 percent bad.

Continuing, he stated that in 1956 Chou En-lai, Premier of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), spoke to Boris N. Ponomarev, a Secretary of the CCCPSU in charge of international affairs, criticizing the mistakes of the CPSU and for failure to consult the other Parties on the question of Stalin. Teng continued, reminding the interested Parties that on November 30, 1956, Mao spoke to Comrade Yudin, then USSR Ambassador to the PRC, stating that the basic policy or line "during Stalin's leadership was correct, and one should not treat one's comrades as an enemy."

Teng said the CPSU's claim that the CPC agreed with the criticism of Stalin was not in accord with the facts. What the CPC said in the past was that it agreed on the Stalin criticism to uphold the prestige of the CPSU in the world communist movement.

M. A. Suslov, a member of the Presidium and a Secretary of the CCCPSU, representing the CPSU at the same meeting, in his reply to Teng, brought further light on the history and development of this rift.

He charged that the CPC had linked its campaign against the CPSU with the lessening of international tensions, which began in 1954. He charged that the CPC's claim that the serious difficulties between the Parties arose out of the 20th Congress was untenable, as will be demonstrated.

B. Moscow Declaration and Peace
Manifesto, November, 1957

A basic document in any understanding of the current Sino-Soviet rift today is the "Declaration of Communist and Workers Parties" signed by representatives of 12 Communist and Workers Parties following the 40th anniversary celebration of the CPSU in Moscow. This meeting occurred from November 14 - 16, 1957. It was signed by representatives of the USSR, China, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, East Germany, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Representatives of Yugoslavia, while present, did not sign this document. Representatives of fraternal parties of the capitalist countries and later most parties in one form or another endorsed this document.

Section I of this Declaration noted that the main content of the present epoch is the transition from capitalism to socialism; that the growth of the forces of socialism had stimulated the rapid expansion of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement during the post-war period. It notes that the people of the colonial and dependent countries still languishing in slavery are intensifying the struggle for national liberation, and the progress of the national liberation movement had greatly accelerated the disintegration of imperialism.

It states that in the present epoch, world development is determined by the course and result of the competition between two diametrically opposed social systems and the rapid economic

advancement of the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, is demonstrative of the vitality of socialism.

It states that while socialism is on the upgrade, imperialism is heading toward a decline. Imperialism is weakened as a result of the disintegration of the colonial system.

Because of the conditions of the working people in capitalist countries, as well as contradictions between classes in these countries, increasingly favorable conditions are being created for bringing them into an active struggle for socialism.

The Declaration attacks the United States as a center of world reaction and as the sworn enemy of the people. It states, "So long as imperialism exists, there will always be soil for aggressive wars." At the same time it charges that the aggressive imperialist forces flatly refuse to cut armaments, to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, and are continuing the "cold war," the arms drive, building military bases, and conducting an aggressive policy of undermining peace and creating a new war. It notes that should a world war break out before a prohibition of nuclear weapons is reached, "it would inevitably become a nuclear war unprecedented in destructive force." The document condemns the "imperialists" for trying to impose on the freedom-loving people of the Middle East "the Eisenhower-Dulles Doctrine," thereby creating the danger of war in this area.

It states, "The question of war or peaceful coexistence is now the crucial question of world policy...At present the forces

... of peace have so grown that there is a real possibility of averting wars, as was demonstrated by the collapse of imperialist designs in Egypt." It maintains that, "The cause of peace is upheld by the powerful forces of our era: the invincible camp of socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union; the peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa taking an anti-imperialist stand and forming, together with other socialist countries, a broad peace zone; the international working class and above all its vanguard, the Communist parties; the liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies; the mass peace movement of the peoples; the peoples of the European countries who have proclaimed neutrality, the peoples of Latin America and the masses in the imperialist countries are putting up increasing resistance to the plans of a new war." It adds, "An alliance of these mighty forces could prevent war."

Continuing it states, "The Communist and Workers parties taking part in the meeting declare that the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of the two systems, which has been further developed and brought up to date in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, is the sound basis of the foreign policy of Socialist countries and the dependable pillar of peace and friendship among peoples. The idea of peaceful coexistence coincides with the five principles advanced jointly by the Chinese Peoples Republic and the Republic of India and with the program adopted at the Bandung Conference of African-Asian countries. Peace and

peaceful coexistence have now become the demands of the broad masses in all countries. The Communist Parties regard the struggle for peace as their foremost task. They will do all in their power to prevent war."

Section II of this document declares that the bedrock of relations of the parties lies in the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism; that the working class throughout the world is interested in preserving from enemy encroachment the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic and "in seeing these gains extended and consolidated." The document recognizes that the socialist countries base their relations on principles of complete equality and non-interference in one another's affairs. Further, that fraternal mutual aid is part and parcel of these relations.

It pledges the socialist states to have economic and cultural cooperation and to expand this cooperation,

It asserts the socialist world as being against the division of the world into military blocs, but recognizes the need for the Warsaw Pact Organization as a defensive necessity because the Western powers refuse proposals for the abolition of military blocs. It pledges solidarity and unity of socialist countries and agrees on a Marxist-Leninist policy for education of all working people in the spirit of combining internationalism

with patriotism and it calls for a determined effort to overcome all survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism. It pledges that all issues of disagreement pertaining to relations of socialist countries will be settled through comradely discussion "with strict observance of the principles of socialist internationalism."

Section III states that the meeting confirmed the identity of views of the Communist and Workers Parties on the "cardinal problems of the Socialist Revolution and Socialist construction." It reaffirms "the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist proposition that the processes of Socialist revolution and the building of Socialism are governed by a number of basic laws applicable in all countries embarking on a Socialist course," but notes that historic national peculiarities and traditions must be taken into account.

The Declaration specifies these laws to include:

1. "Guidance of the working masses by the working class, the core of which is the Marxist-Leninist Party in effecting a proletarian revolution in one form or another and establishing one form or another of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

2. "The alliance of the working class and the bulk of the peasantry and other sections of the working people.

3. "The abolition of capitalist ownership and the establishment of public ownership of the basic means of production,

4. "Gradual Socialist reconstruction of agriculture,

5. "Planned development of the national economy...

6. "Defense of the achievements of socialism against attacks by external and internal enemies,

7. "Solidarity of the working class of the country in question with the working class of other countries, that is, proletarian internationalism,"

The document recognizes that Marxism-Leninism calling for a creative application of the general principles of socialist revolution and construction depends on concrete conditions of each country and "rejects mechanical imitation of the policies and tactics of Communist parties of other countries." The document recognizes the need for correctly applying these basic principles by each nation, but states that disregard of national peculiarities by the proletarian party inevitably leads to its divorce from reality, from the masses, and is bound to prejudice the cause of socialism. Conversely, exaggeration of the role of these peculiarities or departure, under the pretext of national peculiarities, from the universal Marxist-Leninist truth on the socialist revolution and socialist construction is just as harmful to the socialist cause and both tendencies should be combatted simultaneously.

The document recognizes that dialectical materialism is the basis of the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Dialectical materialism is countered by metaphysics and idealism. A failure to base decisions on dialectical materialism will result in one-sidedness and

subjectivism. It recognizes opportunism in the working class movement and notes that the meeting resolutely recognized the need to overcome revisionism and dogmatism in the ranks of the Party. Dogmatism, it states, leads to isolation of the Party and causes contact to be lost with the masses. The Party condemns dogmatism but believes that the main danger is revisionism--a manifestation of bourgeois ideology which paralyzes the revolutionary energy of the working class and demands preservation or restoration of capitalism. This document points out that the conquest of power is only the beginning and not the conclusion of the revolution. After the conquest of power, the working class is confronted with the serious tasks of effecting the socialist reconstruction of the national economy and laying the economic and technical foundation of socialism. At the same time the overthrown bourgeoisie always attempts to make a comeback and the influence of the bourgeoisie is very great. Therefore, a "fairly long time is needed to resolve the issue of who will win, capitalism or socialism." The existence of the bourgeois influence is the internal source of revisionism, while surrender to imperialist pressure is its external source.

According to this document, revisionists "deny the historical necessity for a proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, deny the leading role of the Marxist-

Leninist party, reject the principles of proletarian internationalism, and call for the rejection of the Leninist principles of party organization and, above all, of democratic centralism, for transforming the CP from a militant revolutionary organization into some kind of debating society."

Section IV of this Declaration enumerates the tasks of the Communist and Workers Parties with which they are faced in the present epoch. Carrying out these tasks necessitates closer unity, not only of the Parties, but also of "the entire working class...and peasantry, rallying the working people and progressive mankind, the freedom and peace-loving forces of the world."

"The defense of peace is the most important world-wide task..." The Declaration calls for Communists and Workers Parties in all countries to join in action "on the broadest possible scale with all forces favoring peace and opposed to war." Participants in this meeting declared that they will support the efforts of all states, parties, organizations, movements and individuals who champion peace and oppose war, who want peaceful coexistence, collective security in Europe and Asia, reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use and tests of nuclear weapons." On the question of the historic tasks of the struggle of national independence against colonial aggression, "what is needed is a united anti-imperialist, anti-feudal front of the workers, peasants,

urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, and other patriotic democratic forces."

Since monopoly capitalism is chiefly responsible for the arms race, the present struggle of the working class must be spearheaded against it. Objective conditions exist in countries suffering from the United States policy of economic and military expansion which are a basis for unity under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary party. The tasks include a program to fight for peace, to defend national independence, to raise the standard of living, to carry through radical land reforms, and to overthrow the role of the monopolies who betray the national interests. This section of the Declaration states that forms of transition to socialism may vary for different countries and that the working class and its vanguard "seek to achieve the socialist revolution by peaceful means." It notes that today in a number of capitalist countries, the working class can defeat the reactionary forces and secure a firm majority in parliament, launch a non-parliamentary struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces, and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realization of the socialist revolution.

It states that all of this is possible only by "broad and ceaseless development of the class struggle of the workers, peasant masses, and the urban middle strata against monopoly capital, against reaction, for profound social reforms, for peace and socialism."

However, the document notes that in the event the ruling class resorts to violence, the "possibility of non-peaceful transition to socialism" should be borne in mind.

This section of the Declaration also sets forth a recognition of the need for cooperation between communists and socialists on many issues and states that ideological differences should not keep them from establishing unity of action on many pressing issues confronting the working class movement.

It states that, in the socialist countries, the task is to establish close relations with the broad masses of people to consolidate the socialist system.

It also states, as a task of the Party, the promotion of unity of Communist and Workers Parties for further solidarity between Parties of all countries. "This solidarity is the core of still greater solidarity, it is the main guarantee of the victory of the cause of the working class." It adds that Communist and Workers Parties have the responsibility with regard to the destinies of world socialism and the international communist movement to promote this unity.

The Declaration, which was signed by all the 12 socialist states including the Chinese, recognized the historic decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU (1956) as not only important to the CPSU and to the building of communism in the USSR, but as opening a new stage in the world communist movement and as pushing further ahead the development of Marxism-Leninism.

C. Issues Developing out of 20th Congress
CPSU and Moscow Declaration

The Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957 are cornerstones around which the Chinese-Soviet ideological rift has developed. A close study of these issues therefore becomes of utmost importance.

At a CP Conference held in Bucharest, Rumania, in June, 1960, a secret letter of the CPSU dated June 21, 1960, consisting of some 80 pages, was distributed. It was addressed to all Communist Parties and indicated that as of June, 1960, many of the major issues between the CPC and the CPSU developed out of the Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957.

The June, 1960, CPSU letter discusses a number of these points of conflict stemming from these so-called basic agreements. According to the CPSU document, these included:

1. There is disagreement on the character of the present epoch of world development. The CPSU contended that the 1957 Declaration that imperialism remains aggressive is still in force. The point at issue, according to the CPSU, is "Can imperialism carry out its aggressive plan as it might have done fifty years ago?" The CPSU says "no," that the relation of forces between socialism and imperialism has changed radically, therefore imperialism cannot do things as it could before. Due to these changes it is necessary to have a non-dogmatic analysis.

The CPC, according to this document, sees the present epoch of world development as being one of imperialism, wars and revolution. All other descriptions of the epoch are a departure from Marxism-Leninism and Lenin's characterization of imperialism.

2. On the question of war and peace, the CPSU at the 20th Congress spoke of the possibility of preventing war in the present epoch. The CPSU charges that the CPC in recent statements departed from this thesis of the 20th Congress by speaking of "illusions" regarding the possibility of preventing wars.

The CPSU contends that the CPC overestimated the forces of imperialism and underestimated the forces of socialism and the World Socialist System which it, the CPSU, considers as the chief factor of peace.

The CPSU contends that the CPC departed from this thesis and spoke of imperialism as a "paper tiger" on the one hand and on the other hand says "imperialism is all powerful."

The CPSU contends that "peaceful coexistence" was proclaimed by Lenin in the early days of the revolution and was later agreed to by all Parties at the 20th Congress. Now the CPSU contends that the CPC position is that until capitalism and imperialism are completely abolished, disarmament is an "illusion" and the alternation of war and peace is a constant inevitable phenomenon.

The CPSU contends that "peaceful coexistence" is identified by the CPC as "class peace" and as flirting with the national bourgeoisie. This is regarded as wrong in theory.

The CPSU contends that Marxism-Leninism never extended coexistence to relations between colonies and mother countries, between dependent and independent countries, between proletarian masses and exploiting classes. The CPSU contends that peaceful coexistence means peaceful coexistence with states having different social systems. Further, that peaceful coexistence facilitates revolutionary struggle in all countries under capitalism because the working class would be less influenced by patriotic slogans of defense, national aims, etc. The CPSU stated in the document that it supports the national liberation movement by using alliances with the national bourgeoisie. The CPSU contended that peaceful coexistence does not weaken the might of the socialist camp to repel aggression. The CPSU guarantees the safety of socialism.

The document contends that the CPC contention that disarmament is an illusion is not correct or farsighted. Lenin, as early as 1922, supported disarmament. Today, it is not merely a "diplomatic move" but a serious "political aid" in the interest of world socialism. The CPC charges that disarmament slogans weaken the masses and the will of the colonial people to fight for liberation and against imperialism. The CPSU contends that these charges are false and that the demand to disarm the great powers will hasten the colonial struggle to an earlier victory.

3. The 20th Congress Declaration as to the "possibility" of the proletariat winning power by "peaceful" means is challenged

by the CPC. The CPC also charges the CPSU with advocating "peaceful means as the only way of transition." The CPSU in answer refers to the 20th Congress documents which speak of the peaceful way as only one of the ways provided, in addition to armed struggle and the overthrow of the state apparatus, to attain the victories of the revolution.

The CPSU contended in this document that its thesis is supported by Lenin who taught the working class to master all forms of class struggle, peaceful as well as non-peaceful.

4. The CPSU charges the CPC has departed from the Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957. The CPC, on the other hand, claims that it adheres to the Moscow Declaration of 1957.

The CPSU answered in the June, 1960, document that the 1957 Declaration said "the main content of our epoch is the transition from capitalism to socialism - - in our epoch, world development is determined by the course and results of the competition between two diametrically opposed systems." The CPSU contends that the CPC has reversed this Declaration by describing the epoch as "an epoch of the last stage of the development of capitalism, an epoch of wars and revolutions." The CPSU quoted the Declaration as saying "at present the forces of peace have so grown, that there is a possibility of averting war." The CPSU contends that the Peace Manifesto in effect says "wars are not inevitable, war can be prevented, peace can be preserved and made secure."

The June, 1960, document contended that the Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957 was based on the sound Leninist principles of "peaceful coexistence" and is a sound basis for foreign policy of socialist countries. The CPC says that this is an illusion, that a world without wars and arms can only be achieved when socialism is victorious all over the world.

The document states that the CPC declares the thesis of the 1957 Declaration that "peace is the foremost task" is "erroneous and anti-Leninist" - that it spreads delusions that there can be peace with capitalism.

The CPSU contends that the CPC has rejected the thesis of the 1957 Declaration that there can be different forms of transition. The CPSU contends that the thesis opens a new stage in the world Marxist-Leninist movement and facilitates the further development of new lines. The CPC questions this thesis, according to the CPSU.

The June, 1960, document contends that the 20th Congress rejected the cult of J. V. Stalin and called for the restoration of Leninist principles or norms of activity of the Party in relation with fraternal parties of other countries, with socialist states, and Soviet foreign policy as a whole. The CPSU charges that the CPC continues to question this matter despite the fact that in the 1956 documents statements were made to the effect that the cult of the personality revealed to the Chinese what negative

consequences the deification of the individual can have. The CPSU contends that events have proved the CPSU was right and charged that the CPC hinders the process of completing the job in other Parties.

The CPSU noted that the Declaration of 1957 stresses international solidarity as the bedrock of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and that this presupposes fraternal relations of Parties. They charged that the CPC has violated these principles.

The June, 1960, document charged that the CPC has attacked the CPSU for revisionism, particularly in regard to Yugoslavia. The CPSU contended that it has always upheld the purity of Marxism-Leninism and pursued a constant policy of proletarian internationalism.

The CPSU claimed that the CPC has violated the principles of proletarian internationalism through constant attacks through the Trade Union Movement (World Federation of Trade Unions) and through other world mass organizations.

D. B. N. Ponomarev, Secretary of the Central
Committee in Charge of the International
Department, CPSU, Interprets Khrushchev's
Position at 20th Congress

B. N. Ponomarev, in discussing the Khrushchev speech made at the 20th Congress, CPSU, in 1956, stated in 1958 that while the CPSU regards United States imperialism as the chief enemy of mankind, it did not feel United States imperialism was

as strong as claimed. Ponomarev stated that when Khrushchev made his speech at this Congress on the question of different paths to socialism, he had in mind giving legal protection to the various parties in capitalist countries because he felt a number of these parties were in trouble for advocating force and violence. He was trying to ease the situation of these parties from a tactical point of view. Ponomarev was quick to point out that Khrushchev also said that in the same capitalist countries where there is a strong regime with military and police power at its disposal, the working class may have to resort to force and violence and this applied specifically and concretely to the United States. Ponomarev said that Communist Parties can talk about different roads to socialism, but programmatically there can be no illusion that the dictatorship of the proletariat will not require force and violence to suppress the bourgeoisie who will resist. The amount of force required will depend on the extent of resistance by the bourgeoisie or ruling class.

E. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Chairman,
CPUSA, Speaks on 20th Congress

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn attended the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties at Bucharest, Rumania, in June, 1960. In reporting to some leading CPUSA officials on the conference, Flynn revealed that Khrushchev had stated at Bucharest that the CPC even though it had signed the Moscow Declaration of 1957, was not in complete agreement with the Declaration and signed it with reservations.

Khrushchev said that while the CPC supported the CPSU in its condemnation of Stalin at the 20th Congress, the CPC was, at the same time, attempting to undermine the leadership of the CPSU. He used a saying to illustrate the CPC position on Stalin as: "Here are two swords, one is Lenin's and one is Stalin's - if it is rusty let us clean it." Flynn quoted Khrushchev in defending the position of the CPSU at the 20th Congress in replying to the Chinese at Bucharest by saying "Lenin's sword was directed at our enemies, but Stalin's sword had our people's blood on it."

III. CPC LEADERSHIP SPEAKS - 1958

A. Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC

Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, together with other members of the Politburo of the CPC, while talking with some foreign comrades in July, 1958, in evaluating the world political situation from the point of view of the CP of China, stated that the fight against United States imperialism is the main struggle in the international communist movement. The important thing for the communist world is that they hold high the banner of Marxism-Leninism in order that all parties can move forward when revisionism is cleaned up. He quoted Mao Tse-tung as saying, "The golden age of imperialism is over - the East wind prevails over the West wind."

Teng summarized the world international situation by stating that the communist world after the Moscow Conference of 1957 was in good shape and was united now for the same purpose. In world relations it is now either peace or war. The Moscow Declaration, according to Teng, said that all Communist Parties want peace. China wants peace because it will give China the opportunity to finish off capitalism peacefully. BUT, ACCORDING TO TENG, CHINA IS NOT AFRAID OF WAR, AND IF WAR COMES MANY OF THE COUNTRIES WILL HAVE THEIR REVOLUTIONS FASTER. IF THERE IS A WAR, THE CAPITALISTS WILL BE THE LOSERS. THEY WILL BE THE LOSERS IN PEACE OR WAR. THE USSR IS NOT AFRAID OF WAR - THEY HAVE MISSILES AND SPUTNIKS.

B. Mao Tse-tung

Mao Tse-tung, also in discussing the world international situation, stated in talks with leaders of other Communist Parties in the middle of 1958, that the main enemy of communism is the United States; that the United States fears big wars and since the Sputnik, Mao doubts the United States can even successfully carry out little wars. Mao cautioned that revisionism must be fought to the end and further that the CPUSA must stick to the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. He said that imperialism has many contradictions, "our enemy looks tough on the surface but it is not that powerful."

C. Liu Ning-yi

Liu Ning-yi, Chairman of all trade unions in China and member of the CCCPC, was introduced to a prominent CP leader as the most capable authority in the CPC on the question of the CPC's taking power in 1949. In the summer of 1958, Liu stated that the CPC struggle to take over state power was effected through the unity of workers, businessmen, intellectuals and patriots. It was carried out through underground activity, infiltration of mass organizations, and even infiltration of the military. The Party estimated the enemy carefully and did not engage in adventurism. It accumulated strength and adopted careful and cautious tactics. It cautiously built its membership, being careful to ferret out disruptors. It separated its legal from illegal organizations with the illegal organization being absolutely secret. Prior to taking power in 1949, the CPC developed the art of infiltration to the highest degree. The CPC experiences of infiltration were a master plan for use by the international communist movement.

Liu even claimed that the CPC had practically controlled the entire Kuomintang Government, organizations under the control of the Kuomintang, the trade unions and the military. Before the "liberation," Liu claimed that practically every Nationalist General had a communist as his executive officer. One could only conclude as a result of the interview, which covered a detailed outline on the methods of infiltration, that China must be

considered as a most dangerous enemy in connection with its activities in the international arena.

D. Impressions Received from
CPC Leadership - 1958

As of the summer of 1958, based upon conversations with every leading CPC official, including Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the CPC and then Premier of China; Kang Sheng, Alternate Member of the Political Bureau and Member of the Secretariat, CCCPC; Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the People's Republic of China (PRC); Li Hsien-nien, Member of the Political Bureau and Finance Minister of China, and others of similar official status in the PRC Government, one could only reach the conclusion that China was then a very serious enemy. It had twelve million Party members and twice as many members of the Young Communist League. China was then receiving aid of every type, including not only capital goods but also whole factories, Russian technical personnel, etc., requested from the USSR.

The Chinese were taking the lead in all ideological battles. Mao, for example, was given the honor of actually introducing the Moscow Declaration of 1957. The Chinese were put forward to give leadership in the struggle against revisionism. The importance, strength and influence of the CPC upon the Chinese people cannot be minimized.

As early as the summer of 1958, however, in talking with the leadership of the CPC, one received the impression that the Chinese wanted to work things out on their own instead of being dependent on the Russians. While the Chinese endorsed the policy of coordination or meshing of the economies of the various socialist countries, the leadership put China in a category of a developing, big industrial power. One had the feeling that so long as the Chinese could gain something from it, they would "take it on the chin" even from the Russians, while they were building and learning. As of that time, however, the CPC leadership gave every impression that it considered the CPSU the leader of the international communist movement.

The Chinese, however, continued to look upon Asia as within their sphere of influence and as a sort of "sacred preserve." They noted that they could reach the Asiatic people easier than Russia, and they were doing it. The Russians are white and are looked upon with suspicion in some of the far eastern countries. The Chinese were playing a very important role in these countries. For example, the Chinese were assisting the Burmese and giving them economic and technical aid. They were well aware of conditions in Indonesia and had promised President Sukarno economic aid when he was in China at that time. Leaders of the CPC stated that the Indonesian CP had two million members and that the Chinese were in contact with the Indonesian CP. It appeared that the Chinese had closer contact with the Indonesian CP than did the CPSU as of 1958.

An important part of the CPC program was to set up schools for children of overseas Chinese in Peking. The Chinese were interested in youth and knew that the ancestral ties were strong. They were obtaining thousands of overseas youth to attend these schools from all parts of the world and were building up tremendous good will as a result.

During a meeting in July, 1958, in the International Liaison Compound of the CCCPC, in Peking, certain statements were made by CPC leaders which led to the conclusion that personnel in the compound were made up of overseas Chinese who were CP members and who might in the future work as espionage agents in areas where many Chinese live. A number of Latin Americans were also housed in another guest house in the International Liaison Department Compound.

The CPC in discussions with the leaderships of other Communist Parties even at that time gave the impression of competing with the CPSU to see which of the two Parties would receive the allegiance of the interested CP of another country. However, as of 1958 it appeared that for every practical reason the Chinese would be loyal to the CPSU and the Russians would not permit a break with the Chinese to occur in the international communist movement.

These reasons were largely economic and as of that time there did not appear to be ideological differences, as both were

in agreement on the dangers of revisionism and Titoism. As of the summer of 1958, however, there were many nationalistic differences and some antagonisms apparent at that time.

E. USSR Speaks of Economic
Aid to China

The CPSU during November, 1963, made available certain secret compilations of economic aid rendered by the Soviet Union to China during the period of 1950 through 1961. The essence of this document follows:

The Soviet Union gave to China a truly all-embracing amount of aid in compliance with the requests of the Chinese leadership. This resulted in a mighty industry based on modern technology set up in China. In 1959 the Chinese leadership stated, "The fraternal friendship and all-around aid and cooperation between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union serve the fundamental interests of the peoples of both countries" and, "The victory of the Chinese revolution and the successes in the building of socialism are part and parcel of the fraternal support and aid on the part of the great peoples of the Soviet Union. The Chinese people are deeply grateful to the Soviet Union for its support and aid."

The CPSU noted that in establishing and strengthening the Chinese socialist state by setting up its national industry and a modern defense industry in China, it had done this by denying to the Soviet people many prime necessities and causing them to experience serious sacrifices.

The CPSU noted that the volume of the economic ties between the USSR and the PRC almost doubled during the period 1953-1959 while the volume of Soviet deliveries for Chinese industrial projects grew eight-fold. All in all, the Soviet Union lent technical assistance and helped to build 198 modern industrial enterprises in China.

These enterprises included modern steel works, tractor plants, bearing and mining equipment plants, electrical engineering, turbine and boiler plants, a synthetic rubber factory, an oil refinery, nitrate fertilizer plants, shale producing factories and a number of high capacity power stations, aircraft factories and other specialized plants.

By the beginning of 1961 the production capacities of enterprises built with the help of the USSR involved millions of tons in the various industries as well as millions of kilowatts in the electrical industries. The aggregate capacity of turbines put into operation at power stations equalled 3,250,000 kilowatts.

In 1960 the share of enterprises built up with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union in total volume of industrial output in China accounted for 30% in pig iron, 39% in steel, 51% in rolled metal, 80% in lorries, 91% in tractors, 30% in synthetic ammonium, 25% in electrical power, 55% in steam and hydraulic turbines, 19% in generators, 25% in aluminum, 11% in heavy engineering, etc., of the aggregate production of the PRC.

Continuing, the CPSU reported that in the period of 1950-1960, 8,500 qualified Soviet specialists were sent to the PRC to render technical aid. In the same period, 1,500 specialists were sent to China to give a helping hand in science, higher education, public health and other fields. About 10,000 Chinese engineers, technicians, skilled specialists and researchers received practical training in Soviet factories, construction sites, design offices and research institutes.

In the course of some ten odd years the Soviet Union handed over to China, gratis, some 21,000 sets of scientific and technical documentation, which were the result of tremendous progress in the USSR accumulated for many years. Among the documentations handed over to China were the specifications and drawings for some 1,400 large scale enterprises.

Whole branches of industry, including aircraft, automobile and tractor, aluminum, power and heavy engineering, instrument making, radio and various chemical industries, were set up in the PRC with the help of the Soviet Union. The USSR helped China lay the foundations of an atomic industry. Soviet technical and scientific assistance was given in nuclear physics research and the erection in 1958 with Soviet aid of China's first experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron. The Soviet Union was supplying China the very first models of unique equipment which even some Soviet enterprises had not as yet received.

The Soviet Union granted the PRC loans adding up to 1,744,000,000 rubles (in new currency) on favorable terms. It deferred debt and interest payments for five years because of economic difficulties in China. It provided China with free loans of hundreds of thousands of tons of raw sugar to be returned in kind in subsequent years. It shipped grain in the amount of 300,000 tons in the spring of 1962 at the request of the PRC. (There are available other factual figures indicating the scope and extent of this economic aid rendered to the PRC by the USSR.)

IV. EVENTS OF 1959 REFLECTING DEVELOPMENT OF RIFT AND STRUGGLE FOR ALIGNMENT OF FORCES

A. 21st Congress CPSU, January, 1959

The 21st Congress, CPSU, was held on January 27, 1959, and was called a Congress of Builders of Communism with emphasis on production, productivity and the standard of living of the people of Russia.

The Russians at this Congress reiterated the idea of the thesis which was first developed at the 20th Congress, CPSU. This thesis was the "non-inevitability of war." They claimed that if this thesis was valid up to the present time when the socialist countries were weaker, then it was more valid now when the industrial production of Russia and China had been multiplied and many countries had set up their own socialist movements. In addition, the capabilities of the socialist states to retaliate against aggressors made this thesis valid and served as a preventive against war.

To convince their own people that they had allies in other socialist countries, the Russians made a strenuous effort to bring to the 21st Congress fraternal delegates from every country possible. Emphasis was placed on the Chinese participation, and the Russians boasted that not even in the days of the Communist International had such a mobilization of parties been on display. This, according to the Russians, was proof of the international solidarity of Communist Parties.

Delegates from the non-socialist countries were given the red carpet treatment to impress them with the merits of socialism. There was, however, another possible effect on the people which the Russians were attempting to accomplish. Some of the communists felt that they were not obligated to the Russians for these favors. Where the delegates were from backward countries or where they were colored and came from a country where there was racial distinction, the Russians were attempting not only to convince their Party representatives that they had obligations to the Russians, but also that if they overthrew their present social system they could live in the manner in which they lived in Moscow at that time. By so doing, the Russians would secure the allegiance of these various Communist Parties.

Despite the new thesis of equality of Communist Parties, the CPSU was still looked upon, as of the 21st Congress, as the experienced, leading CP and most Communist Parties, with the exception of a few strong Parties in the socialist camp, namely

China and Czechoslovakia, conferred and met with the leadership of the CPSU to air problems and obtain advice concerning policy, personalities, etc.

At the Congress it was obvious that there had been a lot of friction between the Chinese and the Russians. While Mao Tse-tung was still a leader of the CPC, he did not attend the 21st Congress, nor did he send Liu Shao-chi. It was noted that the Chinese delegation appeared to be very cool and aloof during most of the Congress. During Khrushchev's speech, Chou En-lai's applause was very limited and he appeared to be without enthusiasm.

Further, the delegates had been told that the Congress would close with a huge banquet. Instead of the banquet being held on the last day of the sessions of the Congress, it was held two or three days after the conclusion of the sessions. During that period an announcement was made that the Soviet Union and China had signed a trade agreement. Thus, it is believed that this banquet was postponed until some agreement could be reached between the Russians and Chinese.

This agreement indicated that the Russians had made some serious concessions in regard to giving scientific, industrial and economic assistance to China, including training their Chinese personnel for nuclear installations and rocketry. It is believed that the Chinese had been applying pressure against the Soviets for a long time with the Chinese demanding a more vigorous stand against

imperialism. It was not easy for Russia to escape this pressure since the Chinese were competing with the Russians for allegiance from the various Communist Parties, including the CPUSA.

The production of a letter from William Z. Foster, Chairman Emeritus of the CPUSA, to Mao Tse-tung, in the middle of the 21st Congress of the CPSU was interpreted as part of this vying for allegiance. All of the delegates to the 21st Congress were invited to visit the CPC delegation and most of the delegates accepted. When the delegation from the CPUSA visited the CPC delegation, they were not accompanied by any leading representatives of the CPSU.

Further, it is noted that while the East German communist regime had recently concluded a trade agreement with China, this could not have been done without the approval of the Russians, and this at the same time indicated that concessions were being squeezed out of the Russians by the Chinese.

Summarizing, it is believed that the following were some of the factors currently at work in influencing the Party of the Soviet Union at the time of the 21st Congress in January, 1959:

1. Russia was not anxious to engage in armed conflicts right then since that would destroy the current Russian plans for a higher economy as set forth in the seven year plan of the Congress.

2. Russia was fearful of the growth of German imperialism and the growth of German military power and rearmament, and it was

necessary to convince the fraternal parties that Germany was a real threat and had to be eliminated.

3. The Russians were playing on the fears of the European people, particularly those who were previously victims of German aggression, to remind them of the destructiveness of nuclear war.

4. The Russians were mobilizing the international communist movement in every part of the globe and the 21st Congress was providing mobilization to engage in some form of activity to hamper in any method or form imperialist aggression. The Russians did this by playing on the nationalistic sentiment of the Parties, particularly in Latin America and Africa.

5. The Russians were under pressure from the Chinese who tried to discourage an easing of tensions between the USSR and the Western powers. The Chinese used the tensions between Russia and the Western powers in order to wring concessions from the Russians. In the past the Chinese had not supported a summit meeting when it appeared that they would not be involved.

6. The top Soviet leadership was very sensitive to United States opinion and attitude.

In this regard, the CPSU, even in their relations with the CPUSA, tried to be circumspect and to discourage bold and challenging speeches by the American communists when they were on Soviet soil because such speeches might cause discord between the Russians and the United States.

1. Attitude of CPC Delegates
to Fraternal Delegates

During the 21st Congress the delegates of the CPC were not overly friendly with other delegations. Yet there appeared to be competition between the Chinese and the Russians in order to win the allegiance of the international Communist Parties. It was further believed that the new thesis on the relationship of the Communist Parties, that is, that all Parties are equal, signifies that the CPSU did not want to assume responsibility for all of the activities of China.

The vying between the Chinese and Russians for the allegiance of other Parties can be illustrated by the fact that Mao selected a date during the middle of the 21st Congress to put a letter by William Z. Foster, Chairman Emeritus of the CPUSA, in an official Chinese publication. It was necessary for "Pravda" to reprint parts of the letter quoting the Chinese source. The Chinese were also known to have extended formal invitations including invitations to the American delegates to visit the Chinese Embassy in Moscow and to visit China itself.

Further, immediately following the 21st Congress of the CPSU in February, 1959, Anna Louise Strong, an American who had lived and worked in China for many years, directed a letter in her name from China addressed to American delegates to the 21st Congress. In this letter she stated among other things, "I think it is very important that someone come here soon who goes back to

the USA to organize 'contacts.'" The interpretation placed on this message was that Strong would like to see a person similar to herself come to China who would then return to the United States to organize and propagandize for the CPC.

2. CPSU Efforts to Influence Latin American Delegates

During the 21st Congress of the CPSU, delegates of 13 Latin American Communist Parties met in sessions for approximately five days. These sessions were separate and apart from the Congress proper and were devoted to discussions of problems relating to Latin America as a whole as well as to problems involving the individual Parties. It was obvious that the Chinese and Russians were vying for the allegiance of these Parties. The Russians, for example, attempted to prevent Latin American delegates from meeting as a group. The gathering heard reports from delegates of Cuba, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Panama and others regarding their programs and plans for the future.

B. CPC Tenth Anniversary Celebration, Peking, China, September 28-30, 1959

On September 28, 1959, there was a reception for leading members of CP delegations to the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the founding of the PRC. None of the delegates from the Soviet Union were observed at this reception.

The two-day meeting of Communist Parties present in China in connection with the anniversary celebration began after

the above reception on September 28, 1959. At this meeting the Chinese tried to imitate the proceedings of the 21st Congress of the CPSU by electing a presiding committee. The chairmanship was rotated between Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Tung Pi-wu and Chu Teh. Mikhail Suslov of the Soviet Union spoke, but only a few minutes.

On September 30, 1959, a banquet was held for all of the delegations. Chou En-lai was chairman and the main attraction was Premier Khrushchev. He received very good greetings from delegates other than the Chinese. The Chinese applauded politely.

Under appropriate protocol, Mao should have introduced Khrushchev, but did not do so although Mao and Khrushchev carried the same leadership title in their respective Parties and as heads of government.

Khrushchev spoke emphasizing peace and peaceful coexistence. He had just returned from meeting with President Eisenhower at Camp David. The little applause, in the main, came from other than Chinese delegates. The Chinese sat on their hands. In the middle of his speech he quit speaking, turned his document over to his translator, told him to read it, and sat down in disgust.

On September 30, 1959, a massive parade was held commemorating the tenth anniversary celebration. The first tier of the reviewing stand was restricted to Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Khrushchev and Suslov.

A large poster with photographs of Chinese leaders, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin faced the reviewing stand. No

photographs of Khrushchev were observed anywhere. Most of the slogans emphasized Mao as the leader. It appeared at that time that another cult of the personality was being built in China.

In so prominently displaying photographs of Stalin, the idea was clear among the delegates that the CPC was telling the rest of the communist movement that it was following Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism. When asked why such prominence to Stalin, the Chinese said because no other leader lived through most of the communist revolutions and because he, Stalin, laid the foundation for socialism. In discussing matters with CPC leadership, it was obvious that the CPC placed considerable emphasis on ideology, that is, Marxism-Leninism. It emphasized proletarian internationalism to a much greater extent than did the CPSU. Outside the socialist camp, the CPC views the rest of the world as being on the defensive and in a state of crisis. It felt that the imperialist countries were confronted with revolt, particularly in colonial or semi-colonial countries.

The CPC believed that the imperialist or capitalist countries, especially the less powerful ones, were faced with an economic crisis. On the other hand, it felt that there was an opposite camp - the socialist camp - which was growing every day in every sphere, economically, politically, and with emphasis militarily. Therefore, when the bourgeoisie or the imperialists want to negotiate or make a concession, this in the Chinese view is not due to a position of strength but instead is due to weakness. This applied to the United States as the leading imperialist country.

Because of this reasoning, the CPC favored an international policy which could be characterized as "uncompromising" or a policy which pushed aggressively for maximum concessions. It felt that through this policy, imperialism would be kept off balance and communism would win out. This theory was expressed in many speeches, meetings and private discussions with the CPC during the tenth anniversary celebration in 1959.

1. Efforts to Curry Favor of
Latin American Parties Continue

Many Communist Parties of Latin America were represented at the tenth anniversary celebration of the founding of the PRC. Among the more prominent CP leaders were Anibal Escalante, Secretary of the CP of Cuba, and Victorio Codevilla of the CP of Argentina.

Based upon observations and discussions with these and other Latin American delegates at this conference, it appeared that the CPC was very much involved in the situation in Latin America, particularly in Cuba. The CPSU was also deeply involved in currying the support of the delegates of these countries, and there appeared a possibility in 1959 of a conflict between the Russians and the Chinese which might develop with regard to policy which should be pursued by the international communist movement in these countries. The Chinese themselves were interested in training Latin Americans for immediate guerilla warfare. The Russians on the other hand adopted a long-range program for communist development in Latin America, feeling that the Latin American countries at that time were not ready for violent revolution.

V. RIFT DEEPENS,, RUSSIANS INFORM THE
FRATERNAL PARTIES, BUCHAREST, JUNE, 1960

A. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn Reports
on Rumanian Meeting

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Chairman of the CPUSA, in confidential discussions with CPUSA leaders in 1960, revealed that prior to the conference of the Rumanian Workers Party in June, 1960, the CPSU circulated an inner Party letter dated June 21, 1960, to all Communist Parties consisting of some 80 pages which outlined the CPSU views of the basis of the Sino-Soviet rift. This document dealt with specifics concerning these differences from the CPSU point of view.

Flynn reported that in discussions on June 25, 1960, all speakers present in Bucharest said that they were in agreement with the Moscow Declaration of 1957, that is, the Twelve-Party Declaration, and the 64-Party Peace Manifesto executed at the same time. Except for the Chinese, according to Flynn, all speakers reaffirmed their allegiance to the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union.

Flynn reported that the CPC was represented at Bucharest by Peng Chen, Member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPC. He reportedly stated that the CPC favors "peaceful coexistence" but the CPC was critical of the 80-page letter being circulated by the CPSU at Bucharest. Flynn reported that some of the CPC charges were "slanderous" in character when Peng proceeded to reply to

all charges made by the CPSU. The 80-page document submitted by the CPSU maintained that the CPC was not following the spirit of the Moscow Declaration. She reported that on the proposed Bucharest Communique, Peng claimed the CPC delegation was without power and without a mandate from the CCCPC to sign this document. He suggested a Moscow meeting at a later date. He claimed that the Bucharest Communique went further than the Moscow Declaration and that the Chinese delegation needed time to study it because of its length. Flynn stated that Peng refused to consider discussion until the CCCPC was consulted.

Flynn reported that on June 26, 1960, at the second session of the Conference, the CPC delegation announced receipt of permission from the CCCPC to sign the Bucharest agreement if CPC amendments "which were never offered" were made to it, but even if the amendments were not accepted Peng announced that the CPC would sign the communique.

Flynn reported that Khrushchev took the floor at this session expressing regret that the Chinese were signing the communique with reservations because they really did not agree with it. Khrushchev reportedly then went into a long speech outlining differences between China and the Soviet Union while at the same time stating everything must be done to preserve the unity of the Parties. He, however, stated that unity must be on a principled basis and not unity for the sake of unity.

Khrushchev reportedly noted that differences between the Soviet Union and China had existed for more than one and one-half years. He indicated the CPC in 1957 was not in complete agreement with the Declaration of 1957 and that since then China had expressed disagreement with the resolutions of 1957 at a World Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Peking and that one of the main differences is on "coexistence, war and peace." Khrushchev charged that the Chinese are against coexistence but coexistence means peace - "only madmen want war." He stated that the USSR believes the international situation has changed since Lenin formulated his thesis on imperialism. Today, according to Khrushchev, imperialism cannot alone decide to make war. If war is unleashed, "I do not want to risk the lives of my people and of the world."

Khrushchev reportedly charged the CPC with attempting to force its views on Russia. He noted the aggravations between them on the India border incident and charged China with "nationalism" on the India issue. He defended "coexistence" as sound Leninism. He charged China with failing to agree on military matters relating to the air defense of both nations two years previously.

Continuing, Khrushchev spoke on the cult of Stalin, noting that at the 20th Congress he had said the CPSU had to expose Stalin. He charged the CPC with trying to undermine the leadership of the CPSU and in conclusion asked for agreement at Bucharest, but suggested that a committee be set up to draft a new declaration at

a conference to be scheduled for Moscow in November, 1960.

Flynn reported that Peng Chen replied to Khrushchev. He claimed that the issue between the Parties was on the international situation. That is, how to conduct a battle against "our enemies" or how to defend peace. Peng charged that the CPC did not receive equal treatment at the Bucharest meeting and Khrushchev had slandered Mao in speaking against the communes, against the "Great Leap Forward" and against the India affair. He accused Khrushchev of speaking at the Rumanian Workers Party reception with representatives of the press present.

He charged that the Rumanian meeting was specifically organized by Khrushchev to attack the CPC. Khrushchev reportedly rebutted Peng's charges and charged the Chinese with breaking agreements at the Warsaw military meeting, of not publishing specifics, and he threatened not to participate in the future conferences with the CPC if agreements are not kept.

Peng said that Khrushchev rejects the general line of the CPC and is carrying on work with other Parties to undermine the CPC.

The communique, according to Flynn, was signed by the Parties and was first published on June 27, 1960. It was also approved subsequently by other fraternal parties.

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn in September, 1963, prepared an inner Party document for the CPUSA, noting that she had attended the Bucharest Conference of 1960 and subsequently had visited various other countries.

Flynn noted that by the Spring of 1960 the Sino-Soviet conflict had degenerated alarmingly. She stated that following the Bucharest meeting, she had visited various countries and it became evident in speaking with leaders that the situation had worsened to the point where attempts were being made to contain the controversy and to report it carefully and at top levels, "at first," with the hope of resolving the conflict at the 81-Party meeting scheduled for November, 1960.

Flynn reported that the Bucharest meeting lasted only two days and resulted in only a brief formal "reaffirmation of international policy."

She reported that the Russians and other Parties set forth a series of complaints against the Chinese, primarily on their procedures and tactics at various recent "mass organization" conferences of such organizations as the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Peace Council and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, where USSR foreign policy was criticized and at which non-communists were present. She reported that the Chinese were sharply criticized for publishing certain works on international policy without consultations or knowledge of brother Parties. Charges were also leveled at this conference that the Chinese were using their Embassies in socialist countries as centers for the distribution of propaganda literature against the USSR. She reported that the Chinese had expressed sharp differences with the commonly accepted thesis that "war is not fatally inevitable" and

disagreed with the possibility of achieving general disarmament and peaceful coexistence of different social systems. Flynn claimed that the CPC engaged in personal attacks on Nikita S. Khrushchev, contended that Khrushchev and his supporters exaggerated the dangers of nuclear warfare, and the Chinese claimed the United States was only a "paper tiger." Flynn further contended that the Chinese claimed the world peace movement, as presently constituted, is based on fear and is disarming the people. The Chinese argued the peace movement must be anti-imperialist and must be willing to fight for freedom for colonial peoples and for socialism.

Flynn contended that the various fraternal parties charged the CPC with having views at complete variance with the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and with the decisions of the 20th (1956) and 21st (1959) Congresses of the CPSU to which the Chinese had agreed.

According to Flynn, on the second day of the Rumanian Congress, the Chinese delegation announced the CCCPC had a mandate for the delegates to sign but with reservations that they, the Chinese, would later divulge through the Central Committee.

Flynn stated that the document signed at the Rumanian Workers Party meeting was the origin and basis for the 81-Party meeting in Moscow in November, 1960.

Concluding, Flynn indicated that attempts were being made at that time to contain the controversy and report it carefully with the hope of resolving the conflict at the 81-Party meeting. She said the Chinese did not reply to the discussion at the

Rumanian meeting so it was agreed to adjourn the meeting after two days and to reconvene in Moscow later that year.

B. CPSU Reaction to Rumanian Meeting

B. N. Ponomarev, in discussing the Bucharest meeting in the Summer of 1960, stated that the CPSU was so concerned about this conference that it had called for preliminary meetings with the CPC representatives in Moscow prior to the Bucharest meeting. He said two conferences were held with the CPC, and the Russians spent hours with the CPC trying to convince them they did not understand the CPSU position. The Russians quoted Mikhail Suslov's speeches at the 20th Congress and other speeches and, Ponomarev said, as a result, the CPSU was now in the process of informing its Party membership regarding developments at this meeting.

Continuing, Ponomarev expressed bewilderment as to how the CPSU could handle the rift between these Parties. He said Khrushchev at the Bucharest meeting repeated the position of the CPSU on the matter of imperialism, that war is not inevitable, and that peaceful coexistence and disarmament are possible in the world where different social systems exist, but the Chinese do not believe Khrushchev.

He stated that efforts of other Parties to induce the CPC to accept criticism in the manner of friends have been for naught.

Ponomarev said the Soviet press had not to that date criticized the CPC by name. It has been speaking in generalities, stressing the importance of coexistence, disarmament, etc. With regard to the future, Ponomarev stated that it depends on the Chinese comrades. The CPSU received additional reports of CPC abuses of nationals of fraternal countries who were sent to China. These reports were to the effect that the Chinese were talking behind the backs of leaders of various Parties.

Ponomarev said that the CPSU would not turn its cadre into being anti-Chinese. Khrushchev at Bucharest said he will continue to work for improved relations but will not give in on principles.

Ponomarev said that although the Chinese signed the Bucharest Declaration, they had not changed their views. The Russians used the signature of the Chinese on the Bucharest document to present a unanimous position to the world in the hope that it would move the Chinese. He mentioned that affairs of state between China and the USSR are also involved, including the question of arms, modern weapons, etc. Ponomarev quoted Khrushchev as stating at Bucharest that the dispute between the CPC and the CPSU was more than ideological, it involved problems of state. Khrushchev referred to the fact that China had not given permission to the USSR to build radar and radio stations on Chinese territory to maintain contact with its Russian Pacific submarine fleet. Also, he indicated the Chinese did not permit the USSR to land military planes in China.

Nikolai Mostovets, Head of the North and South American Section, International Department, CPSU in speaking on the same subject matter in late June, 1960, went further. He reported the Chinese had asked the USSR for modern military weapons, including nuclear warheads, missiles and A-bombs, but the USSR refused to comply. It is noted, however, that Khrushchev, on the other hand, at the Bucharest Conference said "We have never refused you (the Chinese) any request."

VI. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST- LATIN AMERICA AND CUBA

A. Latin America

In July, 1960, Boris N. Ponomarev, in charge of the International Department, CPSU, in discussing CPC successes in Latin America, stated that the Chinese had trained 50 Latin comrades in China and filled them with anti-CPSU propaganda by surreptitious propaganda insinuations. The Chinese suggested to these Latin Americans that they should be armed and that there be armed struggle and guerilla warfare in Panama even though there are only a few communists in this country. The Chinese used the same line on the Brazilian comrades and some of these comrades, although not the main leadership, agreed with them on the question of the need to resort to violence.

B. Cuba

At the Eighth National Assembly of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) of Cuba, held on August 16-20, 1960, at Havana, Cuba,

the CPC was represented by General Wu Hsiu-chuan who used as his theme the "United States is the chief enemy of the people's world." He spoke of United States maneuvers under the mask of peace and called for united action to destroy imperialism. He said imperialism is using revisionism to stop the march of the people.

A telegram was read from the CPC asking Cuba to act as a stimulant for all Latin America against Yankee imperialism. Delegates from other Parties present (the USSR was not represented) were of the opinion that the CPC had not changed its line since Bucharest in June, 1960.

It was evident that the CPC then had some influence in Cuba even though the Cuban communists were definitely committed to the line of the CPSU. The Chinese delegation promised the Cubans unreserved and unconditional support by the Chinese Government and were attempting to get the Latin Americans into an action program. The pro-Soviet communist countries expressed a desire not to get involved in "little wars" and spoke along the line of current CPSU policy. Thus the Chinese were pushing the Latin Americans while the Russians were holding back a little.

Prior to the Eighth Assembly of the PSP of Cuba, Castro raised the slogan at a youth rally "Turn the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of all America." This slogan called for armed rebellion in Latin America. At the Eighth Assembly this slogan disappeared. The PSP did not think it was tactically advisable and the CPSU

persuaded Cuba to slow down. This marked a definite turn on the part of the PSP to commit itself to the line of the CPSU. Economic aid by China to Cuba as of 1960 was small compared to the aid being rendered by the USSR.

VII. EDITORIAL COMMISSION MEETING
PREPARATORY TO 81-PARTY CONGRESS,
OCTOBER, 1960

As a preparatory step to the 81-Party Congress scheduled for Moscow in November, 1960, it was agreed that in October, 1960, representatives of some 26 Parties would gather as an "Editorial Commission" to attempt to formulate an agreed statement on the CPC-CPSU rift to the 81-Party Congress. Both the CPC and the CPSU were represented on the Commission.

Khrushchev was then in the United States and did not participate in the Commission meetings.

In September, 1960, Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, and Kang Sheng, Alternate Member of the Politburo, CPC, arrived early before the scheduled Editorial Commission meeting.

Pyotr N. Pospelov, Member of the Presidium and a Secretary of the CCCPSU, briefed other Editorial Commission arrivals on the status of the CPC-CPSU rift prior to the Editorial Commission meeting.

He advised that the CPC delegates brought with them a 165 page letter of September 10, 1960, which was full of slanderous charges. Further, that the Chinese had instigated additional

border incidents necessitating the driving back of Chinese citizens by the Soviets into Chinese territory.

Pospelov said the Chinese representatives were obdurate to the point where civil discussion could not be carried on with them. Discussions lasted for five days.

The CPC letter of September 10, 1960, reportedly charged that the CPSU by letter dated June 10, 1960, had begun an organized campaign against the CPC. The CPSU letter was limited to theoretical principles, according to Pospelov. The CPC letter charged the CPSU with selling out to imperialism and called Khrushchev an apologist for imperialism as well as charging him with "great power chauvinism." The CPC letter stated that the CPC would bring these charges before the Editorial Commission meeting.

Pospelov said that unity efforts would continue but that the September 10, 1960, CPC letter created a difficult situation which the Editorial Commission would be confronted with in beginning its debates.

In preparation for the meeting of the Editorial Commission at which representatives of 26 Communist Parties were present, the CPSU had prepared an 81-page draft document as a basis for discussions at the Editorial Commission meeting.

The CPSU was represented by Mikhail Suslov, member of the Presidium and Secretary, CCCPSU. Frol Kozlov, also a member of the Presidium and a Secretary of the CCCPSU, also played a

leading role. Premier Khrushchev at that time was in the United States at the United Nations and did not participate in any of the sessions of the Commission, but he did appear at the Commission banquet held thereafter.

Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC, led the CPC delegation. Peng Chen, also a member of the CPC Politburo and Mayor of Peking, was among the leading CPC representatives.

The Commission continued in session until October 22, 1960, and the deliberations resulted in a revision of the draft declaration presented by the CPSU on September 20, 1960. Representatives of the CPC and CPSU engaged in sharp clashes throughout this meeting. It was obvious that the CPSU desired to avoid clashes with the CPC at the Commission meetings so as not to upset the scheduled November meeting of the 81 Parties since such clashes might become known throughout the world.

Teng Hsiao-ping, at the October 5, 1960, meeting of the Editorial Commission, expressed the views of the CPC after reading the 81-page draft document which the Commission was considering.

His speech dealt with the question of allegiance to the Moscow Declaration of 1957, the need to reaffirm the Declaration, as well as the Peace Manifesto of 1957.

The CPSU in this draft, according to Teng, put forth good theses on the character of the epoch, on imperialism and on

the anti-imperialist movement, but on the national liberation movement the question needed further development in the document. Parties must not confuse the national liberation struggle by failing to understand the role of the national bourgeoisie. (Current Marxist-Leninist theories recognize the two-sided nature of the national bourgeoisie; however, in the present world struggle, communists in the Soviet Union and other countries feel they must make alliances with the national bourgeoisie such as Nasser, Sukarno and Nehru. On the other hand, the CPC wants to de-emphasize the role of the national bourgeoisie to minimize the importance of neutrality and peace.)

Teng expressed sharp differences on the thesis that war can be prevented and on the thesis that the fight for peace is not in contradiction to the class struggle. He denied the CPC was against peaceful coexistence and for use of nuclear weapons. He charged that the draft document underestimates imperialism and underestimates the war danger generated by imperialism.

On the question of peaceful transition, Teng charged that the draft overemphasizes peaceful transition and said that the parliamentary way is impossible.

Teng said that Marxism-Leninism is not the property belonging to one party - that the experiences of the Chinese must be considered. He charged that the draft ignores these experiences.

On the question of unity, Teng stated it must have a common ideological foundation. Teng claimed that the draft charged a shift in the international communist line and that this line was aimed at the CPC. This draft also charges factionalism, and he stated these are extremely dangerous charges. He said that these questions were not raised for purposes of unity. On the contrary, they were raised for an exact opposite purpose.

Teng said that the Soviet Union was guilty of "big power chauvinism" in pulling its experts out of China. He described this as a father and son relationship and as being against the Moscow Declaration of 1957 which presupposes the equality of all Parties.

He added that the draft can be a basis for discussion but that the weak points not in keeping with Marxist-Leninist theory must be corrected.

Mikhail Suslov on October 10, 1960, replied to the speech of Teng. He expressed pleasure at agreement by the Parties that the draft was a Marxist-Leninist document. His remarks were extremely conciliatory as a whole. He explained that the draft was an analysis of the experiences of the past three years in a Marxist-Leninist way. Its objective was to consolidate the socialist camp and the world communist movement. He then attempted to give Teng some answers.

Suslov stated that in the draft the CPSU did everything possible to effect agreement on a principled basis. However, he charged that the second point of Teng's speech did not contribute

to unity and that the CPSU must rebuff some of the recent charges of Teng's speech.

He said the CPSU disagrees with the CPC on the "paper tiger" idea. The CPSU believes the fight to prevent war means using every possibility to accomplish just that. The CPSU disagrees with the CPC's lack of faith in peaceful coexistence in that it accepts this with all sorts of reservations. He said that peaceful coexistence, i.e., economic, political and social, will weaken imperialism.

The CPSU regards disarmament as a major question. It is out to achieve disarmament and wants to narrow the possibilities of the imperialists unleashing war.

On the question of transition to socialism, the CPSU believes in using all forms - peaceful and non-peaceful. This concept is contained in the 1957 Declaration to which the CPC agreed. The character of the present epoch creates the possibility for peaceful transition. The CPC ignores the attractive power of socialism on this question.

The CPSU has not ignored the collective experiences of the CPC, and when the CPSU speaks of collective experiences, it includes the experiences of China.

The CPC opposes the thesis of the struggle against nationalism, but a very important thesis of the Moscow Declaration calls for combining national patriotism with proletarian

internationalism. The international communist movement requires unity to advance socialism. The CPSU rejects Teng's charges of "great power chauvinism."

Suslov called for an end to factionalism among Marxist-Leninist Parties and asked Teng to support his words with deeds.

Suslov said that the CPSU holds there must be a fight on two fronts, that is, against revisionism which in the Soviet Union has been defeated, and against dogmatism which attempts to skip stages.

Suslov charged that Teng's speech contained many erroneous propositions, many unfair interpretations and absurd assertions regarding the Soviet Union which the CPSU has no right to pass over. He concluded his remarks by warning that the imperialists are trying to split the international communist movement and that Marxism-Leninism must be the guiding star with Communist Parties united, solid and monolithic.

In sessions of October 17 and 18, 1960, sharp exchanges continued between representatives of the CPSU and CPC. Suslov charged the CPC letter of September 10, 1960, sharpened and piled on differences. It carried incorrect statements and there was a lack of Marxist-Leninist approach and further the interests of other Parties were not given consideration in the letter. Suslov said that the CPC rejected the thesis of the cult of the individual

as not being based on fact but on imagination. He said the September 10, 1960, letter contained slanders against the CPSU in that it charged opportunism and abandonment of Marxism-Leninism. Further, that the document attempted to separate Premier Khrushchev from the CPSU and to divide the CPSU from other Parties. He concluded by stating that the CPC letter of September 10, 1960, shows that it is unwilling to meet the CPSU half way and noted that the document does not contain one constructive suggestion. His concluding remarks were to the effect that everyone knows that the CPC, despite its assertions at this meeting, is not for peaceful coexistence.

Teng replied to Suslov's charges stating that the Bucharest Conference contained erroneous theses and admitted that the CPC signed the communique for unity purposes. Teng then enumerated a series of new charges including attacks on the CPC by the Soviet press which the CPC claimed were made after Bucharest and after the CPC had ceased attacking the CPSU.

He charged the CPSU and Suslov with carrying the differences of the Parties into differences involving affairs of state.

Frol Kozlov continued the debate. He stated that the September 10, 1960, letter does not help to overcome the differences, and the Chinese have transferred arguments from the sphere of ideology to the sphere of state relations.

By so doing, the CPC has attacked the international communist movement without consulting any other Party.

Kozlov next proposed a procedure for the Editorial Board covering the following issues:

1. Character of the epoch,
2. War and Peace.
3. Peaceful coexistence,
4. Forms of transition,
5. Other miscellaneous problems.

At this point, Teng Hsiao-ping and Peng Chen then raised a new issue, that being the failure of the CPSU to permit the publishing of the Chinese side of the disagreement in articles which had been prepared for the "World Marxist Review," the theoretical organ of the international communist movement.

Suslov next discussed the objective of the draft document, stating that it must result in the rallying of the socialist camp and the entire socialist movement based on the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the Moscow Declaration of 1957. He stated it must give prominence to the development of the world socialist system and must be considered a preliminary document for the Sl-Party Conference which would follow.

A motion was made by a British delegate to the effect that a second document be prepared by the Commission to be called a "Peace Manifesto." This motion was passed.

The work of the Editorial Commission officially ended on October 22, 1960. The draft declaration, which resulted from lengthy discussions, was, in fact, a revision of the draft proposed by the CPSU on September 30, 1960.

Various delegates expressed the hope that the banquet which would follow the Commission meeting would serve to dull the sharp edges resulting from the frequent clashes at the Editorial Commission meeting. Khrushchev did not appear at the Editorial Commission meeting sessions because of his visit to the United Nations. He was a speaker at the banquet.

Khrushchev entered the banquet hall by obvious arrangement at the same time the CPC delegates entered. He embraced Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, in an obvious effort to "break the ice" and disarm and calm the CPC representatives. The CPSU obviously wanted to avoid sharp clashes at the November meeting.

Less than 150 persons attended the banquet, including members of the Presidium of the CPSU and delegates of the 26 Parties present at the Editorial Commission meeting.

Khrushchev, however, used the occasion to debate the representatives of the CPC. He emphasized that the CPSU did not want to be the "head Party," except insofar as it earns it. He emphasized that the working class of the capitalist countries could not be won for communism merely by slogan, that in competition with capitalism there must be some incentive, an attraction for the

working people. They must believe they are working for a higher standard of living. Khrushchev then cited the example of the United States, where he had learned on his recent visits that in that country an unemployed man or woman receives more in unemployment compensation than does a man or woman in the Soviet Union who is fully employed. Thus, the unemployed in the United States have a higher standard of living than the employed in the Soviet Union. He turned to the Chinese and said, "If you want to attract people to communism, you must raise their standard of living. Ideology by itself as an incentive will not build communism."

He said that for the building of communism peace was necessary and that war was not the solution to our problems. He stated that Marx, Lenin, Bebel and Liebknecht had fought for peace.

Khrushchev stated, "The building of a socialist society out of the rubble of a nuclear war is an unhuman concept. If I believed in the theory of socialism through war, and this was the theory, I would not be a member of the Communist Party. We can win by peaceful coexistence." The remarks of Khrushchev caused considerable flurry at the banquet.

VIII. 81 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES CONFERENCE
MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 10 - DECEMBER 1, 1960

Representatives from 81 Communist and Workers Parties convened in Moscow on November 10, 1960. The Editorial Commission had met from September 30 to October 21, 1960, and had edited and modified a draft of a declaration originally presented to the

Commission by the CCCPSU. The draft declaration was the main point and purpose for the meeting of representatives of these Parties.

Nikita S. Khrushchev delivered the opening remarks which in effect consisted of little more than greetings to the delegates.

A. Report of Mikhail Suslov, Member
of the Presidium, CCCPSU

Suslov reported for the Editorial Commission stating that the main purpose of this Commission was to bring in a document which would unite all Parties. He stated that the document contained an analysis of the present epoch, the contemporary world situation, and an outline of common strategy and tactics of Marxist Parties. He stated that the CPSU was guided by Marxism-Leninism and based itself on the Moscow Declaration of 1957.

Suslov stated that the meeting was called because it was felt there was a need to analyze and give answers to new problems posed by life and work out strategy and tactics for the world communist movement in the present period.

Suslov next went through each section of the draft statement listing eight points which dealt with the pace of the development of world events in the present epoch. They included the following:

1. That capitalism is growing more decrepit and feeble.
2. Many countries in the socialist camp are building socialism at a fast pace. Some are still raising the foundation of socialism.

3. The draft analyzes the laws of construction of socialism, the problem of proportional development, the international division of labor, specialization in construction, mutual assistance, removing of differences in the rate of development, and lays the basis for simultaneously building socialism and reaching communism.

4. The draft sets forth a system of relations between socialist countries and explains how to strengthen their unity and loyalty to Marxism-Leninism.

5. The draft shows the need for solidarity of the socialist camp.

6. The draft also dealt with the problems of combining patriotism and socialism and how to fight nationalism and chauvinism.

7. The draft deals with the dangers of war and peace. It shows that there is a danger of world war and points to United States imperialism as the main enemy.

8. The draft further explains that the nature of imperialism has not changed.

Suslov explained that the thesis of the draft shows that the Communist and Workers Parties are against the export of revolution and are for the accomplishment of the revolution by peaceful means because this would meet the interests of the people and the nation~~s~~ involved in revolution, but this path, peaceful or non-peaceful, would depend on the given situation and class relations in each country.

He pointed out areas of agreement and disagreement encountered by the drafting committee. Disagreement was noted in parts of Section 5 relative to the rooting out of groups and factions. The CPC opposed the section relating to unity of Parties and felt that the question of factionalism and groupings was aimed at the CPC and should not be raised. The sections dealing with the CPSU and the importance of the 20th and 21st Congresses were inserted, according to Suslov, to emphasize these Congresses as examples of international solidarity. The CPC and Indonesia opposed this.

On the question of the cult of the individual, all delegates except China favored this in the draft. India and Albania joined China in opposing the formulation of "a world without war and without arms" and the elimination of war in our time.

Suslov concluded by expressing the hope that the conference could achieve unity even on the items of differences mentioned and that the conference would adopt the draft unanimously. Suslov's report was presented on motion and accepted without opposition.

B. Report of Nikita S. Khrushchev

Khrushchev in his opening address reiterated the Soviet position concerning war and peace, disarmament, the character of the epoch and ways and means for transition to socialism.

He specifically reiterated the thesis of the 20th Congress that transition can be peaceful and non-peaceful but emphasized peaceful transition is in the interest of the masses. His entire

speech was conciliatory in nature calling for unity as a prerequisite for the building of socialism and communism.

C. Circulation of Mao Tse-tung's
Speech Made at Meeting Discussing
Draft of Moscow Declaration of 1957

During the November 14, 1960, session of this Conference the CPC circulated a speech of Mao Tse-tung which he delivered at a meeting at which representatives of communist bloc countries only attended. This was also the meeting at which the draft of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 was framed.

The purpose of this circulation by the CPC was an attempt to show that the position of Mao on peace and peaceful coexistence was contrary to the position attributed to him by the CCCPSU in a letter of November 5, 1960.

This document touched on Mao's views on peace and the possibilities of nuclear war. His theme was that the CPC hoped for peace, but that if the imperialists insist on war, including nuclear war, the only thing to do was to make a drastic decision to fight first and then reconstruct society.

This letter also covered Mao's views on the cult of the personality, stating that Stalin had done great work leading the Soviet Party, but over a period he developed metaphysics and damaged dialectics. Mao supported Khrushchev for ousting Molotov and others from the CPSU leadership, commenting that Khrushchev was "comparatively correct."

In this document Mao compares the population living within the imperialist and socialist systems and the productivity at the disposal of the two systems. He concluded that in a nuclear war "...if half of humanity were destroyed, the other half would still remain, but that imperialism would be entirely destroyed and there would be only socialism in all the world..." When this was quoted at the conference, a British delegate shouted, "Who will remain? You mean millions of Chinese will remain - but I have my doubts that a single person will remain on the British Isle if a few nuclear bombs are dropped."

D. Enver Hoxha, Albania, Speech
of November 16, 1960

Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor, delivered a violent attack on Khrushchev and the draft document itself at the November 16, 1960, session of the Conference. He charged that it was impermissible to flirt with or embellish United States imperialism. Khrushchev, he said, was confused on the question of transition to socialism and like the revisionists, some comrades believe in peaceful coexistence, but the concept of peaceful coexistence is surrendering to imperialism. Hoxha strongly defended the CPC against the charges of the CPSU leveled at Bucharest. He charged the CPSU with dishonesty and that the CPSU violated Marxist-Leninist norms of Party relationships. He charged the Soviet Union with "big power chauvinism" and with the use of coercion, flattery and propaganda to divide the Albanian.

leadership and separate it from the CPC. He stated that the Soviet Union even interfered with Albanian foreign affairs and also attempted to reach some of the Albanian military men including some generals. Hoxha defended Stalin as the greatest leader since Lenin and charged the CPSU had no right to raise the cult of the personality at the 20th Congress and called for the deletion from the 81-Party statement of the section dealing with the cult of the personality.

Hoxha left Moscow two days after his speech because he reportedly feared kidnapping and bodily harm. He departed via Finland and traveled through West European countries using airplanes other than those of the socialist nations.

E. Khrushchev Replies, November 23, 1960

Khrushchev made his second speech before the Congress on November 23, 1960, in answer to the speech of Hoxha of Albania and Teng Hsiao-ping of the CPC.

In essence the speech was conciliatory, yet it was sharp in many respects. He defended the draft document as correct in characterizing the nature of the present epoch and said it was supported as a Marxist-Leninist document for the world communist movement. He said this statement and the Moscow Declaration of 1957 can be a guide for all Parties.

Khrushchev examined the draft statement as corrected and approved the part dealing with the balance of forces and the definition of the epoch and the thesis dealing with the transition from capitalism to socialism.

He said the main task was to prevent nuclear war and that peace was the cornerstone of all Soviet policies.

He denied the charges of the CPC relative to forms of transition to socialism to the effect that the CPSU recognizes only peaceful transition and denies the need to prepare for non-peaceful transition. He reiterated that the CPSU at the 20th Congress acknowledged that the degree of violence necessary depended on the resistance of the bourgeoisie and even pointed out that in certain capitalist countries where the capitalist class and military are strong that "violence was inescapable." He defended the condemnation of the cult of the personality and appealed for unity and the strengthening of the section on unity in the statement. He appealed to the CPC to reconsider its dangerous course and expressed the hope that the CPC would heed the collective opinions of the meeting and carry through the behest of Lenin concerning unity.

F. Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary,
CPC, Replies, November 24, 1960

On November 24, 1960, Teng spoke in response to the November 23, 1960, Khrushchev speech. He strongly defended the CPC and its adherence to the Moscow Declaration of 1957. He agreed with most of the present draft statement but argued for strengthening and improvement. He said that the CPC sees the need for vigorous struggle. The CPC is not against peaceful coexistence

but recognized the need for vigilance. It holds that the possibility for peaceful revolution is rare and therefore the CPC prepared both ways, for peace and war.

Teng said that the CPC views the "spirit of Camp David" as bad in the struggle against imperialism. He saw a forward step in the draft resolution which in effect says if war does take place it will destroy imperialism. He made a plea for unity, expressed loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and pointed out that the majority of the Parties were in agreement on the draft. He denied that the CPC had fought against unity. He recognized the CPSU as the leading Party but cautioned that the CPSU should not expect support without consultations. Teng said that the CPC rejects the attack on Mao as being "separated and divorced from the masses." He denied the CPC was attempting to force its views on the majority. He said the CPC could not agree on the sections of the document on factionalism and on the charge of national communism and their position on the 20th and 21st Congresses. He appealed to the delegates to delete these sections in the interest of unity.

G. Summary

Several items of pertinence were noted as coming out of these meetings. Two or three days before the conclusion of the meeting in Moscow the delegates to the Congress noted that the CPSU and CPC would not reach agreement. The CPC was surprised at having received little support for its viewpoints at this meeting. Only the CP of Albania gave the CPC solid support. The CPC

received support from the Communist Parties of Thailand and Malaya on the need for militant and non-peaceful revolutions. The Communist Parties of North Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Australia supported the CPC to the extent that they argued for softer words in certain sections of the declaration of representatives of the 81 Parties where the language seemed to be an indictment of the CPC and where this might widen the gap between the CPSU and CPC. The Communist Parties of India and Ceylon supported the CPSU.

The Editorial Commission meeting and Moscow meeting of the 81 Parties was, in fact, a two-month debate on the main theoretical propositions resulting from the 20th Congress of the CPSU.

These were:

1. That war is not fatally inevitable.
2. That revolutions do not always have to use force and violence. That peaceful revolutions become more and more possible as socialism advances in the world. No real concessions were made to the CPC on these propositions; however, agreement was finally reached at Moscow by giving concessions to the CPC to a point. Had the CPSU and the other Parties not given these concessions, it would have meant an irrevocable split between the CPSU and the CPC right there and then.

The position of the CPC was that there had been a vacuum since the death of V. I. Lenin. The CPC wanted to revive Stalinism as a step toward making Mao the leader of the international communist

movement. The CPC has a long perspective, and it appears they were trying to win Communist and Workers Parties in the international communist movement to their side with Mao, the Chairman of the CPC, as the indisputable leader.

At the Editorial Commission meeting and the meeting of the 81 Parties, each of many weeks duration, it became clear that the CPC was shocked when it realized the lack of support by the other Parties. On the other hand, the CPSU, as a result of these meetings, now clearly recognized the need to pay more attention to fraternal parties and its relations with them.

Ideological concessions were made to the CPC in order to present to the world a show of unity and to provide a truce or cooling off period with the aim of ironing out remaining differences in one way or another. The ideological concessions made by the CPSU were:

1. Cutting down the section of the declaration dealing with Stalin's cult of the personality.

2. Leaving out a statement to the effect that the 20th Congress of the CPSU had world-wide significance.

3. Sharpening the attack on the Yugoslav revisionists.

In this regard the CPSU and the Communist Parties of West Europe wanted to compromise differences with the League of Yugoslav Communists but the CPC did not agree to this.

4. Omit from the statement the definition of National Communism.

This statement was ostensibly intended to apply to the situation in Yugoslavia but, in fact, was aimed at the CPC. The CPC stated that the term "national communism" was created by the bourgeoisie and was really aimed at the CPC. The CPC was willing to have the declaration deal with "bourgeois nationalism" but not with "national communism."

5. A change in regard to the question of factionalism and groupings in the international communist movement.

The original draft submitted by the Editorial Commission in October, 1960, cited the need for strict adherence to international decisions arrived at by conferences of the international communist movement. This was a general condemnation of the CPC for factional and group activity. In the final draft there was no condemnation of factionalism, and in its stead there was an appeal for unity in the international communist movement.

6. In the section dealing with revisionism and the "right danger," dogmatism and sectarianism, there was some toning down of the emphasis on dogmatism and sectarianism.

7. In various parts of the declaration there was a sharpening of the language. The term "U. S. imperialism" was added in several places due to pressure by the CPC.

Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, was their main spokesman at both meetings. Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, although present, did not speak at the 81-Party Conference.

Teng, in answer to Suslov, a member of the Presidium, CPSU, said that the CPC could not make a sudden shift in line since discussion of the ideological differences between the Parties had penetrated all levels of the CPC, and its membership had to be consulted. They could not be asked to make an about face in that discussion. Unlike the CPSU leadership, the CPC had spread this disagreement with the CPSU widely and deliberately.

In the opinion of leading CP personalities of several Parties who attended the meetings, the Chinese in the future would demand material concessions from the Russians. The unknown factor was the role of Mao in the statement issued in Moscow on December 6, 1960, at the conclusion of the meeting. It was felt that the Russians would want to see what the Chinese would do in the future, and in the meantime the Russians would emphasize the need for unity in the international communist movement.

At the same time certain Russian leaders suggested privately that other leaders of their respective Parties should be aware of the differences. This appeared to be an indication by the Russians that the CPSU had some doubt about the future intentions of the CPC. Most of the CPC leaders felt that the differences between the respective Parties could only be solved by a high level "summit type meeting."

Following the 81-Party Conference Liu Shao-chi, at the request of the CPSU made speeches in Moscow and Leningrad. The

speeches, however, were brief, lacked enthusiasm, and were formal in style.

IX. 22nd PARTY CONGRESS, CPSU,
OCTOBER 17 - 31, 1961

The 22nd Congress of the CPSU was held from October 17-31, 1961, in Moscow. Fraternal delegates from 80 Marxist-Leninist Parties were present, with four other nations having guest representatives. The Albanian Party of Labor was not present because it was not invited.

All of the proceedings of the Congress were open and the proceedings were recorded and widely publicized; however, some of the public records were in edited form.

A. Briefing of Fraternal Delegates

Upon the arrival of the various fraternal delegations in Moscow, one of the first items of business was the briefing of these delegates by representatives of the CPSU on the "Albanian" situation. Throughout the following weeks, this briefing continued on a regular basis.

While in the initial briefing and in many subsequent briefings, these leading officials of the CPSU spoke directly of Albania, the inference was clear that their remarks were also intended to apply equally to the Chinese and the CPC. The purpose of the briefings was to impress on the various Communist and Workers Parties the seriousness of the situation and to determine the attitude of these Parties toward the Albanians and the Chinese.

The CPSU pointed out that Enver Hoxha, the leader of the Albanian Party of Labor in October, 1961, placed Albania on a war footing and openly proclaimed that "Albania would repel a Soviet invasion." Citizens in Albania friendly to the Soviet Union were arrested. They pointed out that the CPC had become so loud in support of Albania and its stated positions in their broadcasts beamed at Latin America that the CPSU was contemplating sending an official delegation to China to demand that the Chinese cease and desist. They pointed out that only eleven Communist Parties had sent greetings to the recent Albanian Party of Labor Congress. They were China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Burma, Malaya, Vietnam, North Korea and the CP of Belgium. The latter Party subsequently withdrew its greetings.

Concerning these Parties, the leaders of the CPSU stated that some have their headquarters in exile in China; "the Japanese and Indonesian Parties are in the pay of the Chinese." Vietnam lives in close proximity to China, and North Korea, while sending greetings to the Albanian Party, in fact, speaks truthfully concerning Albania and the Chinese. New Zealand and Australia, according to the CPSU, reportedly sent greetings because of material aid in the form of money which they had received from the CPC.

Throughout these discussions, individual representatives of the International Department, CCCPSU, made no direct request for support of the Parties whom they were briefing, but did attempt

to influence them to take a stand. The result was that all Parties of North and South America supported the CPSU.

In private discussions with members of the International Department, CPSU, prior to and after the 22nd Congress, these CPSU representatives clearly stated that the status of state and Party relations between the USSR and China had continued to deteriorate since the 81-Party Congress in 1960.

They indicated that attacks were being heaped on the Soviet Union by the Albanian Party of Labor, which were interpreted by Soviet officials to emanate from the "Master's Voice - China."

They indicated that the Chinese had only given lip service to the 81-Party Statement of 1960 and were pursuing the same old policies, teaching their people that "coexistence is impossible - war is inevitable."

These CPSU officials expressed fear that current actions and utterances of the CPC would some day place the Soviet Union in a situation which could provoke an international crisis.

B. Proceedings of the 22nd Congress, CPSU

It could be gathered from the rather complete public reports on the 22nd Congress that the only important speeches, other than that of Khrushchev reflecting the Soviet Union's policies regarding the international situation (especially the German problem), the problem of armament negotiations, and atomic bomb tests, were those of Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense.

These speeches were reported in detail and accurately.

At the Congress there were no special discussions on details and tactics regarding the Soviet Union's foreign policy. The Congress itself emphasized the Party's new economic program, placing emphasis on the "building of communism" and on the economic race with the United States, always stressing the fact that their program was based on peace. Stress was placed on peaceful coexistence and on peaceful competition, throughout all of the speeches.

Some time was spent at the Congress on Stalin's cult of the personality. This further exposé was a clear indication that Khrushchev had consolidated his leadership and influence in the CPSU.

The 22nd Congress served as a platform to receive a public pledge from the various fraternal parties present to the CPSU and to the Soviet Government itself.

All Parties, regardless of size, were given an important place at the Congress and were permitted to express themselves from the rostrum.

This was extremely important to the CPSU strategy since the Soviets have no more powerful allies than these Parties. Because of the existence of China as a powerful rival in the socialist camp with differences that show themselves in the field of doctrine, theory and the practice of Marxism-Leninism, as well as in state relations, the CPSU tried to win the support of the various Parties. As of the 22nd Congress, the CPSU had won the overwhelming majority of Communist and Workers Parties throughout

the world to their point of view, yet there continued to exist constant rivalry to influence and hold these Communist and Workers Parties. By influencing these Parties, the Russians (or Chinese) could further their international policies.

While the CPC was invited and did send a delegation, headed by Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the PRC and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC, the CPC delegation played only a small role at the Congress. Chou En-lai himself departed from the Congress after four days of proceedings and returned to China. The other delegates remained, but for the most part were inactive.

Among the nearly 80 Communist Parties represented by fraternal delegates, possibly as few as ten had any association with the CPC delegation. Those delegates having contact or participating in functions at the Chinese Embassy were those who by close proximity or circumstances were in the Chinese sphere of influence.

C. Discussion Between L. L. Sharkey,
General Secretary, CP of Australia,
and Leaders of CPC, January, 1962

Contained within the confidential files of the CCCPSU maintained concerning the differences between the CPSU and the CPC, there is a document entitled "Summary of Talks Between Comrade L. Sharkey and the Leaders of the CPC, January, 1962." The essence of this document is as follows:

Sharkey could not understand the inflexibility of the CPC leaders during a talk with them on the way back from the 22nd Congress, CPSU. This inflexibility concerned the CPSU vis-a-vis Albania, and the world communist movement. When Sharkey suggested that this would have a bad effect upon the world communist movement and other Communist Parties, Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC, said that a split would not necessarily be a bad result.

He stated that Karl Marx split the First International after founding it. Engels started the Second International, and Lenin split away from it because of its opportunism, "but the sky did not fall on account of this." Lenin was a minority, yet he founded the Third International and put the world communist movement on to the right path.

Today, there are 90 Communist and Workers Parties, but in the opinion of the Chinese leaders, they, including the CPSU, are infected with opportunism and revisionism, and if the world communist movement disintegrates, "the sky will not fall on account of that either." Teng said "The CPC has taken a principled stand and no matter what happens, will go its own way."

According to this document, Sharkey was shocked by the lack of principles and the Chinese cynicism dismayed him. The manner in which they contradicted their own arguments of a year or two before left him gasping.

According to Sharkey, Teng said that Chou En-lai left the 22nd Congress, not because of work at home, but rather in protest

against the CPSU's stand on Albania. In the future, Teng said, the CPC will not send fraternal delegates to Congresses of other Parties and they will not participate in any international meetings of Communist and Workers Parties.

Sharkey said that in 1960 the CPC had said that the peace movement was worthless and even reactionary and that the CPSU's policy of peaceful coexistence will lead to "conciliation with capitalism and opportunism."

Further, that during a previous talk, Teng had said that the testing of a 50 megaton bomb by the Soviet Union had been "harmful" because it had caused confusion among the peace supporters and had brought a split in the unity of the world communist movement.

Sharkey stated that when economic relations between the USSR and China were discussed, Teng said that the Chinese were paying for everything down to the last screw and were paying a higher price than any other country. That is why, he declared, the Chinese are forced to buy wheat in Australia and Canada.

Sharkey stated that when he wanted to discuss basic problems or principles which centered around the 22nd Congress, the Chinese swept aside all arguments and declared, "Everything the Soviet comrades do is bad." Teng reportedly added that the Chinese "do not believe a word the Russians say and do not want to believe them."

Teng then reportedly tried to foist on to the Australian comrades a thousand copies of a book on Stalin written by a Trotskyite which was being widely circulated in the United States and other capitalist countries. Sharkey refused.

Sharkey stated that in order not to listen to any more anti-Soviet tirades of the Chinese, the Australian delegation left China after only 48 hours. He stated that he cannot explain or understand the reasons for the change in the position of the CPC leaders. Although in their talks the Chinese exhibited their dissatisfaction in regard to their economic relations with the CPSU, Sharkey believed that this was not the real reason for their present position.

Sharkey reported to the CPSU that during these talks the Chinese leaders had told him that the Soviet Union provided China with armaments, including submarines and radar installations. However, according to the Chinese comrades, the Soviet Union had tried to get control over these armaments and in this way tried to establish its control over China. For example, the Chinese comrades told the Australian delegation that the Soviet Union had tried to use its submarines to gain control over the Chinese seaboard and to keep operation of radar installations in its own hands. He reported that this suspicion of the Soviet Union by the Chinese in his opinion had its origin in Chinese nationalism and in their mistrust of all white people, including the Soviet people.

**X. REPERCUSSIONS MAKE THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE
IN THE "WORLD MARXIST REVIEW" (1961)**

The "World Marxist Review" is the theoretical organ of the international communist movement, with headquarters in Prague, Czechoslovakia. Representatives of all Communist Parties are assigned to this publication, and its program and policies are formulated through an Editorial Board, which meets regularly.

In late 1961 a leading representative of the CP of Czechoslovakia observed that the CPC representatives who were assigned to the "World Marxist Review" were not then regularly participating in any of the publication's Editorial Board meetings. Some leading representatives of the CPC to this publication were then ill; however, the other lesser CPC representatives assigned to the publication were observed appearing at the publication's offices only long enough to sign in and make their presence known. Infrequently, there were CPC representatives at Editorial Board meetings, but solely for the purpose of taking minutes on the discussions. They did not participate in any of the proceedings of these meetings.

The last concrete contribution made by the Chinese in the way of material for publication in the "Review" predated the Bucharest meeting of 1960. This Czech official was of the opinion that the relationship between the Chinese and the Soviets was continuing to deteriorate since the meeting of the 81 Parties in Moscow in November, 1960. However, he opined that the Chinese

--- were expected to maintain relationships with representatives of the "World Marxist Review" headquarters in Prague.

XI. EVENTS OF 1962 CONTRIBUTE
TOWARD DEEPENING RIFT

Despite conciliatory overtures to the CPC by the CPSU in early 1962, the rift between the Parties continued to deepen due, at least in part, to certain activities of the Governments of the PRC and the USSR, including the action of the Chinese against India and the Soviet withdrawal of missiles from Cuba.

Criticisms and name-calling intensified at international meetings of leading mass organizations in the peace and disarmament fields. These occurrences affected the relations between the fraternal parties as was shown at their Congresses and in the "World Marxist Review." All these further sharpened the controversy between the CPC and the CPSU and between their respective Governments.

A. Letter of CCCPSU To CPC,
February 22, 1962

The CCCPSU sent what was considered a conciliatory letter to the CCCPC on February 22, 1962, relative to the relationship between the Parties, which in essence indicated that the relationship between the Parties had reached "a high point of deterioration" and that it was most urgent that the two Parties attempt to settle their differences. In essence the letter stated:

"This letter was written to express concern of the CPSU over the course of relationships between our two Parties recently.

In a frank and comradely way, we would like to express our serious anxiety over the fact that friendship and cooperation between the CPC and the CPSU are not being strengthened but weakened to the detriment of the interests of the socialist camp and the world communist movement. All communists and progressives are deeply worried on principle and problems of contemporary development in the world and tactics of the international communist movement.

"These disagreements hamper the anti-imperialist struggle and prevent the socialist system from conducting and coordinating foreign policy, make more difficult an agreement on disarmament, handicap the colonial struggle, weaken efforts to assist the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the unity of the broad anti-imperialist movement is now in danger.

"There are no two answers for a Marxist-Leninist. The fraternal interests of socialism and communism require the two Parties to raise themselves over the differences, coordinate policies, and seek the correct way out of difficult situations and to find solutions.

"Our main task is to consolidate in every possible way the revolutionary forces to advance on imperialism. We have a good basis for conducting this single policy - the Declaration of 1957 and the document adopted at the Moscow Conference of Parties in 1960.

"The Moscow Conference adopted a program based on the experiences of the communist movement as a whole. It outlined ideas about the character of today's world, the possibility of averting war, principles of peaceful coexistence, of forms of transition to socialism. It stressed the importance of fighting both revisionism and dogmatism. The decisions of the Moscow Conference have withstood the test of time and can successfully save the consolidation of fraternal parties. We have to solidify our ranks and avoid arbitrary interpretations of its decisions.

"Since the CPC has stressed its loyalty to the Declaration, there is every possibility of overcoming existing differences. The CPSU, in this letter, has no desire to raise questions on which we have disagreements. Rather we emphasize those points which unite us - leaving aside those which we find controversial. Our differences are tactical in character - they cannot possibly overshadow the objectives of all communists.

"We consider particularly harmful carrying of our differences into the sphere of economic, political, military and cultural relations among socialist countries.

"The CPSU expresses again its willingness to resolve our differences in a comradely way, without accumulating and increasing," The letter concluded by indicating a sincere desire to have friendship and cooperation with the CPC for a common cause - "the triumph of peace and communism."

B. Chinese Viewed by Soviets as Promoting
"East is East" Doctrine and Separating
"National Liberation Movement" from Socialism

Boris N. Ponomarev, Head of the International Department, CCCPSU, indicated in November, 1962, that despite the conciliatory letter of the CPSU, sent in February, 1962, to the CPC, relations between these Parties were much worse than in the past. The Moscow Conference of 1960 had not caused the CPC to reverse its arguments and its old positions.

In fact, at the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace in Moscow in the summer of 1962 and at the World Peace Council meeting in Stockholm earlier in 1962, the Chinese had renewed their old arguments and propagandized that there was no possibility of agreement between socialist and bourgeois states. The Chinese representatives attacked the Soviet leaders who were advocating disarmament, yelling "shame-shame." The Chinese Peace Council had also opposed resolutions of the World Peace Council on disarmament because the United States was not named as the main enemy.

Further, according to Ponomarev, the CPC is trying to divide the Asian, African and Latin American movements from the other Parties of the world. In this regard, they are trying to implant in these areas the idea that the most important movements are those in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and also that the center of the revolution has moved to the East, namely China. They hint that the Russian working class has lost its revolutionary

spirit and is under bourgeois influence, that the old Communist Parties of Europe and North America have degenerated and become revisionists and opportunists. Ponomarev related that in September, 1962, the Chinese told a visiting Japanese dignitary in effect that, "East is East; Asians would change world history,"

Ponomarev indicated that the Chinese-India conflict was of great concern to the USSR. He pointed out that it involves two countries who play a role in the fight for independence, one being the Chinese People's Republic, and the other "peace-loving India," China wants India to reject neutralism and non-alignment so that the CPC sectarians can prove their theoretical thesis.

Continuing, Ponomarev discussed the role of the CPSU in Cuba in October, 1962. He stated that all Parties, except Albania, approved the CPSU position. China occupied a different position, and their objective was to sharpen the conflict. He charged that the CPC press had accused the CPSU of appeasing American imperialism. In essence, he opined, the Chinese were trying to push the Soviet Union into war with the United States and were using the Cuban crisis to attempt to separate the national liberation movement from socialism and to spread the idea that the national liberation movement should rely mainly on their "own forces,"

Ponomarev indicated that the CPSU is worried about this situation and feels that it should place proletarian internationalism, that is Marxism-Leninism, as against nationalism preached by the CPC.

Ponomarev asked the question, "What does the future hold?" In reply, he stated that the CPSU leaders are considering further conferences but felt in the final analysis that they must be "franker than ever before."

Ponomarev also referred to an open letter published by the Fourth Trotskyist International in 1960 and sent to the CPC. This letter reportedly stated that the Fourth International agrees with the Chinese Party in their stand against disarmament, peaceful coexistence, etc., that the policy of the Soviet Union created only illusions among the masses. It related that the struggle for these aims distracts from the real struggle against imperialism and that the Bolshevik Party of Lenin was being destroyed.

It was the thinking of the leadership of the CPSU that the "CPC had initiated" such an open letter through the Trotskyists. Politically, according to Ponomarev, it means the destruction of the international policy for all Parties and actually constitutes an open door to destroy all Communist Parties from within.

Vitaly Korinaov, Chief Deputy to Ponomarev, International Department, CCCPSU, added that the Italian conception of polycentrism (two centers or regional centers) has grown from a concrete situation in Italy. The CPSU does not agree with this idea and objectively it could bring harm to the communist movement. If pursued logically, Africa, Asia and Latin America could create their own centers. The slogan, "Workers of the World Unite" could

turn to "Workers of the World Disunite." Reportedly, the Italian Party did not press their idea of polycentrism and Togliatti claimed he was misunderstood. Togliatti said that if by this it is understood that it would result in dividing into national groupings, the Italian Party would not be for this type of polycentrism. Korianov stated that this is the Chinese misinterpretation of polycentrism and this being so, the other Parties will have dropped it.

In discussions in November, 1962, Boris N. Ponomarev stated that the idea of a new conference of Communist Parties had been ruled out by the CPSU because it was felt that such a conference would result in an irrevocable split in the world communist movement at this juncture.

C. Speech of N. S. Khrushchev, October 14,
1962, on the Departure of Liu Hsiao,
Ambassador of the PRC to the USSR

An official confidential record of the CCCPSU contains a record of a luncheon speech of N. S. Khrushchev given on October 24, 1962, on the occasion of the departure of Liu Hsiao, Ambassador of the PRC to the USSR, which contains the following:

Khrushchev stated that the CPSU attaches great importance to the relationship between the two countries. A strong and durable friendship is the most important condition for cohesion and unity of the entire socialist camp. The USSR and the CPSU for their part are doing everything necessary to strengthen close ties and relations with the PRC and the CPC.

"I must say frankly that up to 1958 we had very good relations with the CPC and its leadership. Nothing better could be desired; nothing clouded these relations. Since 1958 there has been a change. These relations became colder and that situation continues to this day. In the opinion of our Party, this does not benefit either our two Parties and countries or the world communist movement...

"Our common enemies, the imperialists, are trying to take advantage of the present situation to drive a wedge between the CPSU and the CPC, between the USSR and the PRC. After 1958, when relations between our two countries deteriorated, the imperialists began to foster hopes that it would be easier for them to carry out their aggressive plans against the socialist camp. True enough, our forces had not weakened by this, no matter what the imperialists think. As individual countries we have remained strong. When we are together, however, our forces grow in geometric progression. It is not merely the arithmetic addition of two forces, but forces multiplied a hundredfold. We should always remember this...

"It is quite obvious that only the imperialists stand to gain from a deterioration of relations between our two countries. They do not hesitate to employ all available means.

"We had a meeting with the French politicians Shmuttlein and Paul Reynaud who passed through the USSR on their way from China. They talked of the existence of the 'yellow peril' from

the East, meaning China (other countries including Japan were included) I dealt them a sharp rebuff and told them we are united on class lines and Marxism-Leninism, for the prevention of war, against imperialism, and for the victory of socialism...

"I can cite facts proving that the capitalist press wants to bring disunity into relations between our two countries and Parties. We must, however, very resolutely say that there are no grounds, no reasons for disputes and differences between our Parties and countries. We have no disputes over territories and frontiers...

"Our practical work demands unity and cohesion of our ranks. We know that the present state of relations between the CPC and the CPSU is creating no little difficulties for many Parties, especially those of the capitalist countries...Some of our fraternal parties are not strong and find themselves in a serious position. They respect China and the Soviet Union. We have to understand this and not provide nourishment for our enemies. Let us open up a clean new page to restore relations as existed before 1958. Let us not rake over old matters...

"You know that we have always supported and still support the PRC in international affairs. When there was a threat of an attack on the PRC in the summer of this year and earlier, we announced resolutely and confirm it again today that we regard an attack on China as an attack on the Soviet Union and shall deal the aggressor a crushing blow."

Khrushchev concluded his speech by stating, "I should like to repeat once more that there would be much better conditions for the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world if the cold were driven out of relations between our Parties and our countries and its place taken by warmth,"

D. Eighth Congress of CP of Bulgaria, Sofia, November, 1962; Eighth Congress, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Budapest, November 20-24, 1962; and 12th Congress, CP of Czechoslovakia, Prague, December 4-8, 1962

Three important Congresses were held in 1962: the Eighth Congress of the CP of Bulgaria, Sofia, November, 1962; the Eighth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Budapest, November 20-24, 1962 and the 12th Congress of the CP of Czechoslovakia, Prague, December 4-8, 1962; which furnished evidence of the increasing sharpness of developments between the CPC and the CPSU and the Parties supporting their respective positions.

Officials of the CPSU considered all these Congresses very important because they gave full support to the CPSU position as against the CPC. However, the 12th Congress of the CP of Czechoslovakia was considered the most important and vital of these Congresses.

The importance of the Czech Congress was shown by the fact that this Congress was used most extensively for the purpose of showing solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist international movement. It was also used as a most important mobilization point

against the Chinese position in the ideological rift. The leadership of the CP of Czechoslovakia on behalf of the CPSU faithfully and diligently devoted most of their attention to the fraternal delegates in order to persuade them to support the CPSU point of view on both the question of Cuba and the CPC.

Sharp words were expressed by Vladimir Koucky, Secretary, CCCP of Czechoslovakia on December 7, 1962. He charged the Albanian Party with slandering the CPSU and charged China with supporting this slander. He said, "We cannot look upon this group as 'inside our family' as the Chinese comrades say."

Antonin Novotny, First Secretary, CCCP of Czechoslovakia, and President of the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia, in a direct reply to an earlier speech of Wu Hsiu-chuan, CPC fraternal delegate, charged the CPC and Albania with distorting the facts of Marxism-Leninism and with adventurism, particularly on the Cuban question.

Leonid Brezhnev, President of the USSR, at the 12th Congress charged Albania, and by strong indirection China, with wanting to drag the world into the "hell" of a nuclear war and thus "save Cuba."

E. CPC Severs Connections with "World Marxist Review," also known as
"Problems of Peace and Socialism"

The CPC served notice on the Editorial Board of the international communist theoretical publication, "Problems of

Peace and Socialism" in a letter dated November 11, 1962, addressed to the Editorial Board. This letter announced the severance of "moral or political responsibility" of the CCCPC for this publication. This letter indicated the disagreement grew out of policies which had been raised by the CPC as early as November 27, 1961, in letters and exchanges between CPC representatives and the Editorial Board.

The Chinese letter noted the issue was that the magazine had published articles attacking a Marxist-Leninist Party, the Albanian Party of Labor, in violation of fundamental principles guiding relations between Parties. It charged the Editorial Board with a violation of an original resolution setting up the publication, which noted that if differences of political significance arose they should be settled by consultation of the Central Committees of such Parties. The letter charged the magazine with interfering with state relations. It set forth details charging that the Editorial Board had published articles favorable to the CPSU point of view, while at the same time it had refused to accept articles of the CPC based on Marxism-Leninism, the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960. It charged the Board with persisting in "splitting" measures for which the CPC could no longer bear any public or moral responsibility.

The letter requested that the words "Chinese Edition" in the magazine be deleted.

A series of exchanges of letters took place within the Editorial Commission, making changes in the articles submitted by the Chinese, claiming that they were contrary to the agreed line of the international communist movement and were dogmatic and sectarian.

In these exchanges of letters, the CPC was charged with a failure to promote circulation of the publication in China, and it was noted that since January, 1962, there was no information available concerning circularization of that journal in China. At the end of 1961 the CPC ceased to honor its financial commitments to the journal. In discussing this situation in the "World Marxist Review," Comrade Aleksei M. Rumyantsev, editor-in-chief of the publication, remarked: "The Soviet Union has already decided that this action by the CPC in regard to the publication constitutes a split in the world communist movement."

F. Status of the Split, December, 1962

The following conclusions were reached concerning the scope and extent of the rift between the CPC and the CPSU as gleaned from contacts with high officials in the international Communist Parties, as well as with leaders in the CCCPSU:

1. The rift between the CPSU and China, according to the CCCPSU leadership, has become much worse.
2. Details leading to this conclusion were based on a speech of a Chinese delegate to the World Peace Council in

Stockholm, Sweden, in 1962, where the delegate stated, "There is no possibility of agreement between socialist and bourgeois states." The Chinese delegates at the same meeting attacked Soviet delegates who were dealing with disarmament and booed them.

The Chinese in September, 1962, sent a telegram to the World Peace Council, disagreeing with resolutions adopted at the July Congress because the United States was not named as "the main enemy." Thereafter, the Chinese began to renew their old line against coexistence and disarmament.

3. The CPC is attempting to divide Asian, African and Latin American movements from the other Communist Parties of the world and to convey the idea that the center of the revolution has moved to the East, namely China.

4. The Chinese are making efforts to implant the idea in the world that the Russian working class has lost its revolutionary spirit and is under bourgeois influence.

5. The Chinese charge that the oldest Communist Parties of Europe and North America have degenerated and become revisionist and opportunists.

6. China, by taking these positions, is placing the problem of national independence on a racial basis.

The Russian leadership admitted that they had no answer to solving the rift. They had adopted a program of being patient with the Chinese. The Soviet representatives expressed fear of immediate Chinese nuclear tests that "will lead the world to catastrophe."

XII. ECHOES OF THE SINO-SOVIET
RIFT IN THE CPUSA (1963)

The CPUSA and its representatives in attendance at international communist conclaves in recent years have given unqualified support to the position of the CPSU in connection with the sharp ideological struggle as well as on state policies. This support has resulted in a line or program calling for peaceful coexistence, disarmament, support of the Soviet position in Cuba, control of nuclear weapons, etc. This is an understandable position because the American Party is totally dependent upon the CPSU for its existence and many of its leadership have had long experience in dealing with the Russians.

The CPC, however, has made overtures to the American Party during the period of the development of this rift in the form of offers of material aid. Of course, such offers and aid would create a situation requiring support of the policies of the CPC and would cause alienation from the CPSU, and for that reason the American Party leaders have been most reluctant to accept support from the CPC, material or otherwise. As of January, 1963, there was a certain attraction to the CPC position in the American Party, particularly since the Caribbean events and the Soviet retreat in Cuba. Certain other difficulties have arisen in the international communist movement which help to compound the rivalry between the CPSU and the CPC, and this has affected every CP in the international communist movement, including the CPUSA.

A. January, 1963, National Leadership Meeting

At a meeting of the leading CPUSA national leaders in January, 1963, two reports were given, one by Gus Hall, General Secretary of the CPUSA. Hall discussed the basis of what he termed "bourgeois nationalism of the CPC." He showed how Mao Tse-tung had depended chiefly upon the peasants and small bourgeoisie in China in his drive for state power. According to Hall, Karl Marx did not differentiate between the peasantry of one state and the peasantry of another. From the point of view of economic position, since they are owners, the peasantry in any country, regardless of development, is capitalist in nature. He supported his position through quotes from Marx, Engels and Lenin. Hall noted that the CPC had given the peasantry special characteristics which communists give only to the working class. Therefore, he stated, according to Mao, the peasantry, if led by communists, could be persuaded to act in behalf of the communists like agricultural workers, who are considered part of the proletariat. Because this thesis is in violation of Marxist-Leninist laws of development, the commune system failed. These facts characterize the Chinese policy, according to Hall.

The second report given at this meeting was based on consultations with the leadership of the CPSU and on attendance at several Congresses of other Communist Parties. This speaker noted that the leadership of the CPUSA fully supported the CPSU on the question of differences with the CPC.

However, following this report, discussion occurred in which certain differences came to the fore in the thinking of the CPUSA leadership, in that some of these leaders injected issues into the discussion which would give confidence to the Chinese.

It will be recalled that the Soviet leadership condemned the Chinese for their use of racism to divide the international communist movement and to consolidate Chinese power in the more backward countries made up of the yellow and black races. The CPSU also condemned the Chinese for giving priority to the national liberation movement over the working class movement of all countries. The CPSU noted that the CPC had been doing this for the purpose of showing that the "center" of the revolution had moved to the East, namely China.

It will also be recalled that in the first debate between the CPC and the CPSU held in the Editorial Commission meeting prior to the 81-Party Congress in November, 1960, the Chinese charged the Russians with "big power chauvinism" and these charges have been repeated by the Chinese on numerous occasions since that time.

Therefore, while the CPUSA leadership unanimously approved both of the reports given in the January, 1963, meeting, the discussions which followed were full of contradictions. For example, Ben Davis, CPUSA National Board member and Negro spokesman for the Party, while agreeing with the two speakers, nevertheless remarked that had the Chinese not been of the yellow race, they

would already have been in the United Nations. This argument of Davis has a false premise since many weak nations of Africa have been admitted to the United Nations; however, on the racial issue, some Negro leaders in the CPUSA as well as a number of Negroes around the CPUSA fighting for social equality, wish to forge a weapon which can be used in this country. These are the people who, instead of saying the "liberation movement" as do the Chinese, call it the "Negro freedom movement." Within the CPUSA, the Negro leader uses this delineation in his drive for power against the white leaders. There are also a few among the white leaders of the CPUSA who for opportunistic reasons are also echoing racial slogans of the Negroes.

The debate within the CPUSA could possibly expand. There were reports of confusion in the Party regarding the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Some Party members raised the question as to whether the Soviet Union went beyond compromise and "surrendered" to imperialism in Cuba. This is the same position taken by the Chinese.

The rift in the world communist movement could conceivably find more repercussion within communist circles in the United States leading to further debates, splits, deviations and dissensions within and around the Party. The so-called "left" circles in America, including the publication "National Guardian," have given voice to this matter by raising certain questions and

publishing articles by Anna Louise Strong always favorable to China, by publishing articles by Professor Morray on Cuba, and through a series of editorials which all indicate a leaning in the direction of the Chinese policy. In this category also is the "Monthly Review," published by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, which also echoes in articles and editorials the Chinese viewpoint.

There have been some defections from the CPUSA over views on the Sino-Soviet rift. None of these defections, to date, involve upper echelon leadership. Some of these defectors have organized around the so-called "Progressive Labor" publication of New York, the "Marxist-Leninist Quarterly," the "Anna Louise Strong Newsletter," and the "Far Eastern Review," all of which echo the Chinese position. The influence of this "left" element on the CPUSA, to date, has been small, but it has great potential appeal particularly to the Negro and to the so-called "revolutionary" intellectual.

Gus Hall on a few occasions has charged that all of these groups and grouplets, as well as their publications, are being subsidized by the Chinese and the Albanians since the CPUSA leadership knows from experience that publication costs are high and these publications are of a high quality and appeared suddenly and regularly.

The CPC has enunciated a new doctrine--Marxist-Leninists inside and outside the Communist Party. This is an open call for

a split. This doctrine was first put into words in the Chinese editorial "A Comment on the Statement of the CPUSA," which appeared in the March 8, 1963, issue of "Renmin Ribao," an official organ of the CCCPC. This editorial attacked the CPUSA and its leadership for embellishing imperialism, acting as stooges for the Kennedy Administration and following the baton of the CPSU.

This attack on the CPUSA was made public after the CPUSA issued its own statement at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German Democratic Republic), where besides circulating this statement on January 9, 1963, the spokesman for the CPUSA, Henry Winston, a Vice Chairman of the CPUSA, joined in the attack against the CPC from the rostrum of the Congress.

B. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, National
Chairman, CPUSA - Inner Party
Document, September, 1963

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman of the CPUSA, in September, 1963, following the public disclosures by the CPSU and the CPC of their ideological rift, with approval of the CPUSA leadership, prepared an inner Party document concerning the history and development of the Sino-Soviet rift. The contents of this document were subsequently published in edited form in the November, 1963, issue of "Political Affairs," the theoretical organ of the CPUSA. Since the rift had now become an open one, it was felt by the national leadership that such a document should be

prepared in order that the leaders of the Party could be fully aware of the facts.

Flynn, in her document, indicated that she had attended a number of the congresses and conferences at which the rift had developed and specifically mentioned the Bucharest Conference of June, 1960, the meeting of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties in November, 1960, and the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961 in support of her position of first-hand knowledge.

The document deals at length with the disagreements which became evident at the Bucharest Conference in 1960, which she reported resulted in a brief, formal "reaffirmation of international policy." She described charges and counter-charges made at this two-day session and stated that the Russian and other fraternal parties set forth a series of complaints against the Chinese, primarily based on procedures and tactics at various recent "mass organization" conferences where the Chinese criticized the foreign policy position agreed to by the socialist camp, and at which meetings non-communists were present.

Flynn reported that the Chinese behavior at Budapest centered about the publication of two books, one entitled "Long Live Leninism," and the other a collection of editorials appearing in the Chinese daily, "Jenmin Jih Pao," on international policy. The Chinese were criticized for publishing these works without consultation with the other fraternal parties. They were also charged with using their embassies in the socialist countries as

centers for propaganda and their literature. Flynn stated the Chinese had expressed sharp differences with the "commonly accepted" thesis that "war is not fatally inevitable" and disagreed with the "possibility" of achieving general disarmament and peaceful coexistence of different social systems. Flynn charged that the Chinese criticism was aimed at Nikita Khrushchev's expressed policies "which are the official policies of the USSR" endorsed by other socialist countries, some neutral countries, and by many peace loving people everywhere.

Flynn reported the Chinese countered with the claim that Khrushchev and his supporters exaggerated the dangers of nuclear warfare and that the world peace movement, as presently constituted, was based on fear and was disarming the people. The Chinese argued that the peace movement must be anti-imperialist and must be willing to fight for freedom of the colonial people and for socialism.

Flynn said that it was charged by the various fraternal parties that the views of the Chinese were at complete variance with the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the line of the 20th and 21st Congresses of the CPSU, to which the Chinese had agreed. Now they were using literature, introducing resolutions and publicly defending a contrary position, without previous consultation with brother Parties.

Flynn stated that on the second day of the Bucharest meeting, the Chinese announced that the CCCCP had instructed that

the communique be signed, but with reservations that would be stated later by their Central Committee.

She reported that at the Rumanian meeting the Albanian delegation was the only one which disassociated itself from criticism of the Chinese publications and their distribution and the actions of the Chinese in the mass organization meetings.

Flynn reported that as she subsequently visited other countries, it was evident that attempts to contain the controversy were being made in the hope of resolving the conflict at the 81-Party meeting.

She reported that the 81-Party meeting had been preceded by a meeting in October, 1960, with representatives of 25 Communist Parties who were members of Central Committees and Secretaries of various Parties but not of the well-known top leaders of the Parties.

This meeting was presented with a draft statement of the CPSU, and M. A. Suslov and B. N. Ponomarev, prominent theoreticians of the CPSU, presided at this preliminary meeting. The 81-Party document was discussed paragraph by paragraph. The chief spokesman of the CPC was Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC. Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking and a member of the CCCPC, was also present. Speeches of the key delegates representing the CPC indicated there were still basic disagreements on the question of "war and peace," the cult of the individual, and the possibility in some countries of peaceful transition to socialism as well as on a variety of Party "tactics." However, according to Flynn,

the CPC concentrated all its fire, after restating its position on foreign policy, on several paragraphs which the Secretariat finally referred to the larger body to meet later. These questions related to war and peace and to the construction of socialism. The Chinese strongly objected to strong formulations on the cult of the individual, insisting that they referred not only to Stalin, but more specifically to their leader, Mao.

Flynn said at the preliminary conference many small Parties from countries close to China were disturbed by the debate and appeared not to want to disagree with either the USSR or China.

At the 81-Party meeting, the Chinese delegation was led by Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the PRC.

At the 81-Party Congress it became evident that the Chinese wanted to "fix the responsibility for policy, foreign and domestic, of the socialist camp, on the Soviet Union" - There was a growing suspicion at the conference of a possible power struggle in the future when the Chinese would attempt to thoroughly discredit the Soviet Union and at the same time the Chinese could assume the position of the "head" in world leadership of international communism in opposition to the Soviet Union.

In the course of debate, Khrushchev outlined the basis of the dispute between the Soviet Union and the Chinese. He spoke of the removal of Soviet experts from China because their professional advice was flouted. He spoke of insults by the Chinese and recalled one incident which occurred at a banquet following the

completion of a project. The Chinese engineers were given a "red flag," symbolic of courage, while on the other hand the Russian engineers were given a "white flag," signifying cowardice. Delegates from other Parties including Antonin Novotny of Czechoslovakia, recounted similar incidents which occurred to their experts in China.

Flynn reported that Khrushchey also charged the Chinese with failure to cooperate with the Soviet Union, in refusing to permit the Soviets to build a radar station for the mutual benefit of China and the Soviet Union in defense protection.

Flynn's document recounted the Chinese charge of "East wind - West wind," which had reference to the change of the revolutionary spirit of communism from West to East. She stated that despite the conciliatory attitude of the Russians and the socialist camp in general at the 81-Party meeting, it was a shock for the delegates attending to hear the bitter and uncomradely language spoken by the Chinese toward their "big brother." She recounted that the Albanians similarly viciously attacked the Soviet Union and gave full and unqualified support to the CPC. She reported that at the conference itself, the Chinese and Albanians maintained that they alone remained true to the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and that all the others had changed and compromised with imperialism. They disputed the possibility of a peaceful road to socialism, and there was an "all or nothing" viewpoint in their positions which refused to take into account

the stages of possible political and economic development over a period of time, eventually leading to socialism.

Flynn reported that the Chinese did not attempt to reply at length to various criticisms mentioned in the document, such as "East wind" thesis except to say that they were poetic and not political expressions. The Chinese denounced the "cult of the individual" and condemned the factional struggle within the international communist movement.

She reported that the Chinese threatened at the conference, as at the Secretariat meetings preceding, that if their objections were not met, they would leave the meeting.

Continuing, Flynn reported that after the adjournment of the 81-Party meeting, the international debate gradually emerged into the open but in a peculiarly camouflaged way. The Russians attacked Albania, and the Chinese attacked Yugoslavia. This idea has, as of now, 1963, been abandoned, and the debate is now in the open.

Flynn next raised the question as to why the Chinese comrades evinced such personal animosity toward Nikita Khrushchev. She stated that some at the conference felt that on the death of Stalin, the Chinese assumed that Mao Tse-tung would be considered the leading Marxist spokesman in the world and that this would be accepted by both Parties. With the struggle for power in the Soviet Union around the "anti-Party group" in Moscow, these expectations were undoubtedly strengthened. Some of the anti-Party group, notably Molotov, were close to the Chinese views.

Apparently the Chinese did not anticipate the emergence of Khrushchev as the accepted leader of the CPSU, nor did they welcome it. Stalin's previous aloof, remote and unsocial characteristics were more to the liking of the Chinese. The Chinese have called Khrushchev uncouth and vulgar. Whenever Khrushchev spoke at the meetings, the cold dignity of the Chinese expressed their scorn.

Flynn reported that on the final day of the 81-Party Conference the Chinese formally accepted the statement. However, Liu Shao-chi, next to Mao in leadership, only spoke once during the entire meeting. He made no statement of affirmation on the statement which came out of the conference. No one at the conference had any illusions but that once again the Chinese were accepting the statement with reservations.

Toward the end of the conference the Chinese, however, seemed to take a more modified position, that is, they did not put it in exact words, but the inference was as follows: "We agree with the desirability of common disarmament, coexistence, the end to war, etc. They are good for propaganda slogans. But we doubt if they are possible to achieve under capitalism. However, we are not opposed to you comrades struggling to attain them, if you believe it is possible, and we will not place obstacles in your way."

Speaking of the failure of Mao to attend this conference, Flynn expressed the opinion that it appeared to be an attitude of

contempt on the part of the Chinese Party not to send their counterparts to the other high leaders present to carry on discussions in such vital matters.

Continuing, Flynn reported on the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in September, 1961, noting that the Chinese delegation was led by Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of China; however, he remained only a few days. His greeting to the Congress contained a rebuke for not inviting Albania and for discussing "inner Party differences in public." Before his departure, Chou placed wreaths on the tombs of Lenin and Stalin, which bore the following respective inscriptions: "Great leader and teacher of the proletarian revolution" and "Great Marxist-Leninist."

Flynn reported that Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking, was left in charge of the delegation. She reported that the Congress itself opened on October 17, 1961, with 87 Parties represented. The conference was a progress report on the building of communism. Also, unfinished business of the 21st Congress on the "cult of the individual" and the anti-Party group which developed after the Congress, the relations with other socialist countries, namely Albania and Yugoslavia, and foreign policy in relation to peace were the subjects of this agenda.

She reported that the Congress upheld the decisions of the 21st Congress and unanimously condemned all attempts to defeat them and to revive the Stalinist methods. Most of the anti-Party group retired into private life, except Molotov, who was made Ambassador to Mongolia. Molotov was later removed

because it was felt he was too close to the Chinese and he was transferred elsewhere.

Flynn reported that the 22nd Congress presented in their program several new major theoretical conclusions which they had arrived at but with which the Chinese Party did not agree. They are as follows:

1. The disappearance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in their now classless society. There is no longer a class to be abolished (the exploiters). It fulfilled its historic function and is no longer necessary.

2. The socialist state is becoming a democracy of the whole people. The dictatorship of the proletariat will cease to exist long before the state "withers away."

3. Transformation of functions of state organs into political organizations of public self-government, such as trade unions, cooperatives, cultural clubs, Young Communist League, is now under way. The program emphasized the need of perfecting the forms of popular representation and to promote democratic principles in the Soviet electoral system.

C. Gilbert Green Views Regarding Sino-Soviet Rift

Gilbert Green, one of the top leaders of the CPUSA who was among the original CPUSA leadership indicted and prosecuted for violation of the Smith Act of 1940, returned to active CP leadership after a long period of CPUSA underground activities, confinement and probation, in August, 1963.

On October 6, 1963, Green made his first public appearance in New York at a large meeting. During the course of his speech Green, in speaking of the CPC, said, "The Chinese are our comrades." The Chinese are "Marxists."

Ben Davis, a member of the CPUSA National Executive Committee and Board, who followed Green on the rostrum, took the occasion to refute Green's remarks publicly. Davis noted that the Chinese were trying to use the race question, and he refuted the validity of Robert Williams' (Negro who fled the United States and is now in China) theory on the Negro question as it regarded the matter of violence.

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman of the CPUSA, subsequently in delivering reactions of the CPUSA leadership's views to Green's remarks, stated that the speech shocked everyone and that people (Party members and leaders) were asking "Is this a new factional fight?" She stated that Green spoke so strongly for the Chinese that Ben Davis answered him equally strongly, and further, that at a subsequent meeting of the CPUSA National Board, the Board members "took him apart." Flynn's evaluation of Green's remarks was that "He is a very stubborn--not willing to listen and quite opinionated on all topics." Green himself subsequently indicated that his remarks had been misinterpreted and that he supported the over-all Soviet position but was critical of the Party for failure to allow free and full discussion of the Chinese position in connection with this rift. Nevertheless, some questions

were raised by the national Party leadership as to Green's potential for future leadership because of his stated pro-Chinese views.

A personal letter from Green dated November 10, 1963, addressed to Henry Winston, CPUSA National Vice Chairman, now in Moscow, has been obtained, of the existence of which the CPSU is also cognizant.

Green in this letter to Winston expressed a wish that Winston was in the United States so that they could "kick around" questions relating to both policy and perspective.

He then stated that there was one question he would like to mention to get Winston's thinking on it. This question had to do with the international controversy with the "Chinese comrades." He stated that he was quite disturbed by some aspects of this controversy--not that it is a controversy because he thought that differences were inevitable, "even exceedingly sharp differences."

He noted that the world was extremely complicated and that conditions in different parts of the world were completely different. Furthermore, he noted that there are contradictions also within the socialist system and in the relations between the socialist states ~~and~~ "not antagonisms--but contradictions." He stated that all of these matters have to be faced openly, analyzed objectively, or else they could become transformed into antagonisms. Green stated that "I, for one, do not believe that Cuba's non-signing of the test ban treaty is necessarily a mistake, given, of course,

her correct evaluation of the significance of the test ban agreement as a whole." In this connection he noted that Washington had refused to consider a nuclear free zone in the Caribbean, that Cuba had been denied nuclear weapons, and he raised the question, "Why should Cuba unilaterally give up its right to these weapons until such a free zone is agreed to?" He said that he mentioned the Cuban situation because he had met comrades greatly disturbed because Cuba had refused to sign the test ban agreement, but yet "I cannot feel that way. I do not believe that unity of the socialist camp precludes differences in tactical approach arising out of difference in national interest and position."

Continuing on the major issue of the dispute, that is, the Sino-Soviet rift, Green stated that he believed the Chinese comrades were basically wrong. Further, he believed that the Chinese view every step to reduce world tension as some kind of an act of betrayal and that this position is "simply out of this world." He stated that in his view the criticism by the CPC of the western parties is dogmatic and wrong and that their attacks on the Soviet comrades is completely irresponsible. He expressed the hope, however, that no irrevocable break will take place. He stated further that he believes that ~~before~~ a world conference of Parties to act against the Chinese is called, there should be preparatory work "with the Chinese" or else no conference should be held at the present time. He indicated that he had no view as

to whether the differences can be reconciled in the near future, but reiterated that certainly nothing should be done to bring on a break. He noted that the Chinese position does carry considerable Trotskyism in it. However, he called Winston's attention to the fact ~~there~~ is one difference which "we cannot forget: it is the position of a Party leading a state with one-fourth of the world mankind."

Green then told Winston that the question that disturbs him the most is how the differences were permitted to reach the stage of vitriolic name calling, particularly on the side of the Chinese, at least as far as public statements are concerned. He expressed the belief that the main reason it has reached this stage is because the conflict was permitted to fester so long behind closed doors until differences of shading and emphasis became differences in fundamental outlook. "In other words," Green stated "I believe the main fault is not to be found in the fact that the dispute came into the open but that it came into the open only when it could no longer be kept quiet, only when it had reached a point of explosion."

Continuing, Green stated that he had read voluminous material published recently and that based upon this it is clear that the differences date back to the 20th Congress--and possibly even before then. He raised the question as to why there was not an airing of these differences in public. He stated that in his opinion a public, comradely discussion could have checked certain tendencies before they became hard and fast lines. He said he

had no fear as to how the Party and non-Party masses would have reacted and had confidence that they would have responded to the corrections made in the Soviet Party and certainly would have responded in support of the policy of peaceful coexistence.

Green then stated that "I think it was a mistake to just brand the Molotovs, etc., as an anti-Party group without ever presenting their views openly for discussion and rejection--for I am sure they would have been rejected. And let us recall that the Chinese comrades have done the same--they have branded those in their leadership who disagreed with their policies as anti-Party but without permitting their views to be presented to the Party."

Continuing, Green said "What I am saying is this: Was there not a deformation during the Stalin period in the entire approach to inner Party democracy? Is it not necessary to permit differences of opinion in the Party, even though we demand that the Party act as one when a decision is made? In the days of Lenin there were real inner Party discussions and debates, but since the defeat of the Trotskyites and the Bucharinites, there have really been no such discussions. I think it is this failure to establish a real normal inner Party democracy and real meaningful Party congresses where differences are thrashed out and resolved which makes inevitable periodic explosions, for what happens is that contradictions that can be resolved and overcome become smothered until at some point an explosion occurs. With all the

progress that the Soviet Party has made in democratization, in getting away from the distortions of the Stalin period, it has still, in my opinion, not openly faced up to this need for real inner Party democracy based on democratic centralism."

Green then cited examples of the speeches at the 22nd Congress which referred to a letter from Molotov, the contents of which were only known to members of the Central Committee or the Congress and which were never divulged to the masses. He said that he thought the details of these letters should be brought to the attention of Party members so that they might wrestle with ideas and think them through so that they could ascertain the facts of the situation and "especially both sides of a basic dispute." He added that only when people think through questions do they have confidence to act on their own; to make independent judgments and not wait for orders from above. He spoke out against "spoon-feeding of the masses" from above and stated that in such an atmosphere it is hard to fight tendencies toward bureaucracy even when there is the best will in the world to do so.

Continuing, Green stated that he thought this same tendency had reflected itself in the world movement and to one degree or another in various Parties. He stated that the Italian Party was especially conscious of this danger and had developed a real inner democratic life and an atmosphere of real discussion over basic questions. In connection with the Sino-Soviet rift, he stated that the Italian Party is most objective in the way it

debates with the Chinese comrades, "never calling them names, always indicating respect for them and their Party and people, and yet giving not an inch on fundamental questions." He added, "I, for one, am for more of this kind of inner life in the communist movement."

XIII. ECHOES OF SINO-SOVIET RIFT
IN CANADIAN CP, APRIL, 1963

Leslie Morris, General Secretary, and William Kashtan, Organization Secretary, CP of Canada, arranged talks in China with the CPC during April, 1963, to express views on problems confronting the international communist movement.

Peng Chen, Mayor of Peking and a Member of the Secretariat of the CPC; Chao I-min, former CPC representative to the publication "Problems of Peace and Socialism;" and Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, were among the individuals with whom discussions were held.

En route to Peking the Canadian delegation met with members of the CCCPSU who reiterated that the differences between the CCCPSU and the CPC are also differences which the Chinese have with other Parties and they concern basic propositions of Marxism-Leninism. The CPSU representatives stated that the Albanian Party of Labor had rejected all overtures for the resumption of talks with the Soviet Union with the demand that the CPSU and Khrushchev must admit their mistakes and apologize to the Albanians before talks could be resumed.

Upon the arrival of the Canadian delegation in Peking, the CPC leadership at the very outset of this discussion indicated an air of hostility to the Canadians. Teng Hsiao-ping launched into a bitter attack against the Canadian Party and said that the Canadian communists were no good, that they never ceased in their attacks on the CPC, and that they had engaged in open polemics.

The Canadian representatives stressed the need to resolve questions through a conference of the international movement. Peng Chen agreed to the need for such a conference but attached three significant conditions to the conference agenda:

1. It must deal with the strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution;
2. It must deal with the relations of Communist Parties to each other; and
3. Such a conference would have to allow a majority to decide on the correctness of the issues. Peng said that the CPC could not trust the leadership of Khrushchev because he had openly and unilaterally violated a resolution regarding Yugoslavia at the 81-Party Congress.

In view of the suggested agenda, the Canadians raised the question with the Chinese as to whether one party can be the judge or repository of all that is correct. They asked what were the roots of these disputes which were disturbing the entire world communist movement including elements in the Canadian Party. As

these questions were raised, the Chinese answered only the questions they cared to answer and then only in an atmosphere of hostility.

Peng engaged in a lengthy dissertation on imperialism and attacked the United States as being the main enemy. He said that the Moscow Declaration of 1957 said that peace is the paramount question, but, in fact, peace is only one point among others. He discussed the thesis of armed struggle as against the thesis of peaceful transition. In this connection he attacked the Popular Socialist Party of Cuba because it did not prepare for armed struggle and became isolated from the Cuban people. He described Castro as "one of the greatest Marxist-Leninist leaders, who saved Cuba, engaged in armed struggle, and won."

As these discussions developed, the CPC leaders kept emphasizing the necessity of civil war and used one-sided arguments to disprove the thesis of peaceful transition.

On the question of a "united front" they developed a similar line. They said they were for a "united front" even with the national bourgeoisie, but the approach should be "to hang our so-called allies, the Social Democrats." This, it is noted, is in contradiction to the Moscow Declaration since this Declaration emphasized the need for a "united front" with Social Democrats.

The Chinese throughout the discussions placed the national liberation question first as against the class struggle. They stressed that the colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America will lead the revolution.

Continuing on the question of war and peace, the Chinese said, "How can we defend peace? First build socialism, then defend peace. We must first depend on the national independence movement in the colonies, then on the peace movement."

Summing up the results of these discussions, it could be concluded that the Chinese in April, 1963, were encouraging any and all Parties to join in the fight for their position even if it meant splitting the international communist movement. The CPC was dogmatically interpreting the Lenin theory of ousting the opportunists at the time of the struggle with the Mensheviks in the early 1900s and wanted to repeat this in the form of a split in every Party, even though the situation in the world today is quite different than at the time of Lenin's struggle with the Mensheviks.

The Canadian delegation reported back to their Executive Committee that while they were in discussion with the Chinese leaders they felt like prisoners in the dock who were being abused, berated, and could not appeal to any logic as far as the Chinese reaction was concerned. They left the conference with the belief that there were many difficulties lying ahead before an international conference of Parties could convene. The Chinese left the impression that they were actively organizing factions in many Parties and that there were pro-Chinese elements in the Canadian Communist Party.

XIV. CPSU VIEWS AIMS OF CPC AS DIRECTED
TOWARD BUILDING UNITED WORLD ANTI-
IMPERIALIST FRONT BASED ON
NATIONALISM AND RACISM - SHIFT
OF "CENTER" FROM MOSCOW TO PEKING

In May, 1963, CPSU leaders including Boris N. Ponomarev, Member of the Secretariat, CCCPSU in charge of the International Department, and V. G. Korianov, his chief deputy in the International Department, CCCPSU, in intimate discussions with leaders of other Parties, engaged in open attacks on the CPC.

They stated that the CPC had lost its perspective and faith in socialism. It no longer thinks in terms of socialist revolution but rather it thinks in terms of national liberation movements. Thus, they are concentrating on the three "A's," referring to Asia, Africa and Latin America. They desire to form a united world anti-imperialist front based on "nationalism and racism." This is part of the CPC philosophy and what it wishes to do is to split or separate themselves from the present world communist revolutionary movement. The Chinese are planning the formation of a new Communist International and are known to have made overtures to the Australian CP to join this new International. This offer was refused by the Australian Party, but the Chinese indicated they were further continuing their plans for a new Communist International with Peking as the "center." When the leadership of the Australian CP refused their offer, the Chinese organized a split-off pro-Chinese group of their own in Australia, headed by an expelled member of the Australian CP.

The Russians stated that the CPC in violation of the 81-Party Conference has continued to engage in splitting tactics in from 20 to 30 Parties, including Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States.

They are also engaging in splitting tactics in organizing six new international organizations of women, youth, students, peace, sports and an international trade union organization.

The CPSU representatives stated that the CPC has also organized centers for women in Brazil, Uruguay, Panama and Mexico. The CPC has influence in Brazil through a group of expelled CP members. It is supplying this group with arms and is training this group for guerilla warfare. The CPC bought out the CP of New Zealand "lock, stock and barrel." For the past two months the CPC has been attempting to promote its line and policy in Africa, Asia and Latin American countries.

During these discussions with members of the CPSU leadership, it was learned that the CPC and CPSU had agreed to meet on current differences on July 5, 1963. Yet three days after they had reached this agreement, Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the PRC, said in a speech, "The foreign policy of socialist countries must not be reduced into the single aspect of peaceful coexistence." This statement itself, according to the CPSU leaders, is in violation of agreements made at the 81-Party Conference.

V. G. Korianov said that insofar as the CPC is concerned, it is simply a racist problem, that is, yellow and black

against white. He reported that in a private conversation with CPSU leaders, Chou En-lai reportedly said "East is East. We are one people. We have nothing to do with you. China can change the world."

Korianov stated that the CPSU disagrees with the race issue and as communists could never accept this thinking. He stated the class struggle is the basic tenet of Marxism-Leninism.

Continuing, he said that now the Chinese are trying to shift the center of the revolution from Moscow to Peking. The signing of the 81-Party Statement in 1960 by the Chinese did not indicate that they had retreated from this position. Rather the signing meant nothing. They have moved further away from that agreement.

Another CPSU leader speaking at the same time stated that the question of achieving unity with the Chinese is not simple. The CPSU will be most circumspect in accepting CPC proposals and will not compromise on principles. The CPSU may compromise on a government level to effect better relations, but such compromise would be in effect a "face saving device."

Continuing, the CPSU leaders stated that with regard to the July 5, 1963, meeting agreed to by the Chinese, the CPSU had already received information from a friendly party that the CPC would go to the Moscow meeting only to restate its position and would do nothing more. The CPSU leader said that in view of this development the CPSU intends to do the same - merely restate its position.

A. CASTRO AND THE SINO-SOVIET
RIFT, AUGUST, 1963

In 1963 Fidel Castro visited the USSR and had personal conversations with Premier Khrushchev. The invitation was extended in order to win Castro into closer cooperation with the USSR.

According to CPSU leaders, Khrushchev made efforts to convince Castro that he wanted Cuba utilized as an example for other Latin American countries, and to accomplish this there were several things that Castro must do. He must build a solid economy and work hard so that the glow of the Cuban revolution will continue to be reflected on the other Latin American countries.

V. Korianov, Deputy to the Head of the International Department, CCCPSU, indicated in August, 1963, that the Russians did not consider Castro completely in rein but that he, Castro, no longer speaks like the Chinese. Further, that since Castro's visit to the USSR, the Chinese had not mentioned him in their press or other public media.

The Russians, however, are still concerned that Castro might still come under the influence of Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Deputy Premier and Minister of Industry of Cuba, and others around him and felt it necessary from time to time to have other Latin American comrades visit Cuba and influence him to do the things which the USSR cannot directly tell him to do.

Insofar as Guevara is concerned, the CPSU said that he was a communist in good standing when he left Argentina but was among those who advocated armed uprisings and adventurism. Guevara left Argentina when the CP of Argentina told him his views were anarchistic, and as a result Guevara went into voluntary exile, looking for greener pastures.

XV. CPC-CPSU CONFERENCE, MOSCOW,
USSR, JULY 5-20, 1963

A confidential meeting between leading representatives of the CPSU and the CPC was held in Moscow, USSR, from July 5 to 20, 1963, for the purpose of discussing differences between the Parties. The CPC delegation was headed by Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, with the Russian delegation being headed by Mikhail A. Suslov, a Member of the Presidium and a Secretary of the CCCPSU.

While both Parties indicated that this conference was to lay the groundwork for a subsequent conference, it was obvious from the beginning that both sides were not interested in settling differences and were more concerned with a reiteration and presentation of their respective positions before the Parties of the international communist movement.

Teng Hsiao-ping made speeches on July 8 and 12, 1963, initially emphasizing that the CPC came to the meeting in an effort to achieve unity in the world communist movement.

He said, however, that the resolution of differences can only be achieved on the basis of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary principles contained in the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960.

Teng referred to a letter of the CPC of June 14, 1963, which he claimed explained the causes of the differences and then said that frankly the causes of the many differences stem from the 20th Congress, CPSU, which presented propositions running

counter to Marxism-Leninism on the question of war and peace, peaceful coexistence and the peaceful transition to socialism. He charged that the CPC had disagreed with the attacks on Stalin since 1956 and that Mao-Tse-tung as well as Chou En-lai and others had so told the Russians. He stated that the "cult of the personality" thesis led and paved the way to a revision of Marxism-Leninism.

Teng charged that the CPSU had adopted a position of "great power chauvinism" in Poland. It had encouraged revisionism and anti-Party factional groups in many fraternal parties. The CPSU itself began to take an opportunistic trend.

Elaborating on CPC charges of "big power chauvinism" by the CPSU, Teng related the fact that on April 7, 1958, Russia had proposed establishing a long-range radar station on Chinese soil and the establishment of a joint Chinese-Soviet fleet, thus trying to bring China under the military control of the USSR. Following refusal by the Chinese, the CPSU launched an anti-Chinese campaign including attacks on the communes.

Continuing, Teng charged that in June, 1959, the USSR unilaterally annulled its agreement to assist China in establishing an atomic industry and in manufacturing atomic bombs.

According to Teng, in September, 1959, a Tass news article presented a biased picture on the China-India border dispute and then in November, 1959, Khrushchev made a statement that the Chinese were behaving stupidly in the China-India border dispute.

Teng charged that at the Camp David meeting in September, 1959, Khrushchev spoke of a world without arms or armies and without wars, that he extolled United States imperialism in every way, that he considered peaceful coexistence as the "thing of things," and that Khrushchev also spoke of the idea that the United States-Soviet friendship would determine the destiny of mankind.

Teng said that on September 30, 1959, at a dinner in Peking on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the CPC, Khrushchev said one must not use force to test the stability of the capitalist system.

Teng said that on October 5, 1959, at Vladivostok, USSR, Khrushchev attacked the CPC, saying that "We (the Chinese) are striving for war as cocks strive for a fight."

In his speech of July 12, 1963, Teng said that the CPSU charges against the CPC are a deliberate distortion of the basic position of the CPC, that the CPSU misinterprets and distorts the Moscow Declaration of 1957, that it holds to its special position and line and imposes the line of one Party on the world communist movement.

Teng said that the CPSU was exerting economic and military pressures on fraternal parties and was using the pretext of the **personality cult** as a basis for interfering in the internal affairs of fraternal parties. He said the CPSU exploits its congresses and the congresses of other Parties and uses all

conceivable means of propaganda to make open and direct attacks on other fraternal parties. It also encourages other Parties to attack some fraternal parties.

Teng charged the CPSU with turning the International Aid Fund into an instrument of the CPSU to conduct factional activities.

Summing this up, Teng said that all of these matters add up to great power chauvinism, dissension, and sectarianism and create a serious threat of a split in the socialist camp and in the world communist movement.

Teng said the CPC rejects the charge that the CPC is seeking to impose an adventurous policy on the whole world. It rejects the charge that the CPC has departed from Marxism-Leninism, as well as the charges of narrow nationalism, left opportunism and sectarianism.

Teng charged the CPSU with renouncing the struggle against imperialism and by so doing renouncing revolution and acting against revolution. This he claimed is undermining the unity of the socialist camp. He charged that the USSR has departed from the principles of proletarian internationalism and has embarked on a revisionist and opportunist line.

Teng charged that United States imperialism is trying to drive a wedge between the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic. He called for unity to deliver a blow against imperialism.

Mikhail Suslov replied to some of these charges in a speech on July 10, 1963. He traced the Chinese campaign against the CPSU and other Parties to the lessening of the tensions of the cold war which began in 1954. He saw a connection between the campaign against the CPSU and the difficulties which China was experiencing in the economic field as a result of its "leap forward" and the communes. He charged the Chinese with laying the blame for its difficulties at someone else's door.

Suslov defended the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the implementation of the decisions of this Congress with regard to the cult of the personality. He reiterated the soundness of the CPSU position on the character of the present epoch and charged that the Chinese thesis that the main contradictions of the present epoch are between imperialism and the national liberation movement is a departure from Marxism-Leninism. He stated that this is the case since the CPC ignores the working class as the leader of the revolutionary struggle. He charged the CPC with making the national liberation movement the central factor of the world revolutionary movement.

Suslov charged that the CPC had rejected the conclusions of the 20th Congress on the question of war and peace and peaceful coexistence as running counter to Marxism-Leninism. He said that the CPC did not recognize the possibility of preventing war and further that it underestimates the power of the world socialist

system and the peace forces, and overestimates the strength of imperialism.

A. CPSU Reaction to Failure of
July 5-20, 1963, Meeting with CPC

Vitaly Korianov commented on the status of the rift following the July, 1963, meeting. He described the situation as in a state of change with the majority of Parties fighting the existing opportunistic nationalistic trend. He said the CPSU will again try to meet with the CPC because it feels it must show the world Marxist movement that it is trying to effect a reconciliation.

Due to the failure of the July 5-20, 1963, meeting of Central Committee representatives of the interested Parties to come to any agreement whatsoever, the CCCPSU directed that a letter be sent to the fraternal parties, setting out the CPSU version of what transpired at the meeting and to further develop the direction of CPSU policy. A secret "news letter" approved by the CPSU Presidium dated August 19, 1963, was prepared for dissemination to the leadership of the fraternal parties.

The letter, in essence, said that the Soviet Union entered into the meeting in a businesslike way and in a cooperative spirit to discuss:

1. Burning problems relating to the international situation;
2. Soviet-Chinese relations and the communist movement; and

3. To further prepare for an international conference of Communist Parties.

The letter charged that the CPC was not interested in eliminating differences but used the meeting for an assault on the decisions of the 20th and 22nd Congress of the CPSU and on the policies of the working class movement. The letter referred to a CPC letter of June 14, 1963, which it charged gave notice that the purpose of the CPC was to build tension, exacerbate the differences and extend the front of polemics.

It stated that the June, 1963, CPSU plenum denounced the slanderous attacks of the CPC made in the CPC letter of June 14, 1963.

The CPSU letter of August 19, 1963, detailed the "obvious" errors of the Chinese comrades and their distortions of basic principles of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960.

The CPSU letter set forth a summary of the CPSU position as presented by M. A. Suslov and stated that he had proposed the following basic propositions for discussion:

1. To struggle for the further development of the might and cohesion of the world socialist system and to make it the decisive factor in the development of human society.

2. To struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence.

3. To struggle against the policy of aggression and war pursued by the imperialist camp headed by the United States.

4. To discuss questions relating to the national liberation movement and ways and means whereby the socialist countries can support the liberation struggle of oppressed nations.

5. To discuss questions of strengthening the unity and cohesion of the world communist movement.

6. To discuss other questions of interest to both Parties dealing with Sino-Soviet relations. Albania and Yugoslavia were also suggested.

The CPSU letter states that the CPSU dealt with each question in detail and set out the viewpoint of the CPSU.

It was shown in the secret "news letter" that the CPC leadership's thoughts on key questions departed from the common line of the communist movement, particularly in the following areas:

1. The main contradictions of the contemporary epoch.
2. War and peace.
3. Appraisal of the role of the socialist system.
4. The national liberation movement in the revolutionary process.
5. So-called intermediate zones.
6. The relation of peaceful coexistence policy to the revolutionary struggle.
7. The role of the revolutionary movement in developed capitalistic countries,

8. The attitude toward the ideology and practices of the personality cult.

9. Relations between the socialist countries.

The CPSU letter of August 19, 1963, claimed that an examination of the CPC letter of June 14, 1963, extended the differences further by raising the question of a new general line. It struck out the existing general line of the working class movement contained in the Moscow Declaration and the Moscow Statement.

Continuing, the CPSU letter stated that the CPC in rebuttal made countless attacks against the program of the CPSU on the struggle of the personality cult, the development of the dictatorship of the proletariat, etc. It charges that Teng, speaking for the CPC, evaded the problems of principle submitted for joint discussion. It charged that his speech was an assortment of distorted views, falsification of facts and insulting threats against the Soviet Union and the Marxist-Leninist Parties.

The CPSU letter stated that the CPC charged the USSR with adventurism and defeatism for the Soviet position on Cuba. It stated that the CPC had demonstrated that they refused to reckon with the distinctive features of modern times that shape the revolutionary movement. The CPC strives for the position of permanent revolution - the export of revolution.

The CPSU letter recounts that the CPSU has demonstrated that it is impossible in "our times" to advance the cause of the

socialist revolution without an active struggle for the prevention of thermonuclear war, and without rallying the masses to the banner of peace, democracy and national independence in an anti-imperialistic front.

The CPSU letter stated that the CPC delegates at the July 5-20, 1963, meeting ignored all facts and repeatedly failed to discuss concrete problems and made no positive proposals. Finally at the end of the session of July 19, the Chinese delegation proposed to adjourn the meeting. There was a motion to adjourn the meeting and to issue a communique. It was suggested that open polemics relative to this matter be ended but the Chinese opposed this portion of the motion.

The CPSU letter then outlined the basic problems and questions existing between the CPSU and the CPC from the Soviet point of view. These were essentially the same points as existed at the opening of the meeting.

The CPSU secret letter of August 19, 1963, lists the following conclusions of the CPSU as a result of its meeting of July 5-20, 1963:

1. There was a clash of lines of the two delegations-- the line of the world communist movement (that of the CPSU) defined by the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960, and the CPC line that wants to openly revise these policies in a left sectarian spirit and replace them by an adventurist, nationalist, disruptive policy. The CPC is bent on defaming the world fraternal parties.

2. The CPC delegation came to camouflage and maneuver, hypocritically showing a willingness to hold discussions but in reality pushing their line against the CPSU and other Parties. A comparison with their 1960 statements shows that they have pushed further and in a more undisguised form.

3. Numerous facts show that the CPC leadership is striving for hegemony in an overt form to achieve leadership of the world Communist Parties but differing from the line of the world communist movement.

4. The CPC refusal to stop open polemics shows they are bent on a disruptive stepped-up campaign. They will use the time between the first and second round of talks for further attacks on the CPSU and other Parties. They will back splinter groups and will continue to sow ideological confusion and chaos in the ranks of the world communist movement.

5. The CPC leadership is out to split the communist movement despite their 1960 pledge and will try to divert the communist movement on an adventurist and sectarian path.

6. This will cause serious damage to the common struggle for peace, against the imperialist policy of aggression and war, to the entire international working class movement, and to the communist and national liberation movement. All forms of renegades will take up with them.

7. The left phrases used by the CPC were merely a smoke screen behind which they conceal their special aims and designs.

Their desire is to keep up world tensions and sabotage the fight to prevent nuclear war or achieve disarmament. This is shown by their position on India and the Caribbean. They are also fanning racial and national discord. Their false theory of the "inter-mediate zone" includes everyone but the United States. Their advocacy of great power adventurism is nationalistic in aim.

8. The result of this policy will be that the CPC will link up with Trotskyism.

9. "We draw the conclusion since they do not back down from their present policy that we must intensify our struggle against left sectarianism, against factionalism, and continue to defend our internationalist Marxist-Leninist line. Defending all fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties, we identify ourselves with all Parties attacked."

10. "We will show self-restraint in order to exhaust all opportunities to prevent a split in the world communist movement. Lenin's bequest places the world revolutionary movement above everything else and that is why we have agreed to continue talks with the CPC."

This document is signed by the CCCPSU.

In August, 1963, Boris N. Ponomarev and Vitaly Korianov discussed the July, 1963, meeting. Ponomarev charged that the CPC is striving for hegemony in the world communist movement. He said that the CPSU is now preparing for a conference of fraternal parties to be held in about six months. He did not believe that the CPC could be kept from this conference. He considered the Chinese as "mad men."

Ponomarev and Korianov noted that it was clear that the Chinese are steering a resolute course for a split. It is a fact within the international communist movement that the policies of the CPC indicate a new opportunistic trend within the movement, not yet clearly defined. It might be called "left communism" or perhaps "nationalistic communism." What are the signs of this trend? They said that the first sign is nationalism and particularly that the inspirer of this new nationalism is a party in power in a big country. The trend is based on: 1) nationalism and 2) on a loss of confidence in the forces of socialism in China and in the international arena. One of the basic reasons for this loss of confidence by China is its inability to solve its economic problems. This has undermined its faith in socialist construction and leads China to move closer to the Western camp economically. All of these facts show that the Chinese have strayed from the camp of socialism.

The third feature, according to Ponomarev and Korianov, is the transformation of dogmatism and sectarianism. China has now gone beyond mere dogmatism and sectarianism, and this current is now on a splitting course which it is pursuing in each Party in the entire communist movement. They reiterated that reports are coming back to the effect that China is doing preparatory work to the formation of a new communist international. The Chinese approached Japanese communist leaders and suggested that it was necessary for each Party to establish as opposition a revolutionary grouping. These groups, according to Ponomarev

and Korianov, cannot be underestimated or ignored in many countries. They exist in the United States and in many other countries.

Continuing, Korianov and Ponomarev said that there is a factual linking up of the Chinese with Trotskyism. The CPC is attracting the Trotskyites for the establishment of a new international.

Another feature of the present situation might be called anti-Sovietism, and this concerns not only Party problems but is transferred also to state relations.

Concluding, Ponomarev and Korianov said that the Chinese, as the CPSU sees it, have launched a cold war against the Soviet Union and other Parties. They are spreading their literature and using all sorts of dirty methods and tactics in their fight. Chinese anti-Sovietism has now come out into the open. Their splitting tactics are not only confined to Communist Parties but are also undermining and splitting all democratic mass organizations. They have not been paying dues to those organizations but come to their congresses and try to break them up or to split them.

According to Ponomarev and Korianov, the Chinese are trying to split these people's organizations in Asia, Africa and Latin America from the world organizations. They are making attempts to form new world-wide organizations based chiefly in Asia, in the trade unions, among writers, women and peace organizations.

XVI. BORDER INCIDENTS BETWEEN USSR AND CHINA

Representatives of the CCCPSU International Department remarked in August, 1963, that during the past several years there had been 156 border incidents of one type or another. The most serious of these incidents occurred on the border between the USSR and China which was heavily populated by Chinese Moslems and involved 60,000 persons who crossed the border into the USSR. They were practically starving and came across the border for food. The Government of China demanded that the USSR drive the peasants back to China with the use of machine guns if necessary.

In the view of these CPSU representatives, none of these border incidents were of great significance. The main concern of the CPSU with regard to these incidents is the fear that perhaps in the future substantially larger numbers of Chinese could cross the border into the Soviet Union. It was noted that these people are Asian and not European and that future incursions by millions of Chinese would concern the Soviet Union, bearing in mind the historical references to invasion by millions of Asians under Genghis Khan. The Chinese are fighting for hegemony of the world.

XVII. ALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, SEPTEMBER, 1963

Based upon comments and opinions rendered by a number of individuals holding leadership positions in the CPSU as of September, 1963, it appeared that the overwhelming majority of Communist and Workers Parties throughout the world are now

supporting the ideological position of the CPSU in the current Sino-Soviet rift.

In Europe, for example, the Albanian Party of Labor is the only Party echoing the CPC viewpoint. Most European Parties have some individuals or small factions who support the Chinese, but none of these Parties reported a threat to existing Party leadership.

All the Parties in Africa are organizationally at this stage anti-Chinese and endorse the CPSU although the Chinese have made both economic and political inroads in these areas. They are particularly interested in Africa and are utilizing the "racial and nationalistic" approach.

In Latin America all the Parties support the CPSU though some CPC influence is noted in these Parties. The CP of Venezuela is a possible exception in that there is a group in the Party leadership that favors armed rebellion although there is a split in the leadership on this question.

The CP of Brazil fully supports the CPSU but within the ranks there are dissidents. A pro-Chinese group is now publishing a weekly newspaper in Brazil.

In Asia and the Far East the CPC has the support of the Malaya and Burma Parties and has "bought out" the CP of New Zealand. The proximity of Malaya and Burma to China, and the fact that these Parties maintain headquarters in Peking make support of the CPC almost mandatory.

The Korean Party of Labor and the Workers Party of Vietnam are lined up against the CPSU.

The CP of Japan is now inclined toward the Chinese, and according to leaders of the world communist movement, this Party too has been bought up by the CPC. There is a minority in the CP of Japan leadership which favors the CPSU.

The vast majority of Communist and Workers Parties desire the CPSU and the CPC to continue to meet, but few believe that the differences can be resolved. The majority of Parties favor international gatherings but ask that there be no compromise on principles.

XVIII. SOVIET GOVERNMENT ATTACKS PRC, SEPTEMBER, 1963

On September 21, 1963, the Soviet Government published an official statement in Izvestia, organ of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, which was widely reprinted in the press and in pamphlet form and distributed throughout the world.

This statement emphasized again the deepening of the conflict and was provoked by a statement of the Government of China of September 1, 1963, on the subject of the treaty banning nuclear testing which was negotiated by the USSR, Britain and the United States.

The Soviet statement makes the charge that the Chinese are using a Government statement to "slander the CPSU" on a wide range of questions in which the CPC and CPSU had differences. It

states that the Chinese statement of September 1, 1963, can no longer be considered as a comradely discussion between communists but as "actions of people who have set themselves the aim of discrediting at any cost the CPSU and the Soviet Union, of splitting the communist movement and undermining the unity of the anti-imperialist forces."

The Soviet Government statement charges the Chinese with "trying to degrade the discussion on principled questions of our times to the level of a vociferous exchange of angry words and angry accusations." It states that the Soviet Government will not trade abuse for abuse but finds it necessary to again restate its position.

The Soviet statement referred to a previous USSR statement of August 21, 1963, which it said "exposed the actual motives that guided the Chinese leaders in their opposition to the nuclear test ban Treaty--it showed their desire to acquire their own bomb at any cost."

The statement examines the motives which prompted the Peking "giants" to rush into battle against the nuclear test ban treaty. It concludes that it is the Chinese desire to make their country a nuclear power. It charges the Chinese with being "provocative" in posing the question of "monopoly" on nuclear weapons and in placing a socialist state on the same footing as the "imperialists."

The statement then criticizes the "Chinese commune" program, noting that the CPSU saw the dangers of this road as

abusing every Marxist-Leninist principle of material incentive. It states that today the Chinese seek to blame the USSR for failure of the PRC economy because of a violation of economic agreements and because of the recall of specialists. It lays the failure of the Chinese economic outlook on the violation of Marxist-Leninist principles and grave mistakes made by the PRC Government.

The document rejects the Chinese claim of the USSR settling for "two Chinas"---and reiterates that the PRC Government itself had advanced the idea of "peaceful reunification" of China.

On the question of border disputes, the statement notes the Soviet Government has, a number of times, called for consultations, but that the Chinese evade such consultations while continuing to violate the border and at the same time the Chinese propaganda machine makes hints of unjust demarcation of some of the sections of the Chinese-Soviet borders. It notes that the artificial creation of territorial problems would be tantamount to a very dangerous path where states begin to make territorial claims. Such propaganda instigates "national passion."

The Soviet statement accuses the Chinese leaders of pursuing their own "great power aims" and of using Cuba, for example, to exploit the crisis for their own factional ends.

The statement continues and emphasizes that the CPSU is interested in strengthening unity between the CPSU and the CPC, but that all practical steps in this direction have been for

nought. Rather, while these efforts were being made, the CPC leaders "are going farther and farther along the road of a split."

The Soviet statement notes that disagreements between the Parties "are being extended by them (the Chinese) more and more to inter-state relations. The Chinese Government has resorted to openly hostile acts against the Soviet Union. Its foreign policy steps contradict more and more the peaceloving policy of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community."

Continuing, the Soviet Government alleges that more recent statements by the Chinese leaders gave rise to apprehensions in another area. The Chinese have not only outdone themselves in the number of abuses but have breached secrecy of internal affairs of the international communist movement. They divulged confidential correspondence between the Governments and Parties of socialist countries, international talks and meetings of fraternal parties. It states that the CPC has slandered the CCCPSU, its leadership and leaders of the other Communist and Workers Parties and "especially Comrade N. S. Khrushchev."

It charges the Chinese have "transcended the boundaries of comradely Party discussion and are now waging an open political struggle against the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist Parties, for their special goals."

Continuing, it states "The Soviet people reject wrathfully and indignantly this unseemly campaign against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, against the world communist

movement." It states that "it is highly impermissible to transfer differences in ideological questions, disagreements arising among Parties, to relations between socialist states--to use them as a pretext to fan nationalism and chauvinism, mistrust and disunity among the peoples of these states."

The statement then calls for ceasing of open polemics because "only people who pay lip service to unity, while actually pursuing a splitting policy, can refuse to end the polemics." It expresses a willingness to discuss the differences in the interest of unity of socialist countries. It continues by warning that if the factional activity continues, the Chinese "will meet with the most resolute rebuff from the CPSU and the Soviet people."

Concluding, the statement indicates that the Soviet Union will not retreat from the principles of Marxism-Leninism and will not be budged by any "adventuristic attacks" on its policy.

One can only conclude that since this statement appeared in the name of the Soviet Government, the chief concern of the CPSU as of September, 1963, was that the Chinese had brought the differences among the Parties into affairs of government, and the CPSU felt the need for expressing itself in the strongest of language so that its position and that of the Chinese would be apparent to the eyes of the world. Thus, the CPSU hoped that in the event of a severance of international ties, the governments of the world would be on notice as to the views of the Soviets on "peace and peaceful coexistence."

A. Soviets Explore Possibility of an
Opposition to Present CPC Leadership
in the PRC - Late 1963

Timur Timofeev, Deputy Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, an affiliate of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, in confidential discussions in November, 1963, stated that the CPSU is presently engaged in carrying out a program of interviewing all Soviet experts and technicians who had worked in the PRC. It is debriefing such individuals in order to secure every bit of information possible with the purpose in mind of attempting to determine if there might be a possibility of the establishment today in China of an opposition to the present CPC leadership.

In this regard Timofeev noted that he had learned that the debriefing of the Soviet experts and technicians who had been among the last to leave China seemed to point out that there was no possibility of reconciliation with the present leadership of the CPC and the PRC insofar as the Soviets were concerned. In view of this, according to Timofeev, the CPSU officials emphasized that there must be no illusion or false hopes held for such a reconciliation. The CPSU will therefore pursue the tactical line of letting the Chinese "yell themselves hoarse" and be labelled as splitters.

B. Status of Sino-Soviet
Relations, Mid November, 1963

In mid-November, 1963, Boris N. Ponomarev, Member of the Secretariat and Head of the International Department, CCCPSU, gave a confidential briefing to selected members of the other Communist Parties wherein he reported on the current status of the Sino-Soviet differences. The essence of Ponomarev's remarks at that time are as follows:

"Have no illusions that the CPC and the CPSU will agree. However, there may be some effort to improve relations with the Chinese.

"We know many Parties have been hurt by the Chinese. For this reason we are trying to use the technique of trying to help other Parties by muzzling these things; that is, the vocal expression by the CPC and their attacks on other Parties. However, the CPC has just published another book, 'Two Lines of War and Peace,' which is in our opinion diametrically opposed to our concept of international developments as related to peaceful coexistence and disarmament."

Continuing, Ponomarev stated that the CPSU had hoped that during the summer of 1963 it would have obtained some positive results from the July meeting with the CPC. He stated that Khrushchev had tried to do everything possible to avoid a split, and in fact since the 81-Party Conference in 1960 the CPSU has attempted to minimize the differences between the Parties in order to avoid such a split.

Ponomarev, continuing, outlined a number of efforts by the CPSU to bring about comradely discussions with the Chinese including an approach by Khrushchev to the Chinese Ambassador Liu Hsiao when he left for China in the fall of 1962. These efforts were interpreted by the CPC as a "sign of weakness."

Ponomarev stated that the CPC takes the position that all Parties of the world are opportunists and that therefore the Chinese are going ahead with their efforts to split all the Parties if they can.

He indicated that the most disgraceful action of the CPC is the ideological attack on the Soviet Union because by so doing they are calling for a split in the socialist camp. He stated that the CPC claims that they are only against the leadership of the CPSU, but the CPSU knows they are against the CPSU and the Soviet Union.

At this point Ponomarev discussed the prospects of a new international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties. He stated the CPSU had given this matter a lot of thought, and at the moment, if an international meeting were called, it would mean an open split. This he said "would mean a split not only of the Communist and Workers Parties but a split of the socialist camp as well. They, the CPC, in the event of such a conference and/or split, would have only 10 or 12 Parties with them. This does not seem like much but nevertheless it would mean a separation."

Continuing, with regard to the possibility of a new conference of Communist Parties, Ponomarev stated that to call an early world meeting would not do. The CPSU needs a lot of time and feels it must try to have a meeting with the CPC prior to such a world meeting. The purpose of such a preliminary meeting would be to see if the contending Parties could not work out some manner of get-together if such a conference was called. He re-emphasized that the CPSU would not agree to a meeting of world Parties if sacrificing any Marxist-Leninist principles would be required. Secondly, he stated that in case the CPC continues to struggle against the very line of the world movement and the CPSU is ready to call a conference, it would need time to prepare for the drafting of documents and in this connection would have to consult other Parties on this matter. Therefore, the CPSU, as of now, sees no possibility of a world conference of Parties in the near future and the CPSU position on such a conference is as follows:

First the CPSU is against a split in the communist movement, yet at the same time a fear of a split will not cause the CPSU to give in on any principled matter. The CPSU will continue to fight for its line and for the line of the world communist movement.

Ponomarev stated that the CPC has its strategic plan to split all the Communist Parties and to establish Communist Parties under its own leadership. They are going about perfecting

this plan in many countries and are seeking to split off a number of people from Parties. This has already occurred in Brazil, Chile, Belgium, Switzerland and other countries. Once these groups are established, they assume the title of a Party, and the CPC will argue that if a conference is held these Parties as Marxist-Leninist Parties should also be invited to any world conference.

Ponomarev recognized that there are some Parties that now agree with the Chinese. He said the CPSU does not object to the various Parties bringing their influence to bear in contact with individual Parties including the Chinese, but that the individual Communist Parties will have to work out the basis of persuasion. However, contact with other Parties, to be of use, should not be limited to leadership but must be established with broad sections of the membership.

Concerning the reaction of the CPC to the latest moves of the CPSU for the discontinuance of open polemics, Ponomarev stated that the Chinese had not responded. He stated that the CPC is acting in a way that it seems to the CPSU it may have to intensify its own polemics. Despite these actions of the CPC, the CPSU was proposing to stop polemics.

Ponomarev concluded his remarks by relating a story the source of which he said was from China and is therefore not always completely reliable. However, he stated, "I will vouch for the following.

"We know that recently in Peking a very important Party meeting was held. At the moment I cannot tell you if it was a

Politburo meeting or a plenum, but at this meeting Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the PRC and Assistant Chairman of the CCCPC, spoke and said the following, 'One of the results of the line pursued by the CPC is the fact that we have shaken the idols, altars and gods of the church. Let us destroy all of these idols, altars and gods completely and we, ourselves, will be the gods.'

C. One More Effort by CPSU
to Effect Conciliation

In December, 1963, a confidential letter dated November 29, 1963, from N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary, CCCPSU, directed to "The CCCPC - Comrade Mao Tse-tung" was obtained. The letter in essence states:

Khrushchev notes that a number of documents had recently been published which publicly outlined the positions of the Marxist-Leninist Parties on the principal problems of the international communist movement raised in the current discussions. He states that "These documents have demonstrated the existence of serious differences within the international communist movement (and a) different understanding and interpretation of the declarations and statements of the Moscow Conferences."

Khrushchev notes that the CPSU and other fraternal parties, "irrespective of their attitudes, are seriously concerned with the fact that the differences are growing deeper and deeper, the scale of the debate is widening, with sharp and frank polemics assuming forms inadmissible in relations among Marxist-Leninists."

He expresses "concern" that ideological differences are transplanted to the "inter-state relations and influence in the sphere of concrete policies, thus weakening friendship and unity of the socialist community," and such a situation within the communist movement cannot but cause grievance on "our part."

Khrushchev called attention to repeated statements of the CPSU to the effect that abnormal relations between the CPSU and the CPC disrupt the strength and forces of the communist movement and benefit "only our enemies" who use existing differences for anti-communist purposes. He expressed concern as to the effect these differences are having on fraternal parties despite a reply of the CPC to the Soviet Ambassador to China, Chervonenko, to the effect that "The skies will not fall down, grass and trees will go on growing, women will bear children and fish will swim in the water."

Khrushchev pointed out that comrades in all countries want "unity" of action because without unity the struggle against the class enemy will be more difficult.

He states that in the present situation an "important and urgent" task of Marxist-Leninists is to turn from the "dangerous precipice" to normalization and consolidation "of all fraternal parties, all socialist countries."

He asserts that now as never before has the validity of Lenin's words regarding duties of Parties to give priority to the cardinal interests of the communist movement been more apparent.

Khrushchev pledged the CPSU to do everything possible for strengthening the unity of the communist movement.

He next outlined the thoughts of the CPSU as to what both Parties could do to achieve the aim of unity of communist movement.

He enumerated these thoughts as follows:

1. Despite serious differences there is a real basis for improving relations in the common struggle for socialism and communism, in supporting revolutionary labor and national liberation movements, and in the struggle for peace against aggressive intrigues of imperialism.

2. Both Parties hold objectively identical positions on the class struggle, the struggle against imperialism, and for the victory of the workers and all working people for the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Though the Parties do not always interpret these questions in the same way, it was felt by Khrushchev that a discussion in a calm and unprejudiced way could result in broad possibilities, not only for the maintenance but also for the development and strengthening of cooperation along numerous lines.

He suggested that now that both sides as well as the other fraternal parties have expressed their opinions on the

controversial questions, that it would be appropriate not to stress the "problems" on which the Parties differ but to wait for the tension to ease and "let time do its work."

Khrushchev then suggested that at the same time the Parties and countries could develop cooperation in the fields where cooperation is possible. In this area, he specifically suggested the development of cooperation in strengthening friendship between the Soviet Union and China and all socialist countries and with all fraternal parties through coordination of activities in various international organizations in order to achieve a common aim of securing peace and promoting a struggle against imperialism.

He suggested further the possibilities for cooperation in the economic field, scientific, technical and cultural fields. This, Khrushchev felt, was possible in view of recent public statements by Chou En-lai who spoke to the press of China's intentions to develop contacts with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and of China's adherence to the five principles of peaceful coexistence.

Khrushchev then suggested as an immediate objective that the two countries start working for trade exchange between the PRC and the USSR and proposed that the Soviet Union in the next few years could substantially increase its exports to China as well as its imports from China.

He recalled that an agreement was signed on May 13, 1962, by the respective governments calling for a reopening of negotiations on the delivery of "complete sets of equipment," the production of which was delayed for two years at the request of the Chinese.

He also indicated the amenability of the Soviet Union for the expansion of technical assistance in construction of industries if the Chinese show such an interest, and he particularly offered technical assistance in the oil industry, in the building of mining enterprises and in other fields "on conditions favorable for both our countries."

Khrushchev next proposed that in view of the fact that both ~~countries~~ are engaged in drawing up new five year plans, that discussions be held on the development of commercial and other ties for approval and incorporation in the national economic plans of both countries.

He next stated, "Of course, it is never too late to begin a welcome process of strengthening cooperation between the USSR and PRC, but it is better to come to it right now."

He pointed out that both countries ~~would~~ gain from broadening the scientific and technical cooperation and from developing all cultural ties. He solicited the views of the CPC toward cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields but only "if you consider that this corresponds to the interests of China." He stressed the value of economic cooperation for

both countries as well as for the socialist countries as being important for the building of socialism and communism.

He stressed that agreements on economic cooperation will also build valuable conditions for normalizing relations in other fields and will facilitate the settlement of other problems which influence relations between the countries.

He stated that he recognizes that recent developments on the China-USSR border "cannot be regarded as normal." In this regard he called attention to Soviet proposals to hold friendly consultations on "demarcation of some parts of the border line, considering that this will eliminate causes for existing misunderstanding." He acknowledged that China likewise had expressed itself favorably in intentions to solve this problem by mutual agreement.

Khrushchev next reminded the CPC of recent statements in the PRC concerning the "aggressive policy of the Tzarist Government" and unfair agreements imposed on China. He said the Soviet Union would not defend the Russian Tzars on setting up the borders, and on the other hand the Soviet Union is certain that China is not going to defend the Chinese Emperors who had taken territories by force of arms. He said that denouncing the exploiter clique will not help the situation and "we cannot but face the reality of the existence of historically established frontiers between the states." Any attempt, said Khrushchev, to ignore this reality can become a source of misunderstanding and conflict that will not resolve the problem.

Khrushchev called for both Parties to create favorable conditions and to avoid everything that might aggravate differences within the communist movement.

He asked Mao to go forward, step by step, and not to permit any actions that might undermine unity.

Khrushchev next asked for agreement not to let open polemics come out of control and reminded the CPC that the CPSU appealed to this course of action in August and as recently as November 7, 1963. Further, that the CPSU stopped publishing articles of a polemic character. He called again on the CCCPC to stop open polemics and other actions detrimental to the unity of the international communist.

Khrushchev was clear in stating that the CPSU was not proposing an all-out exchange on basic problems of world development. He said the CCCPSU in making these proposals proceeds from the position that such proposals would contribute towards strengthening the confidence of the Parties and would create more favorable conditions for the preparation of an international meeting of Communist and Workers Parties.

Khrushchev then again emphasized that if such a meeting occurred, it must be fruitful. It must be fruitful in order not to split the world communist movement, and it must bring about unity of all Parties and forces of peace and socialism.

The letter concludes by reiterating that the CPSU is motivated exclusively by its concern for strengthening unity. Some differences may exist in ideological problems but time will correct "those who are mistaken." The letter is signed by N. S. Khrushchev, First Secretary, Central Committee, CPSU, and dated November 29, 1963.

XX. FURTHER DEFECTIONS FROM
CPSU VIEWS NOTED IN ASIA

In conversations with a leading member of the Editorial Board of the "World Marxist Review" in Prague during November, 1963, it was learned that the CP of Indonesia is now aligned with the CPC and is threatening to withdraw its members from the "World Marxist Review" staff. Also, the North Korean Party of Labor has now officially withdrawn its staff from the "World Marxist Review." This leading official stated that these actions have been the result of the widening ideological differences which now exist between the CPSU and the CPC.

XXI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The information developed in this paper has clearly established that a deep rift exists in Sino-Soviet relations today at both the ideological and state levels and that it continues to grow sharper.

In the foreseeable future, it does not appear that this breach will be healed despite constant efforts by the Russians to effect a reconciliation. It would require a change in the international picture of major proportions to force either of these great Communist Parties into reuniting in behalf of its own national interests, but such an eventuality cannot be ignored.

Each of these Parties wants to place the onus for the split on the other. There is an additional complicated problem at present for the CPSU because at the present time it is virtually impossible for the CPSU to call an international conference of Communist Parties. The reason for this is that the Chinese have set up parties of their own, some of which are small in number, in countries where Communist Parties exist, and would insist that not only the official Communist Parties but also representatives of the split-off parties be represented. This is a dilemma which the CPSU, as of late November, 1963, had been unable to resolve.

The rift is also complicated by differences of national interests which basically involve spheres of influence in the world. It has important racial connotations as definitely stressed by the

Chinese leadership, involving potential alignments of the black and yellow races against the peoples of the white race. It involves a question of a schism in the world communist movement with possible communist "centers" in Peking and Moscow.

Potentially, the ramifications of this rift could involve all nations and continents of the world. Asia, Africa and Latin America are very much in the fore in connection with the struggle for spheres of influence. The Chinese have sloganized this into the three "A's," Asia, Africa and Latin America. The free world has an important stake in the outcome of this rift. It is difficult to conceive of the consequences to the free world, if a reconciliation of these communist powers comes about, which could result in combining their efforts to communize Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Yet, the CPSU considers the Chinese as a potential enemy and is fearful that the Chinese will effect a formal ideological break with the CPSU and the CPSU would move heaven and earth to prevent such a break. This is evidenced by the recent letter of Premier Khrushchev to Mao Tse-tung and the CCCPC of November 29, 1963.

The leadership of the CPC headed by Mao Tse-tung has made efforts to separate the leadership of the CPSU, with N. S. Khrushchev as its head, from the Soviet people. The CPC hopes that a new leadership will rise in the CPSU which would be more friendly to the Chinese position. The Chinese Party disagrees with the

present CPSU leadership on such issues as peaceful coexistence with imperialist states, particularly the United States. Similar sentiments against the leadership of Mao exist in the CPSU.

It is speculative as to whether or not a change of leadership in either of these Parties at this time could result in a renewal of party and state relations since this rift at the present time definitely goes far beyond the question of Party leadership.

The differences now appear to hinge on the question of whether the "center" of the international communist movement will be in Moscow or Peking; that is, who will influence the other Parties of the world and who will guide them in the development of Marxist-Leninist principles, in the struggle against capitalist imperialism and as to tactical means and methods.

The CPSU recognizes that there is support and appeal for the Chinese theoretical approach in many Parties of the world and is concerned with keeping these Parties within its sphere of influence and in avoiding further defections to a new "center" of communism in Peking.

In this struggle for support of socialist nations and Communist Parties, both the CPC and CPSU are constantly currying the favor of Party and socialist state leaders through "red carpet" treatment of leadership at Party conferences and through material support.

While the CPC and CPSU have ideological differences, they are still bound together to an extent by a general outlook-Marxism-Leninism. There are deep differences between them where their respective national interests are involved. As between ideology and national interests on crucial matters of state policy of these countries, at this time, national interests would appear to take precedence over ideology.

Why do the Russians try to reach out for a reconciliation with the Chinese?

1. They fear the effects of a split from the point of view of their national interests and they are concerned with their ability to continue to influence other socialist countries.
2. They are concerned with a possible loss of their power and influence in the world.
3. They are worried because the free world will take advantage of this struggle.
4. They consider the Chinese and their potential allies of the yellow and black races as potential enemies.

These overtures being made by the Russians to the Chinese are not being made by them because ideology is "the apple of their eye;" rather, these overtures are being made because the national interests of the USSR are involved and the power and influence of the socialist camp are weakened by the split.

The issues therefore are:

1. Which of these two powerful countries is potentially the more dangerous to our national interests, and how should the free world deal with each of them now and in the future, keeping in mind that the communist ideology does not think in terms of months or years but in terms of generations and centuries in the attainment of world socialism?

2. How can the free world take advantage of the opportunities offered by the split in the socialist camp by keeping both of these great communist powers off balance while at the same time always keeping in mind our national interests and pursuing tactics that would prevent a reuniting of these powers, which would also mean uniting the entire international communist movement, when they feel their own national interests are threatened?

A correct and positive position by the United States and its democratic allies to take advantage of this rift could result in curbing and defeating the advance of communism.

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